gambit

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

Ahead of flawed elections according to informed sources, New Delhi is engaged in high-level negotiations with the Myanmar military regime to establish new security measures, including cooperation of security firm. This measure aims to protect the security of Sittwe Port and ensure the rapid advancement of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. These discussions could pave the way for further collaboration between India and the junta, providing India with a strategic foothold in the region to counter China’s long-standing influence.

India’s strategic ambitions in Myanmar currently focus on critical mineral resources and regional connectivity. Although India publicly supports the military’s election plans, the reality is that it has no choice but to engage with resistance organizations, as all of its strategic projects fall within territories controlled by these groups. Restricted by China’s rare earth policies, India has been actively seeking alternatives.

According to a Reuters report, India may agree to collaborate with the United States to extract rare earth minerals from Kachin State for processing before exporting them to the U.S. It is reported that India has already made contact with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to explore and collect rare earth samples from the region and discuss the feasibility of establishing transport routes. In Dawki, Meghalaya, trucks line up beside a clear river, waiting for customs clearance. Hundreds of kilometers to the east, workers are laying tracks and pouring concrete for roads that may one day connect to Myanmar and beyond.

If India’s northeast is to become a true gateway to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, India and the U.S. must jointly develop a practical framework—an interconnected network integrating roads, railways, waterways, and fiber optics—to link “Act East” initiatives with the broader Indo-Pacific. Complex Challenges For India, the primary and most formidable challenge is to complete and remove bottlenecks from key cross-border transit corridors: the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (from Moreh to Mae Sot via Myanmar) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which connects Mizoram to the sea at Sittwe, then continues inland via river and road.

However, progress on these ambitious Indian strategic projects in Myanmar has been slow. The Modi government has shown signs of impatience, beginning limited engagement with ethnic armed organizations. Although the KIA controls key rare earth deposits in Kachin State, the region’s rugged terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure pose immense logistical challenges.

Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner has remarked that attempting to extract Myanmar’s rare earths under China’s watch, given the difficult topography and poor logistics, seems “completely insane.” The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, proposed as early as 2002, has progressed sluggishly. To date, only 70% of the highway has been completed. While the Indian and Thai sections were finished in 2023, progress reports on the Myanmar portion remain consistently delayed.

However, local sources reveal that Indian contractors have already begun construction in parts of Sagaing Region, operating under the protection of resistance forces and with tacit approval from the military. As for the Kaladan Project, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhawma stated on Wednesday that the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) is expected to be completed by 2027. The project will link southern Mizoram through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal. He added that the Indian central government is taking steps to extend the railway line to Hmawngbuchhuah in Lawngtlai district, Mizoram’s southernmost point on the border with Myanmar.

The Key Factor: The Upcoming Election According to the military’s Global New Light of Myanmar, India will send teams to monitor the war-ravaged Myanmar election scheduled for December. With parties opposing the military excluded or boycotting the poll, Western governments and human rights organizations view the election as an attempt by the military to consolidate control by paving the way for proxy rule.

India’s current push to secure its interests in Myanmar through security firms not only aims to advance U.S.-Myanmar relations and secure junta support to propel project implementation but also to gain a first-mover advantage and avoid post-election disruptions. It also serves to divert attention from India’s new arrangements in Myanmar amid the election focus. Should India cooperate with a U.S.-linked security firm, it would undoubtedly enhance its resilience to Myanmar’s conflict risks, further solidify the U.S.-India alliance, and boost coordinated efforts to address China’s challenges. However, this approach also carries the risk of provoking domestic backlash within Myanmar. 

General Atomics’ Gambit family of drones, with its common modular core ‘chassis’ concept, now has a sixth member optimized for air-to-surface missions, such as attacking hostile air defenses or enemy ships. The company is already eyeing international sales of the new Gambit 6, particularly in Europe, but it could also be of interest to branches of the U.S. military. The latest Gambit configuration underscores the growing pursuit of loyal wingman-type drones, also now often referred to as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), by armed forces globally.

Gambit 6 made its official debut yesterday at the annual International Fighter Conference in Rome, Italy. General Atomics’ Aeronautical Systems, Inc. division (GA-ASI) first unveiled the Gambit family back in 2022, at which time it included four designs. They were joined last year by Gambit 5, which is intended for carrier-based operations.

“The Gambit Series is a modular family of unmanned aircraft designed to meet diverse mission requirements, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; multi-domain combat; advanced training; and stealth reconnaissance,” according to a press release from GA-ASI. “It’s built around a common core platform that accounts for a significant proportion of the aircraft’s hardware, including the landing gear, baseline avionics, and chassis. This shared foundation reduces costs, increases interoperability, and accelerates the development of mission-specific variants like Gambit 6.”

“The multi-role [Gambit 6] platform is optimized for roles such as electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and deep precision strike, making it a versatile option for evolving defense needs,” the release adds.

An accompanying rendering, seen in part at the top of this story and below, shows a trio of Gambit 6s. Each one is depicted releasing several GBU-53/B StormBreaker precision-guided bombs, also known as Small Diameter Bomb IIs (SDB II).

The Gambit 6 design looks similar, at least externally, to General Atomics’ YFQ-42A. The YFQ-42A is one of two uncrewed aircraft currently under development as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program. The other is Anduril’s YFQ-44A, also known as Fury. General Atomics has previously confirmed that the YFQ-42A leverages prior work on an experimental drone called the XQ-67A Off-Board Sensing Station, which flew for the first time last year, and the Gambit family. The YFQ-42A made its maiden flight earlier this year, and a second example is now in flight testing.

General Atomics is also now among the companies under contract to develop conceptual CCA designs for the U.S. Navy.

“It’s best to think of Gambit 1 as optimized for advanced sensing, and represented by our XQ-67A OBSS [Off-Board Sensing Station] flying today,” C. Mark Brinkley, a spokesperson for General Atomics, told TWZ. “Gambit 2 is optimized for air-to-air combat and represented by our YFQ-42A, which has multiple airframes currently flying. Loaded with the proper weapons, a Gambit 2 could conduct a ground or surface strike as a multirole aircraft, but it is not optimized for that ground mission.”

“The Gambit series, including YFQ-42A, can be equipped with EW [electronic warfare] suites or EW-capable launched effects [uncrewed aerial systems],” Brinkely added.

The Gambit 3 design is primarily intended to act as a ‘red air’ adversary during training. The flying wing Gambit 4, so far the most visually distinctive member of the family, is focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. As noted, Gambit 5 is designed for carrier-based combat operations.

“Gambit 6 will be truly optimized for air-to-ground/surface operations. It might visually look like a Gambit 2, and perhaps the differences would be imperceptible to the casual viewer, as both would utilize RF [radiofrequency] and optical sensing,” Brinkley added. “But the mission systems inside Gambit 6 are fine-tuned specifically for ground/surface operations, missions in which General Atomics has developed deep experience over decades of ground/surface sensing and strikes. Gambit 6 could also be outfitted for an electronic warfare mission, for instance, or even naval strikes.”

Overall, “the idea is that Gambit 6 will be primarily looking down.”

Just like an air-to-air combat optimized CCA-type drone, an air-to-surface focused design would help friendly forces expand their coverage and capacity to perform relevant missions over one or more areas of the battlespace, while also reducing the risk to crewed platforms. As described, Gambit 6s seems geared to be particularly well-suited to the suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses mission sets, or SEAD/DEAD, to aid in clearing the way for follow-on operations.

The idea of CCA-type drones taking on these ‘downward-focused’ missions is not new. Though the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program is currently focused on air-to-air missions, the service has expressed interest in future air-to-surface strike and electronic warfare capabilities. Previous U.S. Marine Corps testing of Kratos’ XQ-58 Valkyrie has put particular emphasis on the ability to launch electronic warfare attacks as part of SEAD/DEAD missions conducted together with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. Earlier this year, the Marines confirmed that experimental work with the XQ-58 was transitioning into a full program of record with a clear eye toward a real operational capability. Air-to-surface missions are also a component of other CCA-type programs globally.

“Air forces throughout the world are looking to air-to-ground-capable CCAs to enhance operational capabilities and address emerging threats in a denied environment,” the General Atomics press release says. “Airframes will be available for international procurement starting in 2027, with European missionized versions deliverable in 2029. GA-ASI is building industry partnerships throughout Europe with the aim of providing sovereign capabilities for all its platforms.”

It has been pointed out that the schedule stated aligns particularly well with a German requirement for a CCA-type drone capable of air-to-surface missions. Last year, Airbus also unveiled a loyal wingman drone with a clear eye toward meeting German Air Force needs. Airbus and Kratos also announced a partnership earlier this year to supply a version of the XQ-58 to the Germans.

General Atomics has made clear that it is looking at multiple potential foreign sales opportunities with Gambit 6.

“Many international allies and partners have expressed interest in a CCA optimized for ground or surface strike. Gambit 6 was announced here in Rome on the first day of the International Fighter Conference, and the resulting interest and inquiry from attending military representatives has been great,” Brinkley, the General Atomics spokesperson, also told TWZ. “We look forward to continuing those discussions here this week. We absolutely intend to submit Gambit 6 for various emerging international opportunities.”

“Nothing would prevent the United States from procuring a Gambit 6 variant, fine tuned to American specifications,” he added.

“I don’t have any additional details to offer on Gambit 5 or the US Navy opportunity. We’ve been talking about the Gambit 5 concept for about 16 months at this point, since Farnborough 2024,” Brinkley also said when asked for a general update on the work the company is doing in relation to the Navy’s CCA effort. “There is no specific relationship between Gambit 5 & Gambit 6 at this time. The point of the Gambit Series is to quickly deliver affordable mass at scale, and to adjust to customer demands rapidly, and each of these aircraft does that, while also leveraging years of hard work and demonstrated success. “

As has been made clear in this story already, the market space for CCA-type drones has been steadily growing in recent years, and extends well beyond General Atomics. Just since September, Lockheed Martin’s Vectis and Shield AI’s X-BAT have joined the growing field of relevant designs. The jet-powered X-BAT is a particularly novel design, intended to take off and land vertically, as you can learn more about in great detail in this recent TWZ feature. In addition to the Gambit family, Vectis, X-BAT, and Anduril’s Fury, among other drone designs, are also being showcased at the International Fighter Conference this week. Also on the market now is Boeing’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat, originally developed for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Aviation Week just recently disclosed the existence of a new drone design from Northrop Grumman subsidiary Scaled Composites, referred to now simply as Project Lotus, which could be in the broad CCA category, as well.

The draft proposals for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan were approved during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2025. The final plan is expected to be adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026.

   China’s Five-Year Plans have been key strengths of China’s medium- to long-term economic and social development framework since the 1950s. Specifically, it has demonstrated strategic foresight, coordinated planning, and consistent implementation. The key strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan are its focus on high-quality development, particularly by achieving stringent climate targets such as peaking carbon emissions before 2030, while relying on strict monitoring mechanisms and advanced technologies. The plan also promotes innovation and digital transformation, focuses on integrated economic and military development, and leverages investment in research and development.

•  The strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, compared to previous five-year plans, are:

1)       Focus on quality development:

Compared to previous plans that focused on quantitative growth, the 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on quality, innovation, and sustainability rather than simply increasing productivity.

2) Integrated economic and military development:

The new plan systematically integrates scientific and technological innovations across the military and civilian sectors, enhancing national capabilities in a comprehensive manner.

3) Shifting towards a green economy:

The plan features new mechanisms for monitoring and managing carbon emissions, representing a significant shift from previous plans that were less focused on environmental issues.

4)       Investment in Research and Development:

The plan continues to boost investment in research, development, and innovation, a core strength that has enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements.

5) Balanced Development:

The plan seeks to achieve balanced development by supporting resource-rich regions, helping to reduce development gaps between different regions.

6) Investment Opportunities:

The plan opens new horizons for investors in areas such as carbon trading, offsets, and carbon asset management services, boosting national economic development.

Based on our understanding of the previous analysis, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) includes goals for economic and social development, focusing on technological self-reliance, high-quality development, and a real economy. The plan aims to be a crucial link towards achieving socialist modernization by 2035.