Six months after Nicolás Maduro’s military removal by US forces, the political situation in Venezuela can be summarized very schematically.
Under the 1999 Constitution, on July 3, Maduro’s absence became absolute. Under this assumption, Article 233 of the Constitution states that presidential elections must be held within 30 consecutive days following July 3. Meanwhile, Delcy Rodríguez remains as acting president, filling Maduro’s absolute absence.
The elections would be the final part of the third phase of the plan that Trump administration officials and Marco Rubio in particular often mention.
However, we know that elections will not be held in the short term, as there is a consensus that a new National Electoral Council (CNE) and conditions of electoral integrity are necessary. That is because, in theory, the first two phases outlined by the US government—stabilization and recovery—should first be completed.
So, how can the Venezuelan opposition push for free elections someday?
To do so, Venezuelans must first determine who within the Venezuelan opposition should lead the charge.
Naturally, it would be María Corina Machado. However, there is evidence that the Trump administration does not want her to be that lead person. I am not saying the White House does not want Machado to be a presidential candidate, but that everything seems to suggest that the Trump administration does not want her to lead the process toward those elections. Which is a different matter.
No political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US.
Therefore, if the US government does not want Machado to lead the political process that will lead us to free elections, who is the US government backing? It has only given two indications so far.
One, somewhat farcical even in terms of US foreign policy, was that Trump invited Enrique Márquez, a satellite political leader, to the State of the Union address. It was a message to say that the US president does not want Machado leading the process that would lead to free elections.
The other was the return of Dinorah Figuera, president of the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, to Venezuela, at the invitation of the US, where she was received at the airport by US embassy personnel. Upon arrival, Figuera met with Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett and National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez. In this way, the Trump administration emphasized its vision of who would be the opposition’s interlocutor.
Finally, after the earthquakes, there was a third, even clearer message: to disavow Machado’s trip to Venezuela.
At this point, it is worth remembering that at this moment in Venezuelan political history, no political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US. Like it or not, the result of the January 3rd operation is that we find ourselves under a tutelage of both the regime and the opposition.
Given this reality, where should we push for the Venezuelan transition?
The 2015 National Assembly, with US support, could dedicate itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly.
If the Trump administration doesn’t want Machado to lead the process toward free elections, and the last clear signal it sent was to involve the 2015 National Assembly, perhaps that’s the path we should follow.
From what we understand, the idea of involving the 2015 National Assembly, through 6 or 12 of its members, is to work with the 2026 National Assembly to build an institutional roadmap leading to elections, specifically the appointment of a new board for the CNE, and perhaps the formation of a new Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).
It is known that this option generates deep distrust in Machado, who attempted to thwart it, apparently unsuccessfully, with the Panama Manifesto, in which she declared, among other things, that she should lead the negotiations with the interim regime. However, it seems that if a definitive break with the Trump administration is not desired, Machado and the 2015 National Assembly should reach agreements.
The first could be that the 2015 National Assembly, with the support of the US government, dedicates itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly. Naturally, Machado’s opinion would be taken into account at all times. This should lead to the appointment of a new CNE board and a new TSJ. Then, the electoral legislation and administrative regulations would have to be reformed to create conditions that allow for truly free elections. Machado’s opinion would also be taken into account at all times.
Finally, a primary election could be held within the opposition, allowing opposition voters to express their views. It is likely that Machado will be re-elected as the opposition candidate. This way would open an acceptable option for those who control this process: an electoral path around the 2015 and 2026 National Assembly elections, and then presidential elections in which, predictably, María Corina Machado will win.