This July 14th appears to be one of the key days in the political process that Venezuela has been experiencing since January 3rd. Early in the morning, the 2015 National Assembly announced a joint work agenda starting August 1st “as a roadmap to promote stability, democracy, and national recovery.”
The announcement was retweeted by Marco Rubio from his personal account on X. Then, Jorge Rodríguez, president of the 2026 National Assembly, announced the start of “a joint roadmap with former members of the 2015-2020 National Assembly.”
At the time of writing, there has been no statement from María Corina Machado.
As we stated just over a week ago, if the Trump administration does not want Machado to lead the process toward free elections, and the last clear signal it sent was to involve the 2015 National Assembly, perhaps that is the path to follow.
It is now clear that this is the Trump administration’s preferred route.
But, as we also pointed out, this does not mean that Machado cannot be a candidate. What we can infer from these recent events is that the Trump administration prefers that the institutional path be built between the 2015 National Assembly and the 2026 National Assembly.
The election of a new CNE is urgent, and the process of selecting TSJ justices must be resumed. It is also necessary to restore control of political parties to their legitimate leaders.
From a legal standpoint, it is difficult to argue that the 2015 National Assembly is the current National Assembly of Venezuela. Yes, it was the last legitimately elected National Assembly, held under minimal conditions of electoral integrity, and it is the last state institution explicitly recognized by the US until January 3, 2026. On March 11, the Department of Justice filed a letter with the Southern District Court of New York, along with a letter from the State Department, stating that “the United States recognizes Delcy Rodríguez as the sole Head of State, empowered to act on behalf of Venezuela.”
Therefore, the value of the 2015 National Assembly lies in this: it was the last parliament elected in a minimally competitive election and has the political backing of the Trump administration to advance the institutional path toward transition.
The discussion about the institutional path is urgent because reaching elections will take time. First, minimum conditions of integrity must be created to hold an acceptable election. Second, the return of Machado and the other political exiles must take place. Third, the campaign must take place in an environment acceptable to the president, without any way of measuring what the president might understand as an acceptable environment for elections. This is especially true after the earthquakes.
Transparency Venezuela and the Andrés Bello Catholic University mapped out what is needed to achieve these conditions of electoral integrity. That work has already been done. Now, the setting of deadlines for these processes is yet to begin. The election of a new National Electoral Council (CNE) is urgent, and the process of selecting Supreme Court justices must be resumed. It is also necessary to restore control of political parties to their legitimate leaders.
Jorge Rodríguez said this week that reconstruction was the only priority and that it was immoral to focus on renewing the Supreme Court and the CNE, since what mattered now was attending to the survivors. But all of this is even more urgent due to the precarious constitutional situation of the presidency. Right now, the 30-day period within which elections must be held is running, given Nicolás Maduro’s absolute absence. It sets a very bad precedent for this process to begin with such a massive violation of the Constitution.
For all these reasons, we need to start talking to answer this question: what is the institutional path that will be followed for the Venezuelan transition?