Diplomacy

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.

Oman had been mediating talks between Iran and the US before Washington attacked Tehran.

Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr al-Busaidi, who mediated the US-Iran talks before the war, has said that diplomatic options are still “available” to de-escalate the situation in the Middle East.

“Oman reaffirms its call for an immediate ceasefire and a return to responsible regional diplomacy. There are off ramps available. Let’s use them,” he said on X on Tuesday.

Al-Busaidi did not provide details on what the options to end the ongoing conflict between Iran and joint Israeli and US forces could be.

Oman had been mediating talks between Iran and the US and said that peace was “within reach” hours before the US-Israeli air strikes began on Saturday, plunging the region into a crisis.

On Tuesday, US President Donald Trump told journalists in Washington, DC, that the US had attacked Iran because “he had a feeling” that Iran would strike first, as negotiations over its nuclear programme stalled.

However, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had said on Monday that the US attacked Iran because it knew Israel was about to bomb the country, and because the Trump administration believed that Tehran would then strike US facilities in the region.

But Oman’s foreign minister pushed back on the Trump administration’s characterisation that Iran was an “imminent threat” to the US. He maintained that “significant progress” had been made in the nuclear talks before the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran.

In its retaliatory strikes, Iran has attacked Israel and US forces across the Gulf region. While Oman does not host any US forces, it has also been struck and dragged into the conflict.

The Oman News Agency reported on Sunday that the Duqm commercial port, located in Al Wusta Governorate in central Oman, was struck by two drones. It said that an expatriate worker was injured in the attack.

A fuel tank at Duqm Port was also hit in a drone attack on Tuesday, but there were no casualties.

Majed al-Ansari, a spokesperson for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the strike on Oman was “an attack on the very principle of mediation”.

Trump expressed solidarity with Gulf countries on Tuesday, saying, “Iran is hitting countries that had nothing to do with what is going on.”

BERKELEY — University of California President James B. Milliken, in his first extensive interview since taking the helm of the nation’s premier public higher education system, defended UC’s diplomatic approach to President Trump’s fusillade of actions against the institution — contrasting it with the more aggressive fight Harvard is waging with the government.

UC has not repeatedly sued the federal government or publicly criticized Trump, while Harvard battles the administration in and outside court amid billions in White House funding freezes.

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“We could have said, ‘We’re going to sue tomorrow.’ We saw that movie with Harvard,” Milliken said of his first seven months on the job dominated by federal attacks. “Harvard is still in negotiations to settle the federal government’s actions, but they have had a series of devastating enforcement actions taken … Given our responsibility to the university and to the state of California, the better course for us was to engage.”

Yet days after the interview, the U.S. Department of Justice leveled another strike against UC in a lawsuit alleging UCLA “routinely ignored” and “failed to report” employee complaints of antisemitism since 2023.

In a statement after the interview, Milliken said UC has already committed to combating anti-Jewish hatred without court interference.

“Antisemitism has no place at UC and we have taken important actions to protect our Jewish students, faculty and staff … We will always have work to do, and our commitment to our community is unwavering,” the statement said. “In light of this — and our oft-cited willingness to work with the government in good faith — the new lawsuit is unfortunate and, in our view, unnecessary.”

In a wide-ranging interview at UC Berkeley’s Grimes Engineering Center, Milliken, 68, offered his assessment of Trump’s actions to overhaul higher education and declined to say whether UC would pay an amount smaller than the $1.2-billion proposed fine over UCLA’s alleged campus antisemitism.

On federal talks, Milliken said UC would “never compromise” on its independence, governance, values and academic freedom.

James B. Milliken.

(Christina House / Los Angeles Times)

He touted UC’s accomplishments despite the challenges: Four faculty members received Nobel prizes last year — the largest ever number from one institution — and UC secured more patents for inventions last year than any university in the world.

Aside from Trump, UC faces internal pressures: multiple campuses, including UCLA, are in deficit. Labor unions are demanding better job conditions. Members of the UAW 4811 academic workers union have authorized a potential strike.

Milliken spoke in favor of diversity, celebrated immigrants and said he wanted to expand student access to the university. He said UC should lead on artificial intelligence.

Milliken started in August after more than six years as chancellor of the University of Texas system. He previously held top roles at the City University of New York, the University of Nebraska and the University of North Carolina. A news and history buff and former Wall Street lawyer who prefers reading paper over pixels, he often cites his study of “The Gold and the Blue,” a two-volume chronicle of UC’s ascent in the 1950s and struggles during the political turmoil of 1960s written by former UC Berkeley Chancellor turned UC President Clark Kerr.

