diplomacy

Can a significant and historic presence in Nicaea in commemoration of the 1700th anniversary of the first Ecumenical Council reshape the framework of global Christian dialogue? Pope Leo XIV stands on ground where the first common statement of Christian belief was formed seventeen centuries ago in the context of the first Ecumenical Council. The lake near Nicaea reflects a city marked by long memory. The visit does not seek public spectacle. It seeks depth.

Nicaea holds a rare form of significance. It represents a moment before fragmentation. A point where Christian leaders gathered to agree on the foundations of faith. The Creed shaped in this city became the common reference for churches that later followed separate paths. Modern reporting treats the return to this location as an event that reaches far beyond history.

Catholic analysts describe the entire journey as a platform for structured engagement in regions facing humanitarian risk. Diplomats notice that the visit creates three layers of meaning. The first is theological. The Creed continues to stand as the most stable reference point in the Christian world. It belongs to all. It excludes none. By returning to this shared foundation, the Pope frames dialogue on a level where long-standing differences do not erase the possibility of cooperation. Nicaea becomes neutral ground shaped by memory, not by competition.

The second layer concerns Turkey. The host country receives two ecclesiastical authorities with global reach. This presence allows Ankara to present a profile of stability and controlled engagement. The Turkish state seeks to gain diplomatic value by precisely managing an event of global religious interest. The visit shows that Turkey can provide a calm setting for high-level dialogue. This matters in a region where tensions remain visible and where regional trust is often fragile.

The third layer concerns the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The presence of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Nicaea reflects continuity. The Ecumenical Patriarchate appears as an institution that maintains a steady link to the origins of Christian identity. The visit confirms that this link remains relevant for contemporary diplomacy. The Ecumenical Patriarchate gains space to articulate its role in matters that extend beyond the inner life of the Church. It operates as a voice that connects historical experience with public responsibility.

The papal journey signals a shift in diplomatic rhythm. States often work inside short cycles, shaped by elections, immediate pressures, and shifting alliances. Religious institutions work with longer horizons. Their strength lies in stability and consistent representation. This contrast produces space for initiatives that require patience. Current challenges in Lebanon, instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the need to support minority communities demand actors who maintain firm positions without rapid fluctuations. A coordinated presence in Nicaea offers such a foundation.

The significance of the visit grows through its simplicity. A prayer beside the lake, a joint statement, and the act of walking together inside the historic city produce a stable message. Cooperation becomes visible without exaggeration. The region gains a moment of calm narrative. Christian communities observe two ancient institutions approaching each other with clarity and restraint. This image contributes to a sense of balance in an environment shaped by uncertainty.

Nicaea becomes a diplomatic space in its own right. It is not an arena of negotiation. It is a site that offers shared memory with no tension. Modern diplomacy often searches for locations that can support conversation without pressure. Nicaea provides this naturally. The city stands outside polarized debates. It holds symbolic value without imposing a political agenda. A papal visit strengthens this character and gives Nicaea renewed relevance in discussions about stability and cooperation.

The effects of this visit may unfold gradually. Joint humanitarian initiatives could gain stronger coordination. Churches may open structured channels for supporting communities under stress in Lebanon, Jordan, and other regions of the Middle East. Dialogue among Christian bodies can develop with greater consistency. States in the Eastern Mediterranean may engage with these institutions in more formal ways. All these possibilities gain substance because the visit gives clear institutional legitimacy to a shared framework.

The return to Nicaea does not promise rapid or dramatic transformation. It shapes a foundation for patient diplomacy. The city provides steady ground in a world where constant crises weaken attention spans. Nicaea speaks through continuity. The visit reminds the international community that institutions with long historical roots can offer stable guidance in periods of instability. This is not nostalgia. It is recognition that durable structures can support fragile societies.

In this sense, Nicaea gains a renewed voice. The city becomes a reference point for future cooperation. The Papal presence demonstrates that sacred geography can still influence public life. The visit marks a shift toward long-range planning where values and institutions act together. It suggests that global dialogue benefits from places where memory and responsibility meet without conflict.

Nicaea does not present solutions. It provides a framework where solutions become possible. For contemporary diplomacy, this may be its greatest contribution. A quiet moment becomes a stable foundation. A historic city becomes a modern point of connection. And a visit shaped by restraint becomes a clear signal that cooperation can grow from shared origins, even in a complex and fragmented world.

In an era of global polarization and escalating crises, the promise of a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) has emerged as a beacon of progressive change. Yet, a troubling paradox lies at its heart: while political support holds steady, the financial backbone of the movement—women’s rights organizations—faces a “life-threatening” funding crisis. In an exclusive multi-respondent Q&A, experts from the Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative—Katie Whipkey, Spogmay Ahmed, and Beth Woroniuk—break down the alarming data from their latest report and outline the path from minimalist commitments to a truly transformative global agenda.

1. The Rhetoric-Reality Gap: A “Life-Threatening” Divide

Your report’s data reveals a world where support for FFP is growing, yet funding for women’s rights organizations is in “urgent alarm.” How do you explain this gap?

Katie Whipkey: The report found that feminist foreign policy is not experiencing the rollback that we might have expected during this time of deep polarization and gender backlash. However, to say that it is growing may not be quite right—the interest is holding steady. That gives us a lot of hope. FFP has enabled governments to double down on existing commitments to gender equality in multilateral spaces and push for more gender-inclusive language. However, when it comes to the tougher structural issues like funding, especially for non-traditional funding targets such as women’s rights organizations (WROs), we see a gap. The brash reduction in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the continually miniscule funding for WROs is alarming. ODA dropped 9% in 2024 and is predicted to fall up to 17% in 2025. Many of the biggest ODA donors are FFP governments, and they are cutting development budgets while simultaneously increasing military spending. This is life-threatening as 90% of WROs in crisis contexts report disrupted operations due to funding cuts. So what we see is that gender equality has been better rhetorically mainstreamed while remaining fiscally marginalized.

Beth Woroniuk: This gap is not new. There has always been a huge divide between the statements of support for gender equality on the part of the development assistance donors, and their actual support for women’s rights organizations. Between 2014 and 2023, just 0.1 per cent of ODA reached women’s rights and women-led organisations directly. Another example: financing to support the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda has ‘failed to match the scale of the challenge.’ The hope was that countries with feminist foreign policies would start to reverse this trend. And we saw this start to happen. Unfortunately this momentum is threatened by the current trend to slash development assistance budgets.

2. Resisting Backlash: The Second Generation of FFP

We’ve seen high-profile FFP abandonments in Europe and the Americas. Where are you seeing the most effective resistance to this backlash, and what does that resistance look like on the ground?

Katie Whipkey: Resistance to backlash takes several forms. Perhaps the single strongest form is from within through institutionalization of as many elements of FFP as possible. When we move away from political feminism—declarations or speeches that can be reversed overnight—and toward institutional feminism—incorporating inclusive and responsive policy into laws, budgets, bureaucracies, and diplomatic culture—we have a chance to stave off conservative pushback. This is the second generation of FFP, where the architecture outlasts the architects. The report identifies five mechanisms for institutionalization: policy, through legislative or administrative provisions; architecture, through dedicated departments; budgetary, through earmarked funds; leadership, through dedicated high-level roles; and capacity, through staff training. Resistance also looks like feminist bureaucrats and civil servants quietly keeping feminist norms alive through budget tagging and gender audits even when political leadership changes.

Spogmay Ahmed: While our report identifies FFP abandonments across Europe and the Americas, it also points out that engagement in FFP discourse—primarily by civil society—has deepened and diversified. For example, our own Global Partner Network for Feminist Foreign Policy has grown from 14 to over 100 partners. Over the past few years, regional networks have launched and expanded. Likewise, academic coverage has greatly increased. While there is no shortage of skepticism, our report demonstrates that interest has persisted, evolved and broadened. That too is one form of resistance.

3. Following the Money: Where Gender-Focused Aid Really Goes

The data shows FFP countries give more gender-focused aid, but the actual amount reaching women’s rights organizations is “miniscule.” Where is the money actually going, and how can it be redirected?

Beth Woroniuk: Development assistance that is counted as ‘gender focused’ supports a wide variety of goals and is provided to governments, international organizations, private sector companies, and NGOs. The vast majority of this funding is for projects that have just one component that supports gender equality, while a small percentage supports projects that directly target gender equality objectives. Traditionally, women’s rights organizations have been seen as too small and too risky to be chosen as key ‘implementors.’ In recent years, new mechanisms have emerged to address these challenges. For example, women’s and feminist funds have mobilized both development assistance and philanthropic resources to provide core, flexible, and predictable funding. These funds allow bilateral assistance entities to reduce the high transaction costs involved in providing multiple small grants.

4. Protecting Resources: A Political Choice

The report’s 5R framework highlights “Resources” as a key pillar. With major donors cutting Official Development Assistance (ODA), how can FFP countries practically “ring-fence” and protect funding for gender equality?

Beth Woroniuk: Protecting development assistance funding for gender equality is a political choