IndiaChina

Lord Palmerston’s maxim that “We have no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies. “Our interests are eternal and perpetual,” aptly describes the rapidly changing nature of India-China relations. Border strife has been the norm between the two nations for decades, shaping their strategic stances. However, October 2024 saw a minor thaw in relations, with New Delhi and Beijing coming to terms with a major agreement on patrolling protocols along the disputed LAC. This breakthrough led to a series of high-level diplomatic engagements in a carefully measured but pragmatic manner. More importantly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping engaged in direct bilateral talks at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, which was followed by a defense ministers’ conversation during the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting in November. The momentum then carried over into December in the form of the revival of the India–China Special Representatives Meeting, one of the important strategic platforms that had been asleep for five years. Although these developments do not eliminate deeply ingrained strategic distrust, they demonstrate a realist convergence; both nations are putting national interests ahead of ideological or historical animosities, embracing engagement rather than isolation as a way to manage competition and maintain regional stability.

In August 2025, Mr. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Affairs Minister, visited India after three years for the improvement of the relationship between the two nuclear and emerging regional states. During his stay in India, Wang Yi co-chaired the 24th round of the Special Representatives’ Dialogue on the Boundary Question between India and China with the National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval. He also had bilateral discussions with Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and met Prime Minister Modi. His visit after the 2020 Galwan clashes between India and China primarily concentrated on bilateral issues like border stabilization, economic cooperation, and regional security.

Therefore, Mr. Wang Yi’s visit to India marks a recalibration of ties based on a healthy and stable India-China relationship that serves the long-term interests of both countries.Secondly, the visit preceded PM Modi’s trip to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, his first visit in seven years, thereby laying the groundwork for stronger bilateral engagements. Thirdly, the visit came at a crucial time, as both countries face pressure from shifting US trade orientations, resulting in a push for pragmatic recalibration of ties and a strategic embrace on both sides.

However, during the month of February 2025, the Indian government ordered the erasure of 119 Chinese applications from the Google Play Store and, by June, announced a five-year tariff on imports of Chinese industrial inputs, which read as putting up a false facade of resistance against Beijing. However, the most compelling contrast comes from the diplomatic posture of India; calling for normalization with China while acting tough on them quite literally sounded like shouting at a neighbor while still borrowing sugar from them. Abandonment by America becomes evident for Modi; therefore, his choice of dialogue with Beijing reinforces both strategic weakness and duplicitous diplomacy. After many years during which warnings on Chinese expansionism were issued, the border may remain tense, but New Delhi seems determined to maintain good relations with China. This very decision of shaking hands underscored India’s inability to match China on political, strategic, and economic fronts. Meanwhile, Wang Yi’s parallel visits to Pakistan and Afghanistan highlight Beijing’s much broader regional priorities, reminding New Delhi just how far it is from being at the very center of China’s diplomacy.

The SCO Summit in Beijing saw the attendance of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who sought to mend ties between China and India after a period of tension; however, unresolved grievances cast serious doubts on the sustainability of this rapprochement. In the short term, ties may improve, since India has realized how great the necessity for cooperation with China has become in pushing its economic ambitions. This necessity to engage China more aggressively is driven especially in light of strained relations with the US under Trump’s steep tariffs. However, deep sensitivities on sovereignty and territorial integrity argue against any form of a sustainable relationship with China, beginning at the Sino-Indian border conflict and continuing through Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir to China’s stance on Tibet. Mutual suspicion over regional engagements also exists, fueled by Beijing’s relations with Pakistan and New Delhi’s burgeoning naval cooperation in Asia. Contrasting language in the Modi–Xi meeting readouts, with India stressing a “multi-polar Asia” while China glossed over it, further reflects differing perspectives on the regional order. Through the stopover of Modi in Japan before going to Beijing and participation in the SCO Summit while skipping China’s Victory Day celebrations, it shows India’s cautious attempts to consolidate strategic autonomy, moving closer to both China and Russia while not disturbing the US or the West. If there is not any forward movement on the substantive disputes, the tensions will resurface in time, making any sustainable rapprochement between India and China again very unlikely, even if large-scale conflict does not seem to be a strong possibility.

In short, India and China may converge temporarily out of pragmatism, but without resolving core disputes, trust will remain elusive. New Delhi’s balancing act between Beijing, Washington, and Moscow highlights both its ambitions and vulnerabilities. Lasting peace requires more than symbolic summits—it demands substantive compromises on sovereignty, security, and regional influence. Until then, rapprochement will remain fragile, an uneasy truce rather than a genuine transformation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are among the more than 20 world leaders attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, which is now the world’s largest regional grouping by population.