He said his job is “to do everything we can to demonstrate the value that’s delivered by these amazing places … I don’t want to underestimate the difficulty in the current political environment,” but, he added, universities have been a national boon “over generations.”

Trump and higher education

Adjusting to the possibility of further retrenchment of Washington’s university research funding is among Milliken’s top concerns.

UC relies on $17.5 billion annually in federal monies, including research grants, Pell grants and hospital payments for Medicare and Medicaid. Last year, the government suspended $584 million in UCLA federal medical, science and energy research grants before a UC faculty-led lawsuit restored the money. But roughly $170 million in grants is still on hold systemwide.

Another independent faculty- and union-led federal suit has temporarily halted the $1.2-billion UCLA settlement demand seeking rightward ideological change on campus. But UC remains open to talks to quash federal probes on its own terms.

James B. Milliken.

(Christina House / Los Angeles Times)

Milliken was vague on the status of negotiations and whether UC would pay a fine — such as the $200 million Columbia University signed off on last year — to settle federal investigations.

“It would be foolhardy of me to speculate on what ultimately might be proposed to the University of California or what we might find acceptable,” he said.

He declined to specify how he would uphold his promises to protect UC’s independence, governance, values and academic freedom.

“I’m not going to go into detail on those because it gets pretty close to the line of what could be a discussion with the federal government,” Milliken said.

Educational access

Milliken was more verbose on the role of higher education and his big-picture visions for UC.

College “helps make sure that we have an educated citizenry that is prepared to actively participate in a democracy that understands our civic traditions, that understands our political system, that understands how our economic system works,” Milliken said.

“Talent is universal,” he said, “but opportunity often isn’t.” Universities “match this talent with the opportunity.”

But federal moves have threatened to change access to education. The Trump administration has sued California’s public universities and community colleges for allowing undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition. A Trump travel ban on dozens of countries has stalled student and faculty applications from Asian, African and South American nations, while a $100,000 fee for new H-1B visas for highly skilled foreign hires could hurt university and hospital recruitment.

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Milliken pledged to protect immigrants.

“I think we need to take a step back and recognize how fundamental the country’s embrace of people from around the world has been,” Milliken said. “It has been an enormous boon in terms of talent and culture and the kinds of things that make this country what it is today. I know people are worried, they’re anxious. In some cases, they’re afraid … One of the things that our university presidents and chancellors think about every day is keeping these communities safe.”

Lifelong learning

UC — home to several of the most selective and prestigious campuses in the nation — continues to grow in size and popularity. The system set a record enrollment of about 301,000 students in 2025. And 252,000 high school and transfer students have submitted applications for the coming fall, another record high. Yet, vast numbers of academically qualified students do not get in, especially to UCLA and UC Berkeley.

Campuses, including UCLA, have upped professional certificate programs and extension school offerings in recent years. Milliken said universities should further embrace learning programs outside of the undergraduate experience. UCLA is developing a plan called “UCLA for Life” to reimagine the Westwood campus’ role for professionals.

“A four-year baccalaureate experience is not enough to prepare you for 40 years or 50 years of a career. You’re going to need to retool, going to need to re-skill. And I look at universities. Students ought to turn to their alma maters. There’s a relationship that you ought to have for life,” Milliken said.

The university’s future and evolution

Milliken wants UC to take on a lead role in AI.

“The continued adaptation of AI is inevitable, and there are good things and not so good things about that. But UC is the most important, impactful university in the world, and it should not be following others in developing what is the ethical and responsible,” Milliken said. “… We’re in a place where I think leadership, whether we wanted it or not, is a responsibility.”

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More Californians should take stock of UC’s role outside of undergraduate education, he said.

“Two-thirds of our students are undergraduates. It’s a hugely important thing. But so is the research we do. So is the healthcare that we do across the state. So is the work we do at national laboratories which support incredible innovation and national security,” he said.

Milliken said he hoped the cuts to university research were a short-term “aberration.”

New research funding state bond bill

UC has put its weight behind a $23-billion bond proposal that will be on the November ballot to create a California Foundation for Science and Health Research, which would fund university and private institutions in ways similar to the National Institutes of Health.

If voters pass it, Milliken said the measure would “go an enormous way” toward making up for federal losses but that it was “impossible to speculate” on the extent as federal research funding, priorities and procedures fluctuate.

“I hope we never get to the question of whether California can replace federal funding,” he said. “Would I like to see it supplement, ensure that disruptions — even if shorter term — don’t derail the important science that’s going on here and the preparation of the next generation of scientists? Yes, I think that’s an incredibly worthwhile endeavor for the state.”

