Al-Qaeda

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

Agreements between the group and local leaders have reportedly already been signed in several towns across Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, in which the group agrees to end its siege in return for the communities agreeing to JNIM rules, taxes, and noncooperation with the military.

Drew Binsky, who has visited all 195 countries in the world, has returned to a war-torn state widely regarded as the most dangerous place to visit – and says it’s “scary and unpredictable”

A fearless globe-trotter, who has explored all 195 nations across the world, has made a return journey to a conflict-ridden territory widely considered the planet’s most perilous destination.

YouTuber Drew Binsky ventured to Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital in East Africa, where he claims there are “no rules” in the bustling metropolis, which is regularly monitored by heavily-armed militants.

Whilst filming a piece for his channel at Mogadishu’s scenic Lido Beach, he outlines how firearms are omnipresent: “There are so many AK-47s around me, I’m not joking you when I say this.

“There’s six guys on that side of the beach, there’s a pocket of six guys right there on the ground, there’s a dude walking towards me in a blue shirt. I feel like I’m just going to be stuck in crossfire.

“All eyes are on me right now and we should probably get the f*** out of here. The longer we stay here, the more attention we get.”

It’s a sensible measure, as in August 2024, the Al Qaeda-linked terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab executed a devastating assault on the beach that claimed 56 lives and wounded over 200 people.

In the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office recommends against all journeys to Somalia.

However, the locals Drew encounters on the beach maintain that the gravest threats are behind them, and that “everyone should come to Mogadishu.”

Dozens can be seen enjoying themselves, with young men playing football and many women in full traditional Islamic dress paddling in the crystal-clear waters while surrounded by AK-47-toting men.

The well-travelled Arizona teacher describes Mogadishu as “one of the most intense places I’ve ever been,” saying it’s “scary and unpredictable,” and quite possibly “the most dangerous city on Earth.”

Drew explained how, during his initial journey to Mogadishu, he was flanked by an enormous security detail.

“Every time I left my hotel,” he said, “I was accompanied by eight soldiers with AK-47s and I was hardly able to leave the car and explore.”

During his second visit, he travelled with a far more discreet protection squad, carrying handguns instead of assault rifles.

Yet Drew emphasises that the capital remains in a constant state of vigilance.

Checkpoints appear every few miles along each main thoroughfare, whilst the impact of more than three decades of conflict has reduced whole streets to little more than debris.

Five years following his initial visit, he notes that the security circumstances on the ground remain unchanged: “All the checkpoints, all the barricades, to enter buildings, the barbed wire fences. Just the hostility that you feel on the streets.”

Conservative estimates place the fatality count from Somalia’s numerous intersecting wars since 1991 at beyond 500,000.

The wounds of perpetual warfare are visible throughout Mogadishu, Drew observes: “Bombings, kidnappings, and street battles have turned everyday life into a battleground.

“To make matters worse, Mogadishu’s lawlessness extends offshore, where Somali pirates hijack ships along global trade routes.”

Despite the risks, Drew found his time in Somalia exhilarating: “Nothing gets my adrenaline rush going than being in a place like Mogadishu,” he says.

Parakou, Benin – Until a few years ago, the sound of Iliyasu Yahuza’s matte black Qlink X-Ranger 200 motorbike would bring the neighbourhood children out into the street. They would abandon their games and rush to the roadside, waving excitedly and shouting his name.

Now, they scatter and hide.

And it is not just the children; across all walks of life in the remote villages of northern Benin, the rumble of a motorbike engine now stirs fear and terror as it’s become synonymous with armed fighters roaming the region.

For Yahuza, a 34-year-old trader who has spent years navigating the bumpy roads between remote farms and local markets, the switch “cuts deep”.

His motorbike was once a symbol of success in his community in rural Brignamaro, some 500km (310 miles) away from the capital city, Porto-Novo. Now, he feels it’s a liability that marks him as a potential threat.

“People have begun seeing me as a member of the armed group launching attacks in this region,” Yahuza told Al Jazeera.

“I no longer feel secure riding a motorbike.”

In recent years, motorcycles have become the preferred mode of transport for armed groups operating not only in Benin, but across the Sahel from Burkina Faso to Mali to Niger. Fighters on motorbikes have changed the face of conflict, experts say.

According to a 2023 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), motorbikes are “one of the most widely trafficked commodities in the Sahel”, deeply embedded in the region’s criminal economy, and “indispensable to the violent extremist armed groups” operating in West Africa’s borderlands.

In the process, public sentiment towards these vehicles, and those who drive them, has shifted, with a shadow now cast over daily riders like Yahuza.

Pride before the fall

Life in Brignamaro used to move to a different rhythm years ago, Yahuza remembers. Children’s laughter chased the echo of his Qlink X-Ranger – at that time a rarity in these parts – as his peers looked on in admiration and delight.

The shift began in 2023, when approximately 12 suspected armed fighters, all mounted on motorbikes, attacked his community.

They terrorised the village and kidnapped a known businessman. Throughout that year, similar incidents rippled across northern Benin’s provinces, from Alibori to Tanguita and Materi. The pattern was always the same. Armed men would arrive fast, strike hard, and disappear into the landscape on their versatile machines.

As a businessman dealing in soya beans, maize, and groundnuts, Yahuza had chosen his motorbike for purely practical reasons. The vehicle could navigate the rough terrain connecting scattered farming communities, and would last longer than ordinary motorcycles.

“That was the major reason I chose the motorbike. Also, it lasts longer than an ordinary motorcycle and for that, it takes about two years before I change one,” he explained.

But more recently, practicality has given way to paranoia.

Security forces regularly stop Yahuza, demanding documentation and explanations. Even minor disagreements with neighbours can take on sinister undertones.

“The locals in my community are raising eyebrows at me. I could remember having a minor misunderstanding with a colleague, and he was quick to profile me as a militant,” he recounted.

Weapon of choice

Much like the Toyota pick-up trucks that became synonymous with ISIL (ISIS) fighters in Syria and Iraq more than a decade ago, motorbikes have emerged as the tactical vehicle of choice for Sahelian fighters.

Groups like al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), with an estimated 6,000 fighters forming the region’s most heavily armed rebel force, have perfected the art of motorcycle warfare. Fast, nimble, and easy to conceal, these bikes enable hit-and-run tactics perfectly suited to the Sahel’s vast, sparsely populated terrain.

In early 2025 alone, JNIM fighters launched a coordinated campaign of attacks: 30 soldiers killed in Benin, more than 50 people near Kobe in Mali, 44 worshippers in Niger’s Fambita, and 200 troops at Burkina Faso’s Djibo military outpost. In each assault, motorbikes provided the speed and surprise that made these attacks possible.

“Motorbikes have become a critical mobility tool for terrorists, including bandits across the Sahel,” explained Timothy Avele, a counterterrorism expert and managing director of Agent-X Security Limited.

The appeal is multifaceted, according to the expert. “Concealment becomes easier” when fighters can scatter and hide their vehicles. The Sahel’s challenging terrain, with desert expanses, dense forests, and mountainous regions, “favours two-wheeled transport over larger vehicles”. Perhaps most importantly, the economics work in the fighters’ favour.

“Another key factor is the lower fuel cost using motorbikes for their operations and mobility compared to, say, Hilux trucks,” Avele added.

Built to last

In the workshop of Abdulmajeed Yorusunonbi in Tchatchou, some 510km (317 miles) from Porto-Novo, the 31-year-old mechanic swears by the durability of these machines. As a local mechanic, he sees firsthand why armed groups favour these vehicles over ordinary motorcycles.

“The only simple fault motorbikes sometimes get is flat tires. It’s only on rare occasions that you will see the engine needing a repair. Their durability is second to none,” Yorusunonbi noted.

This reliability makes them perfect for rebel operations, where mechanical failure could mean capture or death. But it also means that once acquired, these vehicles remain in the hands of armed fighters for years, multiplying their tactical value.

