porcupine

People often perceive Canada’s defense posture as closely aligned with the United States and integrated into continental and alliance structures such as NORAD and NATO. This focus has led to a lack of discussion about small-state autonomy or asymmetric denial in Canadian strategic debates. The porcupine state concept suggests that a nation can deter aggression not by matching the adversary’s military strength or relying primarily on external assurances, but by making it difficult, costly, and politically unattractive to attack or coerce. While this idea is frequently applied to Finland, the Baltic states, or Taiwan, it is rarely considered in the context of Canada. This article examines whether Canada might become or be regarded as a porcupine state. The question is timely given renewed competition among great powers, emerging vulnerabilities in the Arctic, rising grey-zone pressures, and uncertainties about the future capacity of the United States. The following analysis explores the concept, explains why it is not typically associated with Canada, evaluates the feasibility of Canada adopting its features, and considers the strategic benefits of doing so.

The Notion of a Porcupine State

A porcupine approach prevents violence by denying it rather than punishing it. It does not attempt to match an adversary’s skills; instead, it focuses on imposing costs, being resilient, spreading out, and defending territory. Examples include Finland’s Cold War-era territorial defense system, the Baltic states’ adoption of comprehensive defense concepts after 2014, and current discussions about Taiwan’s need for mobile, survivable, and affordable assets. These regimes utilize distributed sensors, resilience, mobility, and civilian preparedness to make aggression slow, unpredictable, and unattractive, even to stronger foes. The porcupine model assumes that outside assistance may be delayed or limited, thereby favoring autonomous denial capabilities that increase the cost of attack, both politically and operationally.

Why the Porcupine Concept Has Not Been Applied to Canada

The porcupine framework has not been adopted in Canada because the country has consistently relied on the United States and tends to follow others historically. Perron demonstrates that Canada often aligns with the United States, prioritizing alliance cohesion over developing independent capabilities. This strategic culture supports a defense stance centered on interoperability rather than autonomous denial. Hughes et al. explain that Canada takes a defensive and community-oriented approach in the Arctic, whereas the United States adopts a more aggressive and confrontational stance. They also emphasize that the region has been chronically under-resourced, with limited infrastructure and forces such as the Canadian Rangers, who are neither prepared nor equipped for high-intensity conflict. These limitations oppose what a porcupine strategy demands—strong territorial defense and resilient infrastructure. Economic data further supports this dependence. According to Solomon and Fetterly, the United States shoulders 97.6 percent of the NORAD burden, while Canada accounts for only about 2 percent but receives 36 percent of the benefits. Canada’s contribution to bilateral research and development is less than half a percent, indicating it invests minimally in building its own capabilities. Long-term underinvestment erodes any independent stance. Skogstad and Compton observe a considerable decline in equipment and readiness, with fighter numbers decreasing from over 240 in 1990 to just 78 in 2019. The Department of National Defence has also cut its capital budget by 16 percent annually. These institutional, cultural, and fiscal trends elucidate why Canada has not been regarded as a porcupine state. Could Canada Become a Porcupine State? Despite these constraints, Canada could adopt selective elements of a porcupine strategy under specific conditions. The most plausible domain is the Arctic, where gaps in surveillance, infrastructure, and military presence create vulnerabilities that even modest investments could address. Hughes et al. highlight the need for improved northern resources and domain awareness to reduce these vulnerabilities. A porcupine-oriented shift would require enhanced long-range detection and interception, especially given Canada’s limited capabilities until new F-35A fighters become operational. Addressing procurement and capital spending challenges is similarly essential, since sustained denial capabilities require correcting the chronic budgetary lapses identified by Skogstad and Compton. Adopting porcupine elements would also require Canada to assume a more balanced share of continental defense responsibilities by addressing the disproportionate reliance on U.S. investments identified by Solomon and Fetterly. While political and fiscal constraints are significant, partial adoption is feasible if Canada prioritizes resilient infrastructure, territorial denial capabilities, and long-term procurement reform.

Why It Would Be Beneficial for Canada

A selected porcupine approach could be beneficial for Canada’s strategy. Enhancing autonomous denial capabilities will increase Arctic independence and give Canada greater control over its territory in a region that has been underinvested and lacks infrastructure. A more balanced and resilient continental defense posture would arise from reduced operational reliance on swift U.S. action. Improving Canada’s autonomous capabilities would help address longstanding issues identified in fiscal and capacity assessments, making Canada more credible within NORAD and NATO. Therefore, adopting porcupine principles would enhance Canada’s resilience, resolve burden-sharing problems, and bolster its reputation as a trusted security partner.

Strategic Implications

If Canada adopted some of a porcupine’s defensive stance, especially in the Arctic, its strategic role would significantly change. A more resilient, denial-focused approach would support the ongoing modernization of NORAD by reducing Canada’s reliance on U.S. assets for monitoring, early warning, and interception. Enhancing our own capabilities, whether in long-range sensing, air and maritime domain awareness, or strengthening our northern infrastructure, would improve continental security by making it more reliable and redundant, especially as threats from Russia and China in the air and at sea become more complex.

If Canada invested in denial capabilities, it would also shift the balance of power within NATO’s northern security environment. Even modest enhancements to Canada’s Arctic readiness would facilitate reinforcements to Europe, strengthen the north flank, and close the capability gap identified by allies over recent years. This would bolster Canada’s credibility within NATO and better align with the growing expectations for countries to play a significant role in defending the High North. Adding porcupine-like elements would also reduce the likelihood of strategic issues with the United States. Differences between Canada’s and the U.S.’s Arctic positions, especially Washington’s tendency toward forward-leaning, preemptive strategies, can be exploited by adversaries. Greater self-sufficiency for Canada would shrink these gaps, lower political tensions, and simplify decision-making during crises.

Conclusion

Actors don’t usually think of Canada as a porcupine state because its security strategy has long relied on working with the United States, focusing on interoperability, alliance solidarity, and collaborative frameworks rather than self-sufficient territorial defense or autonomous denial. This strategic mentality, combined with a lack of investment and gaps in capabilities, has led many to believe that Canada depends on others to repel threats rather than strengthening its own defenses. However, the evidence shows that this approach is not fixed. If the political climate is favorable and investments are appropriately directed, Canada could develop traits of a porcupine state, especially in the Arctic, where its vulnerabilities are greatest. Even minor improvements could bring significant strategic benefits.

Enhancing infrastructure in the north, creating more resilient, dispersed sensing networks, and establishing reliable territorial denial systems would not only increase Canada’s independence but also reduce the burden on U.S. assets for continental security. This would help address long-standing gaps in NORAD, making the command less vulnerable to rapidly changing threats from the air and sea. A stronger, more independent Arctic posture would also bolster NATO’s credibility on its northern frontier. It would lessen NATO’s reliance on European reinforcements and demonstrate that Canada is prepared to bear a fairer share of the costs.

A customized porcupine approach, one that complements, not replaces, cooperation among allies, would make Canada stronger, improve crisis management, and offer more strategic options at a time when the world is becoming increasingly unstable. Most importantly, it would show that Canada is serious about its objectives and can be relied upon for the long term, thereby enhancing its reputation within both NORAD and NATO. In this context, adopting porcupine traits is not merely a theoretical idea; it is a practical way to improve continental security, defend national sovereignty, and establish Canada as a dependable security partner.