blowback

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has become the target of a sustained right-wing backlash after the US-based Jewish advocacy group included an organisation founded by slain right-wing figure Charlie Kirk in its online database on extremism.

The blowback escalated sharply on Wednesday after FBI Director Kash Patel announced that the bureau would sever ties with the ADL, accusing the prominent advocacy group of spying on Americans.

Tech billionaire Elon Musk’s post calling the ADL a “hate group” set off a firestorm of criticism online, forcing the group to scrap the “Glossary of Extremism and Hate”, which contained more than a thousand entries on groups and movements with connections to hateful ideologies.

But that has not subdued the backlash from conservatives – the base of the governing Republican Party.

So, what’s ADL’s online database, and why has it triggered MAGA (Make America Great Again) rage? And how has the nonprofit, which backed the crackdown on pro-Palestine campus protests by the administration of US President Donald Trump, ended up ruffling feathers across the political spectrum?

What is ADL?

The ADL is one of the oldest and most influential Jewish advocacy groups in the United States. It was founded in 1913 by members of the B’nai B’rith – Hebrew for “Sons of the Covenant”, a Jewish fraternal organisation – to counter anti-Semitism and prejudice against Jews.

The group, which calls itself “a global leader in combating antisemitism”, started with its original mission, “to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all”.

Over time, the ADL grew into a national force with branches spread across the country. It works closely with law enforcement agencies to train officers on identifying bias-motivated violence. It also develops programmes and resources on anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, partnering with schools, universities and communities.

Its monitoring of right-wing racist and anti-LGBTQ+ extremism also allowed it space within the US’s liberal Jewish community.

Since its inception, the ADL has argued that anti-Zionism could lead to anti-Semitism. But in the past couple of decades, the nonprofit has been pushing to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism, which conflates some criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. The ADL has also backed a controversial resolution passed by the US Congress that defined anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism.

The ADL is a well-resourced civil society group, with around $163m in revenue last year alone.

What caused the backlash against ADL?

The recent backlash was triggered after several influential right-wing social media accounts began posting screenshots of the ADL’s entry on Kirk’s organisation, Turning Point USA, in its “Glossary of Extremism”.

Kirk, who is credited with galvanising young voters for Trump, was assassinated last month.

Though Turning Point USA was not listed as an “extremist organization”, the nonprofit had documented incidents where its leadership and affiliated members had made “racist or bigoted comments”.

ADL’s entry on “Christian Identity” – which the nonprofit identified as an extremist theology that promotes white supremacy – also drew widespread criticism from right-wing influencers.

The ADL has long positioned itself as a nonpartisan watchdog. But conservatives have increasingly argued that it has become politically aligned with progressive causes, including the group’s partnerships with social media companies in moderating hate-speech policies.

Jonathan Greenblatt, the ADL’s CEO, has been accused of “weaponising anti-Semitism” to attack critics of liberal policies and of conflating right-wing populism with hate speech in the past.

In the weeks following Kirk’s assassination, the US has seen a wave of right-wing backlash against public figures who criticised him, with several commentators and journalists facing professional repercussions – including the brief suspension of a television show by comedian Jimmy Kimmel and the firing of Washington Post columnist Karen Attiah.

What was in ADL’s online database?

The ADL “Glossary of Extremism and Hate” was an online, searchable database launched in March 2022 by the organisation’s Center on Extremism. After the backlash from right-wing influencers, mostly from the MAGA camp, the ADL quietly moved to retire its database from the public.

The database contained more than 1,000 entries providing overviews and definitions of terms, symbols, slogans, tactics, publications, groups, and individuals associated with various extremist ideologies, hate movements, and related activities.

The resource covered a broad spectrum, including white supremacism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim bigotry, and extremism on the far right and far left. The glossary reportedly included groups like the Proud Boys, the Nation of Islam, the Oath Keepers, and others.

The ADL, in its statement, argued that “an increasing number of entries in the Glossary were outdated”, and “a number of entries [were] intentionally misrepresented and misused”.

The organisation further said that it wanted to focus on exploring “new strategies and creative approaches to deliver our data and present our research more effectively”.

