featured

The recent decision by the United States Navy (USN) to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program after eight years of development and billions of dollars in investment represents a significant setback in US naval modernization drive. The Constellation-class was meant to become a modern, multi-mission combat vessel capable of relieving operational pressure from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and narrowing the growing numerical advantage of the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Instead, continuous design changes, and subsequent delays changed what was supposed to be an easy-to-construct warship platform into a costly and significantly delayed project. After failure of several major projects like Zumwalt destroyer and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate project has degraded Washington’s efforts to sustain the naval balance of power against rapidly expanding naval fleet of PLAN.

The Constellation-class project was a product of USN’s urgent need to fill the gap left behind Oliver Hazard Perry-class (OHP) frigates which were phased out from USN services in 2015. The OHPs, despite lack of built-in vertical launch system (VLS), were regarded for their reliability, and versatility in missions ranging from open-ocean escorting to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The retired hulls of OHPs were purchased by navies of several US allies including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkiye. Their withdrawal from USN created a capability void that the Littoral LCS program – comprising of Freedom class and Independent class vessels – was expected to fill. However the LCS encountered numerous mechanical failures in hulls and propulsion system, cost overruns, and capability gaps that rendered it unsuitable for missions in contested naval environments.

As USN halted further procurement and early retirement of LCS, it attempted to follow a new approach, i.e., opt for a proven design tailored to meet USN requirements. Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design was chosen as the baseline for a modern, affordable American Constellation-class frigate. At initial stage, it appeared a sound idea. The FREMM platform had already proven itself in European naval forces, and the USN specific variant was modified to carry 32 Mk-41 VLS cells capable of firing SM-series interceptors and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, alongside Naval Strike Missiles. This program committed to be a potent yet affordable and rapid addition in USN fleet while retaining 85 percent commonality with original design. But as USN continued to impose new requirements, complications in construction, and alteration in designing began to inhibit the efficiency of the program. Constellation-class frigate undertook major size increment than parent FREMM design, stretching from 466 feet to nearly 500 and increasing to over 7,200 tons. Instead of leveraging a proven design, USN trapped itself with a pseudo-original design which now shared mere 15 percent commonality with the original design. By 2024, the first frigate was already three years behind schedule, and the program’s cost enlarged well beyond initial estimations. Faced with increasing costs, long delays, and design complications, the USN eventually axed the Constellation-class frigate program too, leaving behind a significant gap in USN surface fleet which this frigate was supposed to fill.

USN now wants a new frigate class structured on proven American design by 2028. Reportedly, the design of US Coast Guard (USCG) Legend Class cutter will be used as baseline to develop a USN specific variant. These 4,600 tons class ships are capable of conducting blue water operations and support 57mm deck gun, Phalanx CIWS, and flight deck with hanger to support rotary wing operations.  Its USN specific frigate version can accommodate a 16-cell Mk-41 VLS module, 8x Harpoon/NSM cruise missiles in canisters, RIM-116 Sea RAM, and torpedo tubes. Using an American proven design for mass producing USN specific frigate of relatively smaller size and low tonnage will allow USN to produce and commission larger number of hulls in relatively less time. But on flip side, this new frigate class will be far less capable than recently cancelled Constellation-class as they are unlikely to carry Aegis CMS, and will have significantly less range, endurance, and weapon load-out.

Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the rapid growth of China’s naval power. PLAN is now commissioning highly capable naval combatants including flat-deck aircraft carrier (Fujian), next generation destroyers (Type-055 and Type-52DL) and frigates (Type-54B), and new class of conventional as well as nuclear submarines. Chinese coast guard, and maritime militia collectively operate more than 750 vessels – more than twice the number of hulls under US control. While the US Navy still retains qualitative advantages, especially in nuclear submarines and carrier aviation, trends in shipbuilding capacity significantly favor Beijing. China commands more than half of global commercial ship production, while the US share barely registers at a tenth of a percent. This allows China to mass produce modern warships for PLAN at a pace the United States cannot simply match.

