United Kingdom’s F-35 Program Slammed For Cost-Saving Blunders
The U.K. Ministry of Defense is facing growing questions about the progress of its F-35 program, after key shortcomings were outlined in a recent critical report from the Public Accounts Committee, a body that examines the value for money of government projects. As well as the adverse effect on the program of years of cost-cutting, the F-35B still critically lacks a standoff strike capability.
In particular, the committee found that a shortage of maintenance engineers is having a profound effect on F-35B availability and output. During Parliamentary questions in the House of Commons, Ben Obese-Jecty, a Conservative member of parliament, asked the Ministry of Defense how long it would take to fix these issues.
In response, Luke Pollard, minister of state at the Ministry of Defense, said that the maintenance engineer shortages would not be fixed for three to four years, although steps had been taken in this direction, including a “significant” increase in the recruitment of engineers over the last two years. These efforts have included boosting training capacity as well as sign-on bonuses for new recruits.
According to the Public Accounts Committee report, The U.K.’s F-35 capability, the shortage of qualified engineers in the Royal Air Force (RAF) came about due to a failure to determine exactly how many of these critical staff would be needed. As a result, this is now one of the main reasons behind the F-35’s availability being judged “poor” and the jet consistently failing to meet targets.
“The Ministry of Defense has introduced a program of surging recruitment for the RAF so that it returns to workforce balance across every specialization,” Pollard explained. “This activity includes a significant focus on the engineer profession where, over the last two years, the RAF has offered joining bonuses and increased the capacity of technical training schools to enable more recruits to be trained. To improve retention, the RAF has implemented a Financial Retention Incentive for engineers. The recruitment and retention of personnel remains one of the top two priorities for the chief of the defense staff.”
While it’s true that the U.K. Armed Forces, in general, are suffering from a lack of technical support staff, it remains embarrassing that, in the case of the F-35B, the Ministry of Defense simply “miscalculated how many engineers would be needed per plane,” by failing to take into account staff taking leave and performing other tasks.
Overall, the Public Accounts Committee judges the F-35 “the best fast jet the United Kingdom has ever had.”
The jet is currently operated by two frontline units, the RAF’s No. 617 Squadron, the “Dambusters,” and the Royal Navy’s 809 Naval Air Squadron (NAS), as well as a training unit, No. 207 Squadron, RAF, which serves as the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU). All of these are home-based at RAF Marham in England, the main operating hub when the jets are not embarked in one of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers or deployed on operations. As of this summer, 38 F-35Bs had been delivered, with one of these lost in a carrier accident in the Mediterranean.
The report found that a history of “cost-cutting” throughout the U.K. F-35 program “has caused significant problems in its use,” which have affected the jet’s “capability, availability to fly, and value for money.”
While these issues relate to the in-service F-35B, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the jet, the same report also warns that the plan to introduce the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A version, which is nuclear-capable, is also likely to run into problems relating to costs and timelines.
When it comes to RAF Marham, the Public Accounts Committee slams the airbase for its “substandard accommodation,” which it described as “shabby, sometimes lacking hot water, and lacking bus access to a local town.”
The report notes that work on infrastructure at Marham won’t be finished until 2034, a “very complacent date,” and one that could further exacerbate problems in personnel retention.
Turning to the aircraft itself, one of the most significant problems caused by the cost-cutting relates to the facility that is required to assess the F-35’s stealth capability. This is critical to ensure that the fighter’s low-observable characteristics are functioning as they should. After all, the jet’s stealth features are key to its evading high-end air defense systems. More broadly, it should be noted that this type of infrastructure is a core requirement of the F-35’s unique capabilities, and constructing and sustaining it comes at an added cost.
To reduce the spending on the program, the Ministry of Defense delayed the investment in the facility, which provided a savings of £82 million (around $107 million) by 2024-25. However, due to inflation, the final cost of completing the facility will add another £16 million (around $21 million) on top of that by 2031-32.
In another effort to save cash in the short term, in 2020, the Ministry of Defense chose to slow down the delivery schedule of the F-35Bs, which had the effect of reducing the number of jets available on the flight lines today. The situation was then compounded by a lack of funds for buying new aircraft in 2020; this meant that seven aircraft were delivered a year late.
Finally, the Ministry of Defense took the decision to delay the full establishment of the first Royal Navy F-35B squadron, 809 NAS, again on budgetary grounds. This means the squadron has to wait until 2029 to get its full infrastructure at Marham. As a result, capability has been reduced and, once again, the eventual spend will be even greater: from £56 million (around $73 million) to a likely £154 million (around $201 million).
With this history of financial mismanagement in the program, the Public Accounts Committee is skeptical about how the Ministry of Defense will manage the introduction of another version of the jet, the F-35A.
After years of speculation, the United Kingdom finally announced this summer that it will buy 12 F-35As. As we have discussed in the past, this jet offers a number of advantages over the F-35B, but the Ministry of Defense has specifically highlighted its ability to join the NATO nuclear mission, which would see the jets armed with U.S.-owned B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs. On top of this mission, the RAF says that the new jets will be assigned to the training unit and will primarily be used in that role.
According to the Public Accounts Committee:
“Becoming certified for the NATO nuclear mission will add new requirements to training, personnel, and possibly infrastructure, but discussions in this area are at an early stage, and no indication of forecast costs has been provided by the Ministry of Defense.”
One of those costs could well relate to the secure underground weapons vaults that are required to store the nuclear bombs. Whether such vaults did exist at RAF Marham in the past, it’s unclear whether this infrastructure remains intact or what degree of work it might need to accommodate the B61-12s. Some reports suggest the vaults have been dismantled or even filled in completely. Making use of U.S.-operated vaults at nearby RAF Lakenheath could be another option.
