We know from statements issued by the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, the 2026 National Assembly, and the State Department that August 1 was set as the launching date of a roadmap leading to a political transition in Venezuela.
The incentives for the various actors to accelerate or delay this political negotiation process are clear. The Venezuelan interim government (as the State Department statement refers to it) will have an interest in delaying the process as much as possible to prolong its time in power and preserve the current state of affairs. For the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, it offers a window of opportunity to gain relevance and demonstrate its ability to accelerate the agenda that Dinorah Figuera announced before any other actor. The Trump administration will want this process to proceed at a pace that does not jeopardize its control of the country until the elections (and perhaps even after). It is in María Corina Machado’s best interest for the situation to develop in a way that allows her to gain control and create the conditions for her to be the opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential elections.
Other, less prominent actors will try to influence the process. We have already seen AD leader Henry Ramos Allup trying to position himself, for example, to defend Machado’s participation, as did Henrique Capriles, and other voices will surely emerge along those lines in the coming days. Those aspiring to a new National Assembly and new elections for governorships and mayoralties will certainly also try to influence the process.
But let’s turn to the most relevant conversation, with just under two weeks until August 1: what could be the institutional path to achieving this political transition through free elections?
A new National Electoral Council (CNE)
Since the elections are administered by the National Electoral Council, it would seem that the first step should be, precisely, to elect a new CNE board.
Choosing a reliable one could be the first challenge. What has been offered previously is insufficient: a majority of three or four people close to or allied with the government and one or two “independents” or those close to the opposition. A board is needed that complies with Article 296 of the Constitution, composed of “five people not affiliated with political organizations.”
This CNE must begin with an essential task: the purging and updating of the Permanent Electoral Registry. It is crucial that Venezuelans abroad be allowed to vote and that the necessary logistical and diplomatic conditions be established to make this possible.
A new Supreme Court
Under the Venezuelan constitutional system, the decisions of the CNE can be subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). Directly by the Electoral Chamber. Indirectly by the Constitutional Chamber.
Therefore, the appointment of new justices to both the Electoral Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber is necessary at the outset of this process. Article 263 of the Constitution clearly outlines the requirements for becoming a Supreme Court Justice. In May of this year, the Supreme Court Law was amended to increase the number of justices from 20 to 32. The Constitutional Chamber (the most important chamber) is composed of seven justices. This increase means that 12 new justices must be elected. Furthermore, a significant number of the current 20 justices are of retirement age.
This, as with the CNE, is debated and decided in the National Assembly, whose majority is controlled by Jorge Rodríguez. It would have to be a decision by chavismo, or the result of a political rupture, for the political rights of the non-government-controlled population to be considered both when electing CNE board members and when appointing Supreme Court justices. This relates to the next point.
Restoring civil and political rights
For several years, Venezuela’s main political parties and actors were subjected to confiscation and persecution through various administrative measures, such as those issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic to disqualify candidates, and even judicial measures to replace the boards of directors of opposition parties like COPEI, Primero Justicia, and Acción Democrática. It is essential to compile a report detailing all these measures and establish an action plan to reverse them, allowing political parties and leaders to operate and return to Venezuela.
Then, reforms must be made to those laws and administrative regulations that, long before January 3rd, restricted freedom of expression and the conditions for holding elections, such as the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, the Simón Bolívar Law, and the Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The same must be done with respect to the resolutions of the CNE that have restricted political and civic participation in the electoral processes. Furthermore, cases where it has been argued that the 2026 Amnesty Law is inapplicable, such as that of María Corina Machado, must be reviewed.
Given that the incentives of the actors in this process are not and will not be aligned, as shown above, it is crucial to immediately establish timelines for the phases of the process, beginning August 1. This will allow us to gauge the level of commitment among the parties to move forward with the transition.
There are certainly conditions attached to this process that are not public, and that will shape its phases and pace. However, we must begin a public conversation about ideas for addressing this crucial phase of political life starting August 1.