For years, the legal fight over Venezuelan assets abroad turned on one basic question: who does a foreign government recognize as the person entitled to act for Venezuela? In the United States, that question once pointed toward the opposition-led structure tied to the 2015 National Assembly and, before that, Juan Guaidó. After Guaidó fell, Dinorah Figuera became the head of what remains of that 2015 Assembly, the Comisión Delegada. Through that entity, the opposition continued trying to preserve control over foreign assets such as Citgo and funds held abroad.
Reuters reported in 2023 that the new opposition leadership under Figuera moved to oversee foreign assets, including Citgo and gold held at the Bank of England. During the Biden administration, the State Department likewise said in January 2023 that it would continue to recognize the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.
That is no longer the key US posture. In March 2026, the US government formally told a federal court in New York that the United States is recognizing Delcy Rodríguez as the “sole Head of State, able to take action on behalf of Venezuela.” The filing relied on the State Department’s March 5 statement normalizing relations with Venezuela under Delcy Rodríguez and on President Trump’s public remark that the United States had “formally recognized” the Venezuelan government. That is the legal pivot. Once Washington says who it recognizes as Venezuela’s head of state, US courts and agencies do not get to run their own foreign policy.
This is why the debate about Delcy’s legitimacy under Venezuelan domestic law, while politically important, is not the decisive question in New York, Delaware, Texas, or Washington. The majority of Venezuelan lawyers believe that Delcy Rodríguez is illegitimate. I am not arguing otherwise. However, under US constitutional law, recognition of a foreign sovereign belongs exclusively to the President of the United States.
The recognition question has shifted sharply in Delcy’s favor, even if some operational steps are still controlled by licenses, sanctions, and pending litigation.
In the case Zivotofsky v. Kerry, decided in 2015, the US Supreme Court said exactly that: the President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition, and the nation must speak with “one voice” on that subject. Older US Supreme Court cases say the same thing in slightly different words. The practical result is simple: if the President recognizes one person as the one entitled to act for a foreign state, US courts (federal and state courts) generally follow that determination.
So, does that mean Delcy now controls Citgo? As a matter of US recognition law, the answer is yes, in the sense that authority now runs through the person Washington recognizes, not through whichever Venezuelan faction lawyers or commentators prefer. But there is one important practical wrinkle: Reuters reported that Delcy’s team still needs US Treasury clearance to take over Citgo’s US subsidiaries, and Citgo also remains entangled in ongoing court proceedings. In other words, the recognition question has shifted sharply in Delcy’s favor, even if some operational steps are still controlled by licenses, sanctions machinery, and pending litigation.
England works in much the same way. In the Bank of England gold litigation, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that recognition of foreign heads of state is a matter for the executive, not the courts. The Court called this the “one voice principle”: English courts must accept the executive’s recognition position as conclusive. That is why the courts treated Juan Guaidó as the recognized head of state when the UK government recognized him. The logic is straightforward. English judges do not decide who truly won the constitutional struggle in Caracas. They follow the position taken by His Majesty’s Government.
If London does the same, the same logic will likely carry over to Venezuelan assets in England, including the gold dispute.
That is also why there is no serious legal basis for pretending that personal politics can change the answer. A lawyer may dislike Delcy Rodríguez. Another may dislike Dinorah Figuera. Someone else may prefer Edmundo González. None of that changes the recognition rule. On this issue, legal analysis is supposed to be colder than politics. If Washington recognizes Delcy, US institutions will generally treat Delcy as the person entitled to act for Venezuela. If London does the same, the same logic will likely carry over to Venezuelan assets in England, including the gold dispute. The law here is not about who we admire or dislike. It is about who the executive power of the US recognizes. Nothing else.
One last point matters. I have not found any official UK statement, as of now, publicly recognizing Delcy Rodríguez in the same clear way the United States has. A January 2026 statement by the UK Foreign Secretary referred to her as “acting President” and urged democratic steps, but it did not announce the kind of formal recognition statement the UK issued for Guaidó in 2019.
So the US conclusion is already here. The English conclusion depends on whether London takes that additional recognition step.