The recent use of a laser directed energy weapon to down an aerial object near El Paso, Texas, and its chaotic aftermath, highlight the policy challenges and impediments the U.S. still faces in defending against drone incursions over the homeland. These are major national security concerns and a topic The War Zone has been reporting on for years.
The latest chapter in the ongoing saga of U.S. efforts to begin countering small drone incursions over the country began last week. Reacting to what they thought was a drone operated by a Mexican drug cartel, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel reportedly used a laser directed energy weapon to take down the object, which multiple reports say turned out to be a Mylar balloon. The system, which Reuters identified as a AeroVironment LOCUST laser counter-drone weapon, was lent to CBP by the U.S. Army. This is the first publicly known instance of an object being shot down over the U.S. with a laser in an operational setting.
You can read more about LOCUST and how it works in our story here.
The use of the LOCUST came as the FAA was working on “a safety assessment of the risks the new technology could pose to other aircraft,” The New York Times reported. “F.A.A. officials had warned the Pentagon that if they were not given sufficient time and information to conduct their review, they would have no choice but to shut down the nearby airspace.”
The tug of war between the Pentagon and FAA – which led to a shutdown of airspace over the nation’s 23rd largest city – is a glaring example of the convoluted and conflicting authorities the U.S. relies on to deal with the increasing threat posed by drones.
The FAA did not respond to our request for comment. We also reached out to U.S. Northern Command and AeroVironment for comment.
However, safety concerns about using directed energy weapons, and especially kinetic ones, to take down drones in the U.S. have been a major factor in why they aren’t employed in this role.
A little less than a year and a half ago, officials at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which has coordinating authority for counter-drone efforts in the U.S., said the use of such weapons was not yet on the table. The reason is that they can create dangerous or otherwise serious collateral effects that are not a concern in a war zone.
“The biggest thing right now is the impact of the laser when it moves beyond its target,” NORTHCOM Deputy Test Director Jason Mayes said of laser directed energy weapons for counter-drone use. “You know, how far is it going? What’s that going to do? How long does the laser need to remain on target before it begins to inflict damage and so on, right?”
Mayes, speaking to a small group of reporters, including from The War Zone at Falcon Peak 2025, a counter-drone experiment at Peterson Space Force Base in October 2024, also raised questions about whether the laser beam could impact aircraft or even satellites passing by, as well as things on the ground like “hikers up on a hill.”
The military has been working to mitigate those concerns, Mayes proffered at the time.
“I think that we could get to a point where we have approval for that here in the homeland,” he posited.
The video below shows a test of a U.S. Navy shipboard laser directed energy weapon capable of being employed against drones.
USS Portland (LPD 27) tests LWSD laser system
It is unclear when the approval to use laser counter-drone weapons came or how extensive such permissions have been. We also don’t know if the LOCUST system, understood to have been stationed at nearby Fort Bliss, was sent there under a pilot program established under the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It calls for at least four military installations to be used to speed up the development of counter-drone efforts at bases across the country. The measure includes systems “capable of destroying or disabling a small unmanned aircraft by means of high-powered microwave, laser, or other similar technology.”
Fort Bliss is also home to a significant portion of the Army’s air defense units, which are increasingly charged with the counter-drone mission. The base is also a major hub for border security operations, which the U.S. military often conducts in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, as well.
The future domestic use of laser counter-drone weapons remains an open question, but the NDAA pilot program gives the military additional authorities under existing statutes to at least test them. Still, as we have frequently noted, a confusing and often competing set of federal laws governing the use of counter-drone systems domestically impacted the ability to defend against these threats. The El Paso situation is a case in point of how challenging this can be.
NORTHCOM has authority over the troops and equipment, in this case a laser system, to take down the drones. However, federal laws limit where and when the military can use these systems, which is a large reason why CBP was involved.
In advance of the U.S. hosting the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympic Games, the Trump administration pushed to expand counter-drone authorities. Congress granted that when it passed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Under a federal law known as 124n, “the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ, including CBP, have limited authority to mitigate drone threats domestically to protect covered facilities or assets,” Scott Shtofman, Vice President & Counsel, Regulatory Affairs for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), told us. “That authority has been extended and expanded, under the Safer Skies Act of the NDAA, to certain certified state, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies operating under federal training and oversight.”
Still, “it’s not a blanket nationwide shoot down power and only applies in defined threat situations,” he added.
Meanwhile, under another federal statute commonly referred to as 130(i), “DoW can mitigate drone threats to protect military installations and missions inside the U.S., but it does not have general domestic airspace policing authority,” Shtofman posited.
However, the Pentagon is working to expand its counter-drone capabilities.
In January, the recently created Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401 announced updated guidance for counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations. The move empowered installation commanders “to take decisive action to protect military facilities, assets, and personnel within the homeland,” according to a press release at the time.
“The guidance, signed by the Secretary of War on December 8, 2025, streamlines and consolidates existing policies for detecting and mitigating UAS under the authority of 10 U.S. Code § 130i,” the release added, referring to another one of the laws governing domestic counter-small drone efforts. “It addresses the direct and growing threat posed by the proliferation of inexpensive and capable UAS. This updated framework provides commanders with the expanded authority and flexibility needed to dominate the airspace above their installations.”
Among other things, the new rules eliminate restrictions on defense perimeters that reduced installation commanders’ abilities to protect against drones.
“The previous ‘fence-line’ limitation has been removed, giving commanders a larger defensive area and greater decision space to protect covered facilities and assets,” the new rules state.
In earlier reporting, we noted that not all installations were considered “covered” to take down drones. The new rules permit service secretaries to determine which installations should be covered, to increase the number.
Beyond that, the Pentagon is now allowed to share “UAS track and sensor data among interagency partners, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). It also allows for the use of trained and certified contractor personnel as C-sUAS operators.”
“Every commander has the inherent right to self-defense,” the Pentagon told us. “The Department of War will defend its personnel and assets from illicit UAS activity in accordance with our authority under title 10 Section 130i, and the standing rules for the use of force.”
In addition to the numerous drone incursions over U.S. installations that we have frequently covered, cross-border cartel drone operations are a chronic issue, and we have been calling attention to the growing dangers they pose for many years now. Controversy over the El Paso incident was magnified after the White House insisted that the U.S. shot down a cartel drone flying over the border, which was later contradicted by the reporting that it was a mylar balloon.
Regardless of what it was, small drones remain a clear and present danger to the U.S. Whether new technology and additional authorities to use them will make a difference is an open question.
Update: 8:31 PM Eastern –
A U.S. official responded with answers to some of our questions.
- The limit on the distance installation commanders can counter drones is the capability of their counter-UAS systems and the ability to coordinate with local authorities and communities.
- No sites have been chosen yet for the counter-drone pilot program.
- To his knowledge, the El Paso incident was the first time a directed energy weapon had been used against illicit drones in the homeland.
- There are no statutory preclusions to using directed energy weapons against drones in the homeland.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com