Like many in his trade, Yorusunonbi has developed his own informal screening system to filter out unscrupulous clients. He watches for telltale signs – customers who pay in cash without haggling, those who avoid eye contact, or groups arriving together. But in a region where poverty is widespread and many legitimate customers share these same traits, certainty remains elusive.

The psychological impact on communities has been profound. Yaru Mako, 41, a farmer in Kerou, 482km (300 miles) from Porto-Novo, told Al Jazeera he now forces himself to believe that whoever drives a motorbike has affiliations with the armed groups. “Because in all the cases of attacks we have had and heard, the perpetrators always used motorbikes. Mostly, they are two persons per motorbike,” he explained.

This suspicion has real consequences. In early 2024, Yahuza found himself detained for hours by soldiers in Kerou who questioned his identity and motives. Only his local connections saved him from a worse fate.

“I was lucky that I know many people who properly identified me as an innocent person,” he said.

Junaidu Woru, a Tanguita resident, voices what many now believe: that non-fighters should abandon motorbikes entirely for their own safety.

“Innocent people should avoid using those bikes for their own safety. Because when an attack happens, and an innocent person drives around the area at that particular time, they can be mistaken for a militant,” he warned.

The underground economy

The flow of motorbikes into the hands of armed groups follows complex routes through West Africa’s porous borders. Benin, once a major importer of motorcycles, saw its official trade disrupted in 2022 when new taxes were imposed, including higher VAT rates and import levies.

Before that, motorcycles were exempt from import duties. The government later imposed customs levies to boost domestic revenue, a fiscally driven move. However, the policy spurred increased smuggling through border hotspots like Malanville and Hillacondji, raising security concerns about untracked vehicles potentially reaching criminal groups in the Sahel.

According to traders in northern Benin, these measures have pushed the trade underground, with buyers increasingly sourcing bikes from neighbouring countries and smuggling them across borders. The motorcycles enter through various routes; from Nigeria across the northern border into Niger, or through Beninese territory, where they are loaded onto pirogues and transported upstream on the River Niger.

In Parakou’s markets, Zubair Sabi sells motorbikes like Yahuza’s Qlink X-Ranger 200 for about 900,000 CFA francs ($1,590). Some models fetch more than one million CFA ($1,770), while others sell for as low as 750,000 CFA ($1,330), prices that put them within reach of well-funded armed groups.

“As a businessman, all I’m interested in is selling my goods,” Sabi said, before acknowledging the moral complexity of his position. “I don’t mind verifying the identity of the customer before selling to them. But I can’t really say who exactly is buying the bikes or what they are using them for.”

Like other traders, Sabi has implemented informal checks, asking for identification, noting suspicious bulk purchases, or refusing sales to unknown customers arriving in groups. Yet, he admits, these measures are far from foolproof.

Governments across the Sahel have responded with blunt instruments, with at least 43 motorcycle bans having been recorded since 2012, according to GI-TOC. Yet these sweeping restrictions often hurt civilians more than armed fighters, cutting off rural communities from markets, clinics and schools.

For traders like Yahuza, the situation presents an impossible dilemma. Without his motorbike, he cannot reach the remote farms where farmers sell their produce. With it, he risks being mistaken for the very criminals terrorising his community.

“It’s not just about riding any more,” he reflected. “It’s about what people think when they see you on it.”

This article is published in collaboration with Egab.

An al-Qaeda affiliate earlier claimed responsibility for ‘coordinated and high-quality attacks’ in the country.

Mali’s armed forces have killed 80 fighters in response to a series of simultaneous and coordinated attacks on military posts across the country, according to a video statement released by the military.

“The enemy suffered significant losses in every location where they engaged with the security and defence forces,” Souleymane Dembele, the army’s spokesperson, said in a special bulletin broadcast on the armed forces’ television channel, as visuals of fallen rebels, their weapons, motorbikes, and vehicles were displayed.