Although USN plans to expand its fleet from 296 manned warships to 381 manned warships and 134 unmanned vessels by 2045, but so far trends of decline hull strengths have been observed. Ticonderoga class cruisers are gradually retiring, next-generation DDG(X) destroyers are still in far future, Ford class nuclear aircraft-carriers and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are facing delays, and Arleigh Burke Flight-III destroyers are not producing at rate faster enough to accommodate these growing gaps. Unmanned vessels are sometimes perceived as a viable solution to fill-up the gaps but these vessels cannot replace manned warships on one-on-one basis. In sum, aforementioned projects expose the persistent limitations of ship production capacity of US shipyards. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that reviving the shipbuilding sector to meet the USN long-term needs would require annual investments of more than $40 billion for three consecutive decades—a staggering commitment that would require political consensus and sustained strategic vision.

The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate, just like past projects of Zumwalt and LCS- thus represents a persistent crisis in US naval build-up. As China accelerates its naval production and expands power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the United States finds itself struggling to revive its own shipbuilding capacity. Whether Washington can reverse this trajectory will depend on its ability to reform procurement processes, invest in industrial capacity, and adopt realistic designs aligned with strategic needs. Without such changes USN risks entering the next decade with too few ships to meet global demands.

The Thai-Cambodian tension is almost uniformly treated as a manageable bilateral issue, serious but contained, sensitive but familiar. This is a mistake. The real implication of the dispute is not the danger it poses of immediate escalation but rather what it indicates of the future security order of Southeast Asia and of ASEAN’s decreasing strategic relevance in the formation of that order. The problem is not that ASEAN lacks goodwill or experience, but that it is increasingly misaligned with the type of conflicts now emerging within its own region. At the heart of the dilemma is a category mistake: ASEAN was never constituted to arbitrate or adjudicate, only to regulate. Its diplomatic culture emphasizes confidence-building practices and the maintenance of open, institutionalized avenues for dialogue. Those are things necessary and reasonable. Territory sovereignty is different; it is zero-sum and domestically chiseled. As such, solving such disputes with ASEAN’s traditional toolkit is to operate outside one’s skill set, not unlike an artist trying to bake a cake.

Border tensions play a role in domestic politics on both sides. They play into narratives of sovereignty, justify military readiness, and distract from internal pressures. Crucially, escalation is not an end in itself. Escalation has its risks; resolution has its concessions. Protracted ambiguity, on the other hand, can be handled politically. ASEAN’s preference for dialogue without deadlines, restraint without enforcement, and consensual rather than arbitrated decision-making seems to reproduce this state of equilibrium. This dynamic is often misinterpreted as diplomatic paralysis. It is instead the reflection of a stable, albeit fragile, strategic equilibrium. ASEAN offers a forum for de-escalation. From the standpoint of member states, this is not an institutional malfunction but a rational outcome. The costs of change exceed the benefits, especially when national leaders must answer to domestic audiences that reward toughness over compromise. Where this method turns strategically perilous is in the aggregate. Managed conflicts are not frozen conflicts; they harden over the years. Military interventions are normalized, crisis rhetoric becomes established, and trust dribbles away. What begins as stability based on restraint gradually transforms into militarized coexistence. This process is not the escalation of the crisis but its solidification. As strife becomes routine, the region becomes accustomed to permanent insecurity, and politicians come to treat it as usual, not abnormal.

The regional context renders this trend more significant. Southeast Asia is not functioning in a permissive strategic environment today. Competition among the great powers is increasingly shaping the calculations of states in the region. Thailand’s security ties and Cambodia’s external alignments are not marginal to the conflict; they are part of its strategic backdrop. With external alignments solidifying, tensions within the region are becoming less easy to isolate. Even when they are not directly involved, the great powers’ presence changes bargaining behavior, threat perceptions, and strategic confidence. ASEAN can least afford to see its centrality challenged now. Centrality is strategically and politically meaningful when regional institutions make rather than take outcomes. When disagreements are settled outside the ASEAN framework through bilateral interests, external balancing, or strategic ambiguity, the organization’s role is so minimal as to be symbolic at worst. The consultations and statements continue, but the real influence is shifting elsewhere. ASEAN, over time, also runs the risk of becoming a platform on which it simply reacts rather than organizes and shapes regional strains.