More from The Times’ interview with Milliken:

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China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

US President Trump’s announcement of the creation of the so-called “Peace Council,” involving several countries, including Morocco, sparks a deep debate that goes beyond the diplomatic event itself. It addresses the core of the international order established after World War II. The issue isn’t only about establishing a new international body but also raises an implicit question: Is the United Nations still capable of managing global peace and security, or are we entering a phase in which alternatives are being sought?

From this perspective, the Peace Council becomes a political project par excellence, reflecting shifts in the American vision of the role of international institutions and revealing a structural crisis within the United Nations system.

First: The Peace Council… Read for the idea, not the structure.

Internationally and institutionally, the Peace Council cannot be considered a direct alternative to the United Nations. The latter is grounded in an international charter, legal legitimacy, and semi-inclusive membership, whereas the Peace Council remains a selective framework, initially limited in membership, and its legitimacy is based, in particular, on the political will of the countries involved, foremost among them the United States. However, attention to this formal aspect may overlook the substance of the matter. The true value of the Peace Council lies not in its organizational and administrative structure, but in the political message it carries: explicitly questioning the United Nations’ ability to perform its historical function, offering an alternative grounded in effectiveness rather than consensus, and prioritizing alliance over inclusiveness. In other words, we are facing a shift in how international peace is managed, not just a new institutional addition.

Second: Why does the US administration believe that the United Nations has failed? Washington’s view is rooted in the strong belief that the United Nations has faced significant challenges: it has become hostage to the veto powers within the Security Council; it struggles to enforce its strategic decisions in major international conflicts; and it has shifted from being a mechanism for resolution to more of a platform for political battles. This perspective is not merely popular opinion; it is shared by many international relations scholars, who argue that the UN has not evolved sufficiently to address emerging global and regional issues, including unconventional conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, shifting global power dynamics, and a waning collective commitment to international law. In this context, the Peace Council is regarded by the United States as a tool to address what it perceives as a long-standing institutional paralysis.

Third: The Peace Council… Is it truly an alternative or just a parallel path?

When we look at international relations realistically, we usually consider three levels: 1. Legal level: The Peace Council can’t replace the United Nations when it comes to legitimacy grounded in international law. 2. Practical level: The Council aims to fill a real gap in conflict management, especially in cases where the United Nations has struggled to resolve or contain issues. 3. Symbolic and expressive level: This is where the concern grows, as the Council challenges the UN’s exclusive claim to legitimacy in the “peace industry.” In the end, it’s not just about being an alternative or a supporting body. It’s more like a parallel system that could, over time, become a real competitor if it gains more influence and members.

Fourth: The American Dimension… Redefining International Leadership.

The creation of the Peace Council aligns with Trump’s broader perspective on international relations, emphasizing three key points: reducing dependence on multilateral organizations, strengthening alliances, and shifting decision-making authority to major global powers. From this standpoint, the Council is less about promoting peace and more about reshaping America’s influence and alliances, especially in a world where Washington is reluctant to bear the costs of a global order it cannot fully control. This reflects a shift away from seeking international legitimacy toward a focus on “realistic legitimacy,” in which institutions are judged more by their results than by strict adherence to rules.

Fifth: Morocco and the Peace Council… a strategically chosen location

The Kingdom of Morocco’s decision to join the Peace Council should not be seen as a departure from the United Nations, but rather as a strategic move in its diplomatic efforts to diversify its international partnerships. Morocco maintains strong institutional ties with the UN, actively participates in peacekeeping missions, and is also eager to expand its presence in new global initiatives. By joining the Peace Council, Morocco positions itself favorably in discussions on security and stability, gaining an influential role in shaping international approaches to conflict management. This move also helps to reinforce Morocco’s image as a responsible actor that avoids relying solely on a single framework for its diplomatic and security strategies.

Sixth: Is the time of the United Nations over?

The prediction that the United Nations mission is coming to an end may be premature, but it still carries weight. The key point is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness, not one of existence. It continues to exist, but it can no longer handle alone a world marked by multiple power centers, rising complex conflicts, and waning trust in collective action. So, the Peace Council isn’t signaling its demise but rather highlighting the deepening challenges facing the traditional international system.

In the end, the Peace Council put together by the Trump administration isn’t officially replacing the United Nations yet, but it definitely marks a shift—signaling that we’re moving from one phase to another. We’re entering a time when peace and security are handled through selective alliances and initiatives driven by major powers, rather than through large umbrella organizations. The big question is, will this new approach bring about more effective peace, or will it make the world less legitimate and more fragile? The answer won’t be found just in the data but in how this new model actually plays out on the ground.