For decades, Pakistan was the Afghan Taliban’s closest supporter. Islamabad helped the Taliban rise in the early 1990s, seeking “strategic depth” in its rivalry with India. Pakistan welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, with then-Prime Minister Imran Khan describing it as Afghans “breaking the shackles of slavery.”
However, the alliance soon frayed. Islamabad found the Taliban less cooperative than anticipated, particularly regarding insurgent groups that targeted Pakistani territory. Border clashes, insurgent attacks, and fragile ceasefires have repeatedly disrupted trade, security, and civilian life along the rugged frontier.
Escalating Tensions: From Ceasefires to “Open War”
Tensions have been mounting since late 2025, following deadly cross-border clashes in October that killed dozens of soldiers. Ceasefires mediated by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia temporarily eased the situation, but attacks persisted.
The latest escalation came after Pakistan cited “irrefutable evidence” that Afghan-based militants were behind recent attacks and suicide bombings targeting Pakistani forces. Air and ground strikes targeted Taliban posts, headquarters, and ammunition depots in multiple sectors, with both sides reporting heavy losses. Pakistan’s defence minister labeled the situation an “open war.”
The Trigger: Attacks by Afghan-Based Militants
Pakistani security sources linked several recent attacks to militants operating from Afghan territory. These include seven incidents since late 2024, the most deadly being the Bajaur district attack that killed 11 security personnel and two civilians, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamabad argues that Taliban inaction allowed the TTP and Baloch insurgents to operate freely, while Kabul denies the allegations.
Who Are the Pakistani Taliban?
The TTP, formed in 2007, is a coalition of militant groups mainly active in northwest Pakistan. It has carried out attacks on markets, mosques, airports, military bases, and police stations, occasionally gaining territory along the Afghan border and deep inside Pakistan. Its most notorious act was the 2012 attack on schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai, who later received the Nobel Peace Prize.
The TTP has historically fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and used Pakistani territory as a base for operations. Pakistan’s previous military offensives against the group, including the 2016 operation, temporarily reduced attacks but did not eliminate the threat.
Diverging Interests: Pakistan vs. Afghan Taliban
Historically, Pakistan’s support for the Taliban was based on shared strategic interests. Today, those interests are diverging:
- Pakistan’s Perspective: Taliban inaction against TTP and Baloch insurgents threatens Pakistan’s internal security. The continued use of Afghan territory as a safe haven fuels Islamabad’s justification for strikes.
- Afghan Taliban Perspective: Pakistan allegedly harbors fighters from Islamic State
Analysis
Pakistan’s sudden escalation against the Afghan Taliban is a striking example of how strategic calculations can shift dramatically when security threats directly affect domestic stability. Historically, Islamabad viewed the Taliban as a partner a way to secure influence in Afghanistan and counterbalance India. Today, that calculation has reversed: the Taliban are now seen as enabling militants who attack Pakistani territory, undermining the very national security Pakistan sought to protect.
From my perspective, this is as much about perception as capability. Pakistan’s frustration reflects not just the TTP threat, but the Taliban’s unwillingness or inability to control insurgent groups. Even if the Taliban are technically powerless to fully rein in these groups, Islamabad interprets every attack as a breach of trust, eroding decades of strategic alignment.
Another important dimension is geography and asymmetric warfare. Despite Pakistan’s overwhelming conventional advantage its larger military, air force, and nuclear arsenal the border region’s terrain favors smaller, agile forces like the Taliban. History shows that superior firepower does not always translate into quick resolutions in insurgency-heavy zones, and repeated airstrikes may inflame, rather than contain, cross-border tensions.
This conflict also signals that Pakistan’s security calculus is increasingly domestic-focused. While in the past its Afghan strategy prioritized influence over immediate risk management, the TTP’s growing attacks within Pakistan have shifted the priority toward internal stability. From this angle, the strikes are a defensive measure designed to project strength and send a warning to the Taliban that safe havens for insurgents will no longer be tolerated.
Finally, the regional implications are worrying. Repeated clashes threaten civilian populations, disrupt trade, and could destabilize Afghanistan’s already fragile governance structures. Mediation by third parties may temporarily ease hostilities, but without long-term mechanisms to hold both sides accountable, the cycle of violence is likely to continue.
In short, Pakistan’s attack reflects the intersection of historical strategy, modern security threats, and the practical limits of alliances. It highlights that even long-standing partnerships are fragile when domestic security imperatives collide with regional politics—and that conventional power advantages may not guarantee quick solutions in border conflicts dominated by asymmetric warfare.
With information from Reuters.