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) earlier claimed responsibility for “coordinated and high-quality attacks”, saying it had taken control of three barracks and dozens of military positions.

Mali’s armed forces said the attacks took place in seven towns in the central and western regions of the West African country.

The incidents bore the hallmarks of other recent operations by the group, which has conducted similar assaults on military positions in Mali and Burkina Faso.

Mali, governed by a military government since 2020, has for more than a decade fought violent groups linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, while contending with a longer history of Tuareg-led rebellions in the north.

The attacks on Tuesday targeted Diboli in western Mali near the border with Senegal, and the nearby towns of Kayes and Sandere. There were also attacks in Nioro du Sahel and Gogoui, northwest of the capital Bamako near the border with Mauritania, and in Molodo and Niono in central Mali, “all struck by shellfire”, the army’s statement said.

Residents and a local politician confirmed the attacks in at least four towns.

“We woke up in shock this morning. There’s gunfire, and from my house I can see smoke billowing towards the governor’s residence,” one resident in the city of Kayes said.

The person described the gunfire as “intense” while another reported sheltering at home while the assault raged on.

Elsewhere, a local political official wrote on Facebook that “the region of Nioro woke up in shock” and that the towns of Nioro, Sandare and Gogui had been targeted.

The men provided financial assistance to al-Shabab fighters who attacked the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi, killing 21 people.

A Kenyan court has sentenced two men to 30 years in prison for aiding al-Shabab fighters who were behind a deadly attack in Nairobi that left 21 people dead in 2019.

On Thursday, Judge Diana Kavedza Mochache ruled that Hussein Mohammed Abdile and Mohamed Abdi Ali played a critical role by helping two of the attackers escape from a refugee camp using fake identity cards. The pair also provided financial assistance to the group.

“Without financiers, facilitators and sympathisers, terrorists cannot actualise their activities,” the judge said during sentencing, stressing that their support made the attack possible.

“The convicts may not have physically wielded the weapons that caused harm to the victims, but their facilitation directly enabled attackers who were heavily armed with guns, grenades and suicide vests,” Kavedza said.

“This was not a crime with isolated harm; 21 lives were lost,” she added, acknowledging statements from survivors about their ongoing psychological struggles.

“The emotional scars of the attack run deep,” she said.

Abdile and Ali were convicted last month for facilitating and conspiring to commit a “terrorist” act. Both men denied the charges and now have 14 days to appeal.

Background to attacks

The assault on the upmarket DusitD2 complex in the Kenyan capital began on January 15, 2019, when gunmen stormed the compound and opened fire.

Security forces launched an operation that lasted more than 12 hours. The government later announced that all the attackers had been killed.

Al-Shabab, an armed group linked to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility, saying the assault was in retaliation for then-United States President Donald Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

The siege was the first major attack in Nairobi since the 2013 Westgate mall massacre, which killed 67. In 2015, al-Shabab also attacked Garissa University, killing 148 people.

Since Westgate, high-end venues in the capital have ramped up security, including vehicle and pedestrian checks.

The DusitD2 complex, like Westgate, catered to wealthy Kenyans and foreign nationals, groups often targeted by al-Shabab.

The Somalia-based group has repeatedly struck inside Kenya, aiming to force the withdrawal of Kenyan troops from Somalia, where they are part of a regional force battling the rebellion.

Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki, who is wanted by the US, challenges Houthi dominance of Arab and Muslim world’s resistance movement.

The leader of al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch has targeted US President Donald Trump and tech billionaire Elon Musk over United States backing for Israel’s ongoing war on the Gaza Strip and its besieged Palestinian population.

“There are no red lines after what happened and is happening to our people in Gaza,” said Saad bin Atef al-Awlaki in a half-hour video message that was spread online Saturday by supporters of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemeni branch of the armed group.

“Reciprocity is legitimate,” he said.

Al-Awlaki’s video message also included calls for so-called lone wolves to assassinate leaders in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf Arab states over the war, which has decimated Gaza, killing at least 54,772 Palestinians over the past 20 months.