The list is no longer publicly available on ADL’s site, and the original URL now redirects to the organisation’s home page.

How did Musk get into this?

The online smear campaign gained traction on Sunday night after billionaire Elon Musk started interacting with posts targeting the ADL.

Musk, who has more than 227 million followers on X, said, “The ADL hates Christians, therefore it is is [sic] a hate group.”

The ADL’s operations encourage murder, Musk said in another reply to a post on X, formerly Twitter, which he bought in 2022 after paying $44bn.

Musk’s attacks on the ADL still came as a shock to some. ADL’s Greenblatt has, in fact, praised Musk several times, including in 2023 for saying that X would block use of the pro-Palestinian slogan “from the river to the sea”.

That applause reportedly led to the resignation of a top ADL executive, Yael Eisenstat, who headed the nonprofit’s Center for Technology and Society, and the group lost several donors.

The ADL has also criticised Musk, saying X’s Grok chatbot promoted pro-Nazi ideology. The chatbot has praised Adolf Hitler, and called itself “MechaHitler”.

Former and current ADL employees have told Jewish Currents, a US-based progressive publication, that Greenblatt has repeatedly given a pass to Musk’s white nationalist sympathies if they help the ADL fight anti-Zionism – a pattern that reportedly escalated after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel’s now two-year-long war on Palestine, which has been dubbed genocide by an United Nations inquiry panel.

Then again, earlier this year, Greenblatt came to Musk’s defence after several Jewish lawmakers and civil society groups condemned Musk’s fascist-style salutes on stage during a speech after Trump’s re-election.

The ADL had posted: “It seems that Elon Musk made an awkward gesture in a moment of enthusiasm, not a Nazi salute.”

Why did the FBI snap ties with ADL?

The FBI’s decision to cut ties with the ADL also marks a sharp rupture in a partnership that had lasted for decades, at least since the 1940s, rooted in joint efforts to train law enforcement officers and monitor extremist threats across the US.

The move was announced by FBI chief Patel just 24 hours after Musk joined the online campaign, accusing the ADL of having “become a political front masquerading as a watchdog”.

Patel also targeted James Comey, an American lawyer who served as the director of the FBI from 2013 to 2017, during the era of US President Barack Obama.

“James Comey wrote ‘love letters’ to the ADL and embedded FBI agents with them – a group that ran disgraceful ops spying on Americans,” Kash said in a post on X, without offering any more clarity on this.

“That era is OVER. This FBI won’t partner with political fronts masquerading as watchdogs,” he concluded.

Why is ADL accused of pro-Israel bias and of suppressing pro-Palestinian activism?

The ADL has also faced criticism from left-wing activists for exhibiting a pro-Israel bias and suppressing pro-Palestinian activism, particularly in the wake of widespread protests across US campuses over the Gaza war that has killed more than 67,000 Palestinians and turned the Palestinian enclave into ruins.

The advocacy group has dubbed grassroots protests against Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza as “pro-Hamas activism”, while its CEO Greenblatt has described the Jewish groups calling for a ceasefire as “the ugly core of anti-Zionism”.

The ADL also publicly campaigned against campus protests last year, describing some demonstrations as “antisemitic hate rallies”. The group urged university administrators and government officials to take action against protest organisers, and pressured institutions to censor or discipline dissenting voices.

ADL’s Greenblatt praised Trump for withholding $400m in grants to Columbia University after campus protests and complimented the arrest of Columbia pro-Palestinian activist Mahmoud Khalil.

“We appreciate the Trump Administration’s broad, bold set of efforts to counter campus antisemitism – and this action further illustrates that resolve by holding alleged perpetrators responsible for their actions,” the ADL posted above a tweet about Khalil’s arrest.

The ADL’s collaboration with the US administration has dented its credibility, and several staff have resigned, citing the organisation’s overt emphasis on pro-Israel advocacy.

“The ADL has a pro-Israel bias and an agenda to suppress pro-Palestinian activism,” an ADL employee told The Guardian newspaper last year.

From the Cuban Missile Crisis to the war in Ukraine, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—and later post-Soviet Russia—have followed a dangerous pattern: miscalculation and misadventure followed by blowback. Both sides have pursued strategies and have plunged into involvements that backfired, damaged their own national interests, and destabilized international security. Unless this history is faced honestly, there is a risk that the two nuclear superpowers will continue repeating mistakes with unintended catastrophic consequences.

Early in the Cold War, American policy often failed to adjust to important shifts in Moscow. After Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, seasoned diplomats and analysts urged Washington to test whether the new Soviet leadership might pursue a less confrontational line. The father of U.S. containment policy, George F. Kennan, though no longer in government, warned against treating the Soviet Union as immutable and pointed to “evidence of flexibility, of experimentation, of responses to circumstance.” Charles E. Bohlen, who succeeded Kennan as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957, reported that the Kremlin’s new collective leadership appeared intent on consolidating power at home and sought a breathing spell from confrontation.

Scholars such as the influential Sovietologist Philip Edward Mosely argued that Khrushchev’s language of “peaceful coexistence” reflected more than mere propaganda. Within the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Harold Stassen, who served as the president’s special assistant for disarmament from 1955 to 1958, pressed for serious consideration of Soviet arms-control proposals. All of these voices were basically brushed aside by an increasingly hawkish and rigid national security establishment. The costs of that rigidity became clear in the confrontation that brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous moment of the Cold War, demonstrating the dangers of poor judgment and misperception and the terrifying reality of deterrence through Mutual Assured Destruction. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev misjudged U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s resolve, believing he could install nuclear missiles in Cuba without provoking confrontation. In Washington, officials failed to appreciate how threatening their deployment of 15 intermediate-range Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey and 30 more in Italy as part of NATO strategy appeared to Moscow. Khrushchev’s move was in part a direct response to this strategic imbalance.

The crisis ended when Moscow agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba in return for a public pledge by the U.S. not to invade Cuba and a secret agreement to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. What one side saw as deterrence, the other viewed as provocation—and the result was near catastrophe. Although Khrushchev won concessions, the perception of a humiliating retreat fatally weakened him, contributing to his removal from power in 1964.

In the U.S. the outcome was remembered mainly as a triumph. Kennedy’s public image as a tough leader capable of standing up to Soviet aggression was markedly enhanced following the earlier failed U.S. invasion of Cuba—the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle—which had raised doubts about his leadership capabilities. But the deeper lesson—that both sides had stumbled into a confrontation that could have destroyed humanity—was only partly appreciated. The crisis led to the establishment of a teletype “hotline” between the White House and the Kremlin to prevent future miscommunications and to a series of arms control agreements. But Moscow embarked on a massive nuclear buildup over the next quarter-century. Moreover, Cuba’s security was strengthened, solidifying its position as a Soviet client state—just 90 miles from the U.S.—emboldened to eventually intervene militarily, overtly and covertly, in conflicts in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Afghanistan, 9/11, and NATO’s Enlargement

Afghanistan was another defining episode. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981, later acknowledged that U.S. aid to Afghan rebels secretly began months before the Soviet invasion in 1979, with the deliberate aim of luring Moscow into a costly conflict. When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December of that year, the effort escalated dramatically. Billions in U.S. and Saudi funds flowed through Pakistan’s intelligence services to arm the mujahideen, and the introduction of Stinger missiles shifted the balance of the war. President Ronald Reagan expanded it into the largest-ever U.S. covert operation.

The conflict became what Mikhail Gorbachev called a “bleeding wound,” hastening the Soviet Union’s collapse. But the blowback was horrific. Afghanistan became a crucible of jihadist radicalization, producing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and ultimately drawing the U.S. into two decades of war following the terrorist group’s September 11, 2001, attacks on the U.S. homeland.

The Cold War’s end was expected to usher in a new era of peace and stability. Instead, decisions taken in the 1990s and 2000s deepened mistrust. As former Warsaw Pact states sought NATO membership, Washington viewed enlargement as stabilizing. Russian leaders, however, saw it as betrayal, claiming they had been given assurances during German reunification that NATO would not move eastward.

Boris Yeltsin protested, Vladimir Putin internalized the grievance, and resentment hardened. Washington assumed Russia was too weak to resist. But enlargement, intended to consolidate peace, became a seed of future confrontation.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the most consequential blunder of the post–Cold War era. Putin underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and misjudged the resolve of the Western alliance. Far from fracturing, NATO was revitalized. Ukraine’s identity was strengthened, and severe Western sanctions isolated Russia from the West, making it heavily reliant on China for trade, technology, and diplomatic support.

The invasion also ended Europe’s longest tradition of neutrality. Finland joined NATO in 2023. Sweden, neutral since the Napoleonic era, followed in 2024–25. Instead of curbing NATO, Russia’s war of aggression produced NATO’s largest expansion in decades and transformed the Baltic Sea into what has frequently been called a “NATO lake” owing to control by the alliance of almost the entire Baltic coastline and key strategic islands.

Nearly eight years to the day before Russia’s invasion, Henry Kissinger had warned in a March 2014 op-ed article in the Washington Post that “Ukraine should not join NATO” and should instead become a neutral East-West bridge, while U.S. and European policy should avoid feeding Russia’s fears that its security or existence was under threat. That advice was ignored. Encouraged to believe it could partner with NATO and eventually be accepted as a member of the alliance, Ukraine became a flashpoint of confrontation and the stage for the largest and most devastating war in Europe since World War II.

In short, from the brinkmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the proxy war in Afghanistan, from NATO expansion to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, actions born of misjudgment have resulted in outcomes neither side intended—with each insisting the other is solely to blame.

Russia’s authoritarian rule suppresses serious discussion and debate. But in the U.S. and allied nations, the aversion to meaningful discourse is harder to excuse. Democracies owe their citizens an honest accounting of past errors to learn from them, not to justify or excuse Moscow’s behavior.

If policymakers keep turning from history, the dangerous dynamic of blunder and blowback will continue—with risks no generation should be asked to bear.

In the last two years, as well as its war on Gaza and increasingly violent occupation of the West Bank, Israel has launched attacks on Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The most recent attacks on Syria were launched this week, going so far as to hit the country’s Ministry of Defence.

Of course, the Israelis point to their justifications for the attacks on Syria – principally, in Israel’s telling, to defend the Syrian Druze minority. A US-brokered ceasefire has taken effect, but whether it holds remains to be seen.

In Lebanon, Israel claimed it wanted to stop the threat posed by Hezbollah.

The attacks on Iran, it said, were to end that country’s attempt to build a nuclear bomb.

And in Yemen, Israel’s bombing was a response to attacks from the country’s Houthi rebels.

Explanations aside, the question becomes whether the Israelis can continue to act in a manner that has many around the world, and particularly in the Middle East, seeing them as the aggressor.

Impunity over relationship-building

The Israeli argument is that all these conflicts – and the more than 58,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza – are necessary because Israel faces an existential battle that it has no choice but to win.

The Israeli government, in its current far-right makeup, at least, does not seem to care if its neighbours do not like it. Rather, it seems to care that they fear it.

And as the most powerful military force in the region, with the backing of the most powerful military force in the world, the Israelis feel that they can largely do what they want.

Israel is taking advantage of a weakening international order and a moment of flux in the way the world is run, particularly with the United States under President Donald Trump openly moving towards a more transactional foreign policy.

Western countries had previously attempted to maintain the idea of a liberal international order, where institutions such as the United Nations ensure that international law is followed.

But Israel’s actions, over decades, have made it increasingly hard to maintain the pretence.

The world has been unable to stop Israel from continuing its occupation of Palestinian land, even though it is illegal under international law.

Settlements continue to be built and expanded in the West Bank, and settlers continue to kill unarmed Palestinians.

Human rights organisations and international bodies have found that Israel has repeatedly violated the rules of war in its conduct in Gaza, and have accused the country of committing genocide, but can do little more.

Taking advantage

No other power wants, or feels strong enough, to take on the mantle the US is arguably vacating.

And until the rules get rewritten, it increasingly feels like might equals right. Israel, the only nuclear power in the region, is taking advantage.

Supporters of Israel’s actions in the past two years would also argue that those predicting negative consequences for its attacks have been proven wrong.

The main perceived threat to Israel was the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, and the argument was that these countries and groups would strike Israel severely if the latter went too far in its attacks.

Israel did escalate, and the reaction from Iran and its allies was, in many cases, to choose to stand down rather than risk the total devastation of their countries or organisations.

Iran did attack Israel in a way that the country had not experienced before, with Tel Aviv being directly hit on numerous occasions.

But some of the worst-case scenario predictions did not take place, and ultimately, the direct conflict between Israel and Iran lasted 12 days, without the outbreak of a wider regional war.

In Lebanon, Israel can be even happier with the result.

After an intensified bombing campaign and invasion last year, Hezbollah lost its iconic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and much of its military capacity, as well as some of its power in Lebanon. It is now, at least in the short term, no longer much of a threat to Israel.

Israeli hubris?

Israel seems to believe weak neighbours are good for it.

Much as in the case of Gaza and the occupied West Bank, the perception is that there is no real need to provide an endgame or next-day scenario.

Instead, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has demonstrated, Israel can maintain chaos as far away as possible from its borders, as long as it maintains security inside.

But the current situation in Syria is an interesting example of what can go wrong, and when Israeli hubris may go too far.

Netanyahu has maintained that Syria south of Damascus must remain demilitarised.

His first argument was that this would ensure the safety of the Druze minority, thousands of whom also live in Israel and demanded that Israel protect their brethren following violence involving Bedouin fighters and government forces.

The second argument was that the new authorities in Syria cannot be trusted because of the new leadership’s past ties to groups such as al-Qaeda.

After Israel’s bombing and some US prodding, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa agreed to withdraw government security forces from the Druze-majority province of Suwayda on Thursday, warning that while Israel “may be capable of starting a war”, it would “not be easy to control its consequences”.

By Friday, it had become clear that thousands of Bedouin – and other tribal forces – were headed to support the Bedouins in Suwayda after reports of massacres against them.

Al-Sharaa, presumably with the acquiescence of Israel, announced that Syrian government forces would deploy in Suwayda to end the ongoing clashes there, and a new ceasefire was declared on Saturday.

As it happens, the presence of a strong state with control over its territory may be more effective than allowing anarchy to reign.

Blowback

If anything, Israel’s actions in Syria will increase its regional isolation and raise eyebrows among countries that could have been seen as potential allies.

Saudi Arabia has emphasised its support for the new Syrian government, and Israel’s behaviour will add to Riyadh’s feeling, post-Gaza, that any “Abraham Accords” normalising ties cannot happen in the short term.

For many countries in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf, Israeli hegemony, especially with the rise of messianic far-right forces in its government, leads to war, expansionism, chaos, and security risks.

And Israel’s short-term military gains run the risk of blowback elsewhere.

Iran’s military capabilities may have been heavily damaged in its war with Israel, but Tehran will likely seek to shift tactics to undermine Israel in other ways in the years to come, while improving its defences and potentially focusing on achieving a nuclear weapon.

As mentioned, the opinions of regional countries may not be the highest priority to the current crop of Israeli leaders, as long as they continue to have US support.

But that does not mean that – in the long term – Israel will not increasingly face blowback for its actions, both diplomatically and in terms of its security.

Domestically, constant wars, even if beyond Israel’s borders, do not provide a sense of long-term security for any populace.

The percentage of military reservists answering call-ups has already reportedly been decreasing. In a country where the majority of the military personnel are reservists who have jobs, businesses and families to take care of, it is difficult to maintain a permanent military footing indefinitely.

That has contributed to an increasing divide in Israel between a dominant ultranationalist camp that wants to fight first and ask questions later, annex Palestinian land, and force regional acceptance through brute force, and a more centrist camp that – while perhaps not prioritising alleviating Palestinian suffering – is more sensitive to international isolation and sanctions, while attempting to hold on to a “liberal Zionist” image of Israel.

Should current trends continue, and the ultranationalist camp retain its dominance, Israel can continue to use its military power and US backing to yield short-term successes.

But by sowing chaos around its borders and flouting international norms, it is breeding resentment among its neighbours and losing support among its traditional allies – even in the US, where public support is slipping.

A more isolated Israel can do what it wants today, but without a long-term strategy for peace, stability and mutual respect with its neighbours – including the Palestinians – it may not be able to escape the consequences tomorrow.