When the F-35A decision was announced, TWZ also highlighted the potential disadvantages of a mixed fleet, especially with only a dozen of these versions, which represents very much a token force:
“A fleet of just 12 jets adds another type with some different maintenance and infrastructure requirements, and a relatively low availability rate, at least historically. At the same time, the training that it offers is not 1:1 for the STOVL F-35B, and it is questionable whether it will save money in the long run. That would change, however, if the British were to buy A-models in bigger numbers.”
The question of numbers is one that has surrounded the U.K. F-35 program for many years now.
The Ministry of Defense has vehemently stuck to its plan to procure 138 F-35s over the lifetime of the program, although this has long been called into question.
So far, firm orders have only been placed for 48 F-35Bs. The previous Conservative government confirmed it was negotiating to buy another 27 F-35Bs for delivery by 2033. However, this batch of 27 jets will now be divided between F-35As (12) and F-35Bs (15).
At the very least, it seems the planned number of STOVL F-35Bs to be purchased will be reduced.
This could lead to problems, since it is widely considered that significantly more than 48 F-35Bs are required to meet the ambition of 24 jets available for the baseline Carrier Strike mission, across both carriers. Considering training and other demands, a figure of 60-70 jets is generally thought to be reasonable. In the meantime, U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs have, on occasions, been relied upon to make up the required aircraft numbers during carrier cruises, although this wasn’t the case for the recent embarkation of 24 jets on HMS Prince of Wales.
Reports of Ministry of Defense financial mismanagement on the F-35 program also hardly inspire confidence in the even more ambitious plan for the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), the United Kingdom’s future air combat initiative at the heart of which is the Tempest crewed stealth fighter.
As we have discussed before, the future of the GCAP program is by no means certain.
In the past, we have suggested that, should the F-35A prove itself with the RAF, that could open up the possibility of a follow-on purchase, and larger numbers of this version that would be a very obvious threat to the future of the Tempest.
That, however, likely depends on the Ministry of Defense solving the issues with the ongoing fielding of the F-35.
In summing up the U.K. F-35 program, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, the chair of the Public Accounts Committee, likened the mismanagement to a homeowner choosing to delay making repairs to a leaky roof, noting that “making short-term cost decisions is famously inadvisable … and yet such decisions have been rife in the management of the F-35.”
The Public Accounts Committee doesn’t provide a final figure for the U.K. F-35 program’s whole-life cost but does state that the Ministry of Defense’s projection of £57 billion (around $75 billion) through to 2069 “is unrealistic.”
Meanwhile, the additional capabilities that are promised under the latest Block 4 standard will represent another huge investment, but one that is required to ensure the jets perform to their fullest potential. The implications of Block 4 are also yet to be fully understood in terms of cost perspective, but will certainly be very significant.
By way of comparison, the United Kingdom expects to pay £31 billion (around $40 billion) for the design and manufacture of its four new Dreadnought class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, including inflation over the life of the program.
The committee also notes that the Ministry of Defense’s figure does not include costs for personnel, fuel, and infrastructure.
While the financial side of the program is worrying, of more immediate concern for the U.K. Armed Forces is the fact that key capabilities are still missing from its F-35s. While full operating capability was recently declared, after demonstrating the ability to put 24 U.K.-owned F-35Bs on a single carrier, this milestone remains somewhat aspirational, since the personnel shortages are still to be properly addressed.
Alarmingly, for a jet that is the backbone of the Carrier Strike role, the Public Accounts Committee reiterates that the F-35 “will also not have the ability to attack ground targets from a safe distance until the early 2030s.”
This, according to the Chief of the Defense Staff, is the biggest concern of all.
The U.K. F-35’s current lack of long-range standoff weaponry has long been acknowledged as a significant shortfall.
Earlier this year, the National Audit Office (NAO), the U.K.’s independent public spending watchdog, stated the following:
“There are some important capabilities that the Ministry of Defense has delayed into the next decade. Most significantly, the F-35 does not have a standoff weapon to attack ground targets from a safe range, which will impact its effectiveness in contested environments.” The NAO added that this capability isn’t expected in full until the early 2030s.
Currently, the U.K. F-35B relies on the Paveway IV precision-guided bomb to attack surface targets.
Ultimately, it plans to integrate the Selected Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR) 3 standoff weapon, but this process has been repeatedly delayed, as you can read about here.
As an interim measure, the United Kingdom is now looking to provide its F-35Bs with the GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) II, a weapon better known as StormBreaker.
“To acquire a more capable interim air-to-surface weapon, the U.K. F-35 program has requested funding for Small Diameter Bombs,” the NAO said, referring to the SDB II.
However, the NAO also noted that the Ministry of Defense “has yet to provide this funding.”
When it comes to standoff air-to-ground weapons, it is important to note that, while the F-35 is hard to detect using fire-control radars, it is not invisible. In some cases, making a direct attack on a target is impossible in terms of survivability, making it necessary to employ standoff munitions to degrade hostile air defenses.
All in all, the Public Accounts Committee report paints a sorry picture of the U.K. F-35 program, with a culture of cost-cutting constraining its capabilities in the short term, while also increasing costs in the long term.
In order for the U.K. Armed Forces to get the most out of the F-35, which it describes as “the best fighter jet this nation has ever possessed,” the report concludes that the Ministry of Defense “must root out the short-termism, complacency, and miscalculation in the program.”
Contact the author: [email protected]