The message featured images of Trump and Musk, US Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, as well as logos of Musk’s businesses – including electric carmaker Tesla.

Born in 2009 from the merger of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi factions, AQAP is completely distinct from Yemen’s Houthi rebel group, which controls most of the country and agreed to a ceasefire with the US earlier this month.

AQAP grew and developed amid the chaos of Yemen’s war, which has pitted the Houthis against a Saudi-led coalition backing the government since 2015.

Al-Awlaki became the group’s leader in 2024, replacing predecessor Khalid Batarfi, who died that year.

He already has a $6m US bounty on his head, having, as Washington puts it, “publicly called for attacks against the United States and its allies”.

Though believed to be weakened in recent years due to infighting and suspected US drone strikes killing its leaders, the group had been considered the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda still operating since the US killing of founder Osama bin Laden in 2011.

United Nations experts estimate AQAP has between 3,000 and 4,000 active fighters and passive members, claiming that it raises money by robbing banks and money exchange shops, as well as by smuggling weapons, counterfeiting currencies and conducting ransom operations.

The Houthis have previously denied working with AQAP, though the latter’s targeting of the Houthis has dropped in recent years, while its fighters keep attacking the Saudi-led coalition forces.

Now, with its focus on Israel’s war on Gaza, AQAP appears to be following the lead of the Houthi group, which has launched missile attacks on Israel and targeted commercial vessels moving through the Red Sea in solidarity with Palestinians under Israeli fire.

“As the Houthis gain popularity as leaders of the ‘Arab and Muslim world’s resistance’ against Israel, al-Awlaki seeks to challenge their dominance by presenting himself as equally concerned about the situation in Gaza,” said Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemen expert with the Basha Report risk advisory firm.

“For a national security and foreign policy community increasingly disengaged from Yemen, this video is a clear reminder: Yemen still matters,” he said.

From Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan, US wars left not freedom, but ruin. In a recent book, co-authors Noam Chomsky and Nathan Robinson expose how American elites sell violence as virtue, using the myth of democracy to justify endless war.

Human rights groups say politicians have been forcibly disappeared in recent days

Mali’s military government has dissolved all political parties after accusations from rights groups that opposition figures have been arrested.

Assimi Goita, who seized power in two army coups in 2020 and 2021, validated the decision after it was broadcast to Malians in a televised statement on Tuesday.

The parties were disbanded after demonstrations this month, demanding the country returned to democratic rule.

Protesters gathered on May 3 and 4, carrying placards with slogans reading, “Down with dictatorship, long live democracy,” in a rare public rebuke of the military government, which had promised to hold elections in 2022.

A national conference held in April recommended extending Goita’s presidency until 2030, drawing condemnation from opposition figures and human rights groups.

In response to another protest that had been planned on Friday, the military government issued a decree suspending all political activities across the country.

The move forced opposition groups to cancel the demonstration, and the government has now tightened its grip further.

The clampdown has coincided with reports of disappearances of opposition figures. Human rights groups said several politicians have been forcibly disappeared in recent days.

On Thursday, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said Abba Alhassane, the secretary-general of the Convergence for the Development of Mali (CODEM), was “arrested” by “masked gunmen”.

That same day, El Bachir Thiam, the leader of the Yelema party, was reportedly seized by unidentified men in Kati, a town outside the capital.

On Tuesday, a CODEM member speaking on condition of anonymity told the Reuters news agency that the party had lost contact with Abdoul Karim Traore, a youth leader, and feared he too had been abducted.

Malian authorities have not commented on the reported arrests.

Goita first seized power in August 2020 amid escalating attacks from armed groups affiliated with ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).

In July 2020, protests against the former civilian government were violently repressed with at least 14 people killed during a crackdown by security forces.

The military then ousted the elected government, citing its failure to tackle the armed groups.

In December last year, HRW reported that Malian soldiers alongside Russian Wagner Group fighters “deliberately killed” at least 32 civilians and burned more than 100 homes in central and northern Mali.