The Beijing-backed bloc will convene on Sunday and Monday in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin, bringing together a diverse range of power brokers from across Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2001, the summit has shifted focus over the past two decades from Central Asian concerns to global matters.

More significantly, the SCO has become an essential part of China’s “parallel international governance architecture”, said Eric Olander, editor-in-chief of the China-Global South Project.

As Beijing assumes the mantle of the world’s second-largest superpower, the SCO has created spaces for dialogue and cooperation outside “the US-led international system”, Olander told Al Jazeera.

While the summit in Tianjin is largely symbolic, it is a valuable chance to bring together global leaders and bureaucrats in a forum where they can share “common grievances”, Olander said.

With the gathering set to be overshadowed by United States President Donald Trump’s trade war against much of the world – including many traditional allies of Washington – attendees are likely to have even more common ground.

Guests range from Putin, who is wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court, to Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko and the likes of United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Many of the attendees also have longrunning rivalries and border disputes, such as India with Pakistan, India with China, Saudi Arabia with Iran, and Central Asia with both China and Russia.

“There are complex dynamics at play here,” Olander said.

“Underneath the happy family photo is a lot of looking over shoulders,” he said.

‘Swing states’

The SCO has expanded its membership in recent years to include such political heavyweights as India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus as full members, with Afghanistan and Mongolia joining as observers.

Official “dialogue partners” have also grown to 14 countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Qatar, Cambodia, Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

The summit will also notably feature Southeast Asia, a region that Olander likened to the “swing states” in the great power competition between the US and China.

Five heads of state will attend from the region, including Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim and Indonesia’s Prabowo Subianto, as well as ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn.

Observers will be closely watching the dynamics between Chinese President Xi Jinping and India’s Modi, who have not met in seven years, said Claus Soong, an analyst at Germany’s Mercator Institute for China Studies who specialises in China’s global strategy.

India has traditionally been an ally of Washington, but it was hit this week by Trump’s 50 percent tariffs as punishment for its ongoing purchase of Russian oil.

The White House says India’s trade is helping to keep Russia’s economy afloat despite international sanctions, and with it, Russia’s war on Ukraine.

But the shared threat of US tariffs has helped improve relations between New Delhi and Beijing, which had plummeted in 2020 over a deadly skirmish between border forces in the Himalayas.

The two sides reached a deal on their remote frontier in 2024, but their relationship has remained frosty.

Analysts say China sees Trump’s trade war as a chance to ease India away from US-led political and military blocs such as the QUAD, a strategic security forum that includes Japan and Australia in addition to India and the US.

“The key is to look at how China [characterises] its relationship with India after the visit and how the relationship improves between China and India,” Soong told Al Jazeera.

Even subtle changes in language by Beijing carry important diplomatic signals, he said.

The SCO summit will also mark the first meeting between Putin and Xi since the Russian leader met with President Trump in Alaska earlier this month to discuss the Ukraine war.

Analysts will be listening for similar changes in language for how the two leaders describe the China-Russia relationship.

In 2022, just weeks before Moscow invaded Ukraine, China and Russia signed a “no limits partnership”, and Xi has played a vital role in propping up Russia’s economy since then.

This is a point of contention for New Delhi, as China has done far more to support Russia economically since the war started, but has not faced similar sanctions from Trump.

With so many dynamics at play behind the scenes, Daniel Balazs, a research fellow at the China Programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said the most likely outcome of the SCO will be a joint statement from all attendees.

China and Russia are expected to push talking points such as their opposition to “unilateralism” – a coded reference to the US – but most of the language will be watered down to make it palatable to all.

“The symbolism of actually achieving a joint statement is more important than the content of the statement itself,” Balazs said.

“What I would expect is to have a statement which is a very non-controversial one, in order to get everybody on board,” he said.

“Security and stability, comments about improving economic cooperation, and a couple of comments about the importance of multilateralism,” Balazs said.

Police officers stand guard in front of the Tiananmen Gate, in an area temporarily closed to visitors due to construction, in advance of a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, China, on August 20, 2025 [Florence Lo/Reuters]

Following the summit, guests will have a full day in China before travelling to Beijing for a massive military parade on September 3 marking 80 years since the end of World War II in Asia.

That extra day – September 2 – will be prime time for bilateral meetings, the China-Global South Project’s Olander said.

“Who will meet who on the second of September – that’s something to pay attention to,” he said.

More heads of state are due to attend the parade the next day, with additions said to include North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico.

India’s Modi is not expected to stay for the parade, although analysts say he may send a representative, such as his foreign minister.

The Mercator Institute’s Soong said the expansive guest list for the summit and the military parade will give Beijing a boost to its public image, especially among the Global South.

“This is how China demonstrates its friend circle – who can be China’s friend and who is willing to endorse China’s narrative,” he said.