The economic aspect makes the matter even more complex. ASEAN’s integration project presupposes a degree of predictability and strategic restraint. However, it is not entirely effective while security tensions between the two remain unresolved. Border disputes impede cross-border trade and infrastructure planning and introduce risk into investment calculations. They seldom produce immediate or dramatic changes, but they do build up. For a while, economic integration can coexist with political tensions, but not forever. Often, uncertainty begins to erode confidence, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, where connectivity is most vulnerable to instability. The fundamental problem, then, is not whether ASEAN can stop war. It pretty much can, and it often does. The more profound question, then, is whether war prevention is sufficient in a region under such long-term strategic duress. A security order based solely on restraint, without avenues for resolution, will erode its ability to adapt. It treats the symptoms and not the causes of these problems. This does not necessitate that ASEAN turn away from its founding principles, but rather that it apply them in new and innovative ways. Consensus and respect for non-interference continue to be the pillars of regional cohesion. However, they no longer suffice. Without additional tools in the toolbox, such as informal arbitration, issue-specific mediation regimes, or more explicit regional norms on appropriate dispute behavior, ASEAN will remain trapped in a stance of containment, with no progress.

Overall, the Thai–Cambodian tension is no mere side issue. It shows how latent tensions, domestic politics, and external competition converge in ways that ASEAN cannot fully control. The risk is not a sudden breakdown but strategic stagnation: a region at peace but progressively divided, stable but strategically tenuous, and whose members continue to hesitate over which direction they want to take. If ASEAN is ever to have a fundamental, not just a token, role, it has to face up to this fact, not just in rhetoric but in its structures. This decision will determine whether the future security structure in Southeast Asia is built on deterrence of conflict or on the tolerance of latent tensions as the price of regional cohesion.

FROM snowy countrysides to festive city spots, Christmas movies have taken inspiration from a variety of UK locations.

And while the North Pole may be far out of the way, you can get into the spirit by visiting these iconic film spots a little closer to home.

Before you snuggle up to watch your go-to Christmas classics, why not go one step further and visit the exact spot where it was filmed this festive season?

A variety of festive favourites were shot on-site here in the UK, from the star-studded Love Actually to Christmas comedy Nativity!

If you find yourself near any of these famous film locations, celebrate the Christmas season by stepping into the shoes of your favourite festive characters.

Shere, Surrey

This picturesque village hit the big screen when it was featured in The Holiday back in 2006.

Read More On Christmas Films

XMAS FLIX

Full list of Netflix codes that unlock the best Xmas movies for no extra cost

SNOW WAY

Quaint city that’s UK’s best place to live is starring in new Christmas film

The quaint area consists of historic timber-framed buildings and medieval charm, nestled in the idyllic Tillingbourne Valley.

It played home to Kate Winslet’s Iris who famously swaps homes with Los Angeles resident Amanda, played by Cameron Diaz.

Shere provides the romantic backdrop for Diaz as she finds love with Jude Law during her festive getaway.

And the village also featured in the Bridget Jones franchise, which is often considered another Christmas classic for Brits.

Snowshill, Cotswolds

The quintessential Cotswolds village also featured in Bridget Jones Diary, the first installment of the hit series.

In fact, the film and the entire franchise opens with with Bridget turning up at her parent’s house in Snowshill on a wintry New Year’s Day.

And it is in the same town where the quirky protagonist has her first on-screen encounter with her eventual husband Mark Darcy.

Due to the film’s success and the idyllic scenery, many people now stop for a photo outside the village church or one of the quaint houses that appear in the film.

As a result, Snowshill has established itself as one of Britain’s most popular Christmas film locations.

Brighton Pier

While the iconic seaside attraction may be associated with summer fun, it also has ties to the festive season.

Fans of the animated film The Snowman may recognise the historic pier from the famous Walking In The Air scene.

The main characters can be seen flying over the historic pier as they make their way to the North Pole.

While the sequence may be brief, it is perhaps one of the most famous associated with the beloved classic.

Hogwarts Great Hall

Another children’s classic is of course Harry Potter, a film series often associated with and watched around Christmas.

And while witches and wizards may be akin Halloween characters, the cosy grounds of Hogwarts are perhaps the most enticing when they are decked out for the festive season.

Now fans of the film can step into the magic by visiting the Warner Brothers Studio in Watford.

A quick trip from London, this studio tour offers a stunningly detailed look into the making of the movies, and what better time to visit than in the lead up to Christmas when the Great Hall set is adorned with decorations?

Covent Garden

And in the heart of London is of course the famous Covent Garden, which many argue is the home to the city’s best Christmas tree.

While it is already on most tourist lists, the festive season marks the best time to visit this popular spot.

With a famous Christmas market and choir performances, there’s plenty to get you in the spirit at this time of year.

And fans of the 2019 rom-com Last Christmas are sure to spot many filming spots inside this famous square, which feature heavily in the film.

Emilia Clarke’s Kate works as an Elf in a fictional year-round Christmas shop at this location, while the famous karaoke scene was shot at nearby pub The Harp.

St Luke’s Mews, Notting Hill

And if you’re a fan of Christmas rom-coms, you’ll want to pop over to Notting Hill too.

The beautiful cobbled street of St Luke’s Mews plays the backdrop to arguably the most famous scene from the festive flick Love Actually.

Whether you lap up Mark’s (Andrew Lincoln) cue card love confession to his friend’s new wife, played by Kiera Knightly, or cringe at the iconic scene, you’re sure to recognise this famous street.

While this street it located just off Portobello Road, home to the world’s largest antique market, it is still a residential area so remember to be respectful when visiting.

Coventry Cathedral Ruins

Another British Christmas classic is of course Nativity!, which primary school teacher Mr Maddens, played by Martin Freeman, as he attempts to stage a production of the Nativity.

After telling a white lie to impress his ex, Maddens soon finds himself in the midst of a media storm surrounding the school play.

The mayor even allows the class to perform the highly-anticipated show at the historic ruins of Coventry cathedral in an atmospheric climax to the film.

Paddington Station

And who can talk about beloved British festive flicks without mentioning Paddington?

The iconic bear famously made his way from Peru to the Paddington area of London, after which he was named.

Visitors can visit a statue of the bear at his namesake station, which provided the backdrop for one of the most important scenes in the 2014 film.

Elm Hill, Norwich

The picturesque area of Elm Hill in Norwich features heavily in Netflix’s Jingle Jangle: A Christmas Journey.

Snowy scenery provides a backdrop for the adventure of an old toy maker and his granddaughter.

The cobbled streets, multi-coloured houses, and quaint shops of the town provide the perfect setting for movie magic.

And they also ensure the perfect shot on Instagram, whether you’re a fan of the film or not.

Birdsall House

And finally, this Malton mansion plays home to the Christmas family in 2021’s Father Christmas Is Back.

Kelsey Grammer plays James, the father of Joanna, played by Elizabeth Hurley, who he abandoned years ago.

The festive family flick follows them as they attempt to navigate Christmas together, with many scenes set at the stunning Birdsall House.

This beautiful country house is surrounded by glorious Yorkshire countryside and is a popular wedding venue, with private guided tours of the property are available.

In June 1967, when the sun was rising over the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Israeli fighter squadrons skimming through the coastlines at low altitude struck Egyptian airbases with a devastating blow. Within barely a couple of hours, most of the Egyptian air forces were destroyed. Operation Focus was not a mere initiation of the Six-Day War, but it determined the final outcome of the war. When the ground offensives advanced across the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, Israel had already established its critical military superiority, namely, air supremacy. The Six-Day War remains a typical case of how a short, incisive, and highly compressed conflict could overturn the premise of regional deterrence and restructure the long-term strategic reality.

Almost 60 years later, a very different state is studying similar lessons. Based on its nuclear and missile capabilities and deepened defense cooperation with the Russians, nuclear-armed North Korea is refining tools that could enable its own version of a swift and high-impact attack. North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 series—quasi-ballistic missiles modeled upon the Russian Iskander-M—have irregular, low-altitude trajectories that are designed to complicate missile defense. Through their recent use by Russia against Ukraine, North Korea has gained invaluable live-fire battlefield data, accelerating improvements in precision, reliability, and mobility during flight. In addition, thanks to Russian assistance—advanced technology, training assistance, and potential space-oriented targeting support—North Korea is securing capabilities that were unattainable in the past.

The strategic risk lies not in whether Pyongyang could literally replicate Operation Focus. Instead, the genuine risk lies in Kim Jong-un drawing wrongful lessons from the Six-Day War and the Russia-Ukraine War: that surprise, speed, and concentrated firepower could overwhelm the opponent before activating an effective response. If Pyongyang is convinced that a blitzkrieg is achievable or judges that nuclear blackmail could suppress the US and Japan’s intervention for a certain timeframe, the incentives for war could increase.

Ways That North Korea Could Attempt a Six-Day War-Style Blitzkrieg

Such perception—that momentum has changed—endangers the nowadays Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are expanding both in terms of magnitude and precision. Meanwhile, North Korea’s SRBM and MLRS systems could strike almost all major airbases and C2 nodes located within South Korea. North Korean SOF, who have long trained themselves with penetration operations via tunnels, submarines, and UAV drops, are carefully analyzing Russian tactics used in the Russia-Ukraine War, ranging from loitering munition to precision targeting of critical infrastructures. Pyongyang may imagine that by combining missile salvos, swarm drones, electronic jamming, SOF penetration, and nuclear escalation, it could paralyze South Korea’s initial response in the first few hours of the war and create a meaningful fissure in alliance coherence.

Here the Six-Day War offers a second powerful lesson. The opening phase of the war has greater importance than other phases. In 1967, Israel’s preemptive strike wiped out Arab air forces on the ground, granting unlimited air dominance to the IDF. Although North Korea could not attain air superiority, it could attempt something functionally similar—denying the US, Japan, and South Korea’s ability to conduct operations normally in the initial hours of the war. This could include simultaneous missile saturation on air defense batteries, fuel depots, hardened aircraft shelters, runways, and long-range sensors. Meanwhile, missiles with irregular trajectories might avoid radar detection and try to penetrate interception layers comprised of PAC-3, L-SAM, THAAD, and Aegis destroyers. Swarm drones could overwhelm short-range air defense or neutralize petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) depots and movable C2 vehicles. Cyber operations and GPS jamming would complement such a kinetic assault, creating friction and delays in the alliance response cycle.

Eventually, Pyongyang could conduct its own version of Operation Focus ‘in reverse,’ not to secure air dominance but to prevent opponents from achieving air supremacy. This is to enable North Korea to conduct SOF penetration, a limited armored push in and around the DMZ, and nuclear blackmailing to prevent reinforcement. Such an operation would be based on the similar logic—the ideal mixture of shock, speed, and confusion—that Israel showcased in Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Deterring Blitzkrieg: Lessons for the US, Japan, and South Korea

By using the Six-Day War as a reference, the US, Japan, and South Korea could figure out ways to deter North Korea’s aforementioned provocations. Israel’s victory in 1967 was not achieved solely by air supremacy but also through resilience in its mobilization system and the adaptability of its reserve forces. Once securing air dominance, the IDF swiftly mobilized its reserve forces, stabilized major frontlines, and executed critical maneuvers before Arab countries coordinated with one another. Meanwhile, North Korea might use an intensive SOF operation in the initial phase of the war to wreak havoc on South Korea—recreating the chaos that Israel’s opponents had to experience in 1967—by attacking leadership, transportation centers, and communication nodes.

The solution is clear. If South Korea could prevent internal paralysis in the first 24 to 48 hours of the war, North Korea’s ambitious surprise attack would be largely unsuccessful. Therefore, Seoul should treat protection against SOF, city defense, and civil-military resilience at a level equivalent to ‘air superiority.’ This means diffusion of C2, reinforcement of police and reserve forces, hardening communication, and ensuring that local governments could fully function even under missile strikes and SOF infiltration. Irrespective of the high intensity of an opening barrage, state function should be able to survive, maintain consistency, and prepare for countermeasures.

The political aftermath of the 1967 war is also an important lesson. Israel’s swift victory engendered long-term strategic burdens: the occupation problem, regional backlash, and disputes on legitimacy. It well demonstrates that a short and decisive war could create unpredictable, long-term spillover effects. Applying it to the Korean Peninsula, the US and its allies should have a clear picture regarding North Korea’s failed surprise attack or a regime change. Issues like securing WMD, China’s intervention, refugee flow, humanitarian stabilization, and restructuring North Korea’s political order cannot be managed in an impromptu manner.

The strategic task for Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul is to deny Pyongyang any illusion of a short war. Deterrence should be based on the confidence that North Korea cannot achieve within 6 hours what Israel achieved in 6 days. To make that happen, integration of missile defense systems, real-time intelligence sharing, enhancing the survivability of air bases, diffusion of key assets, and rapid counter-strike capabilities are necessary. Moreover, the US and its allies should establish a political foundation that could withstand a war of attrition—a type of conflict that North Korea cannot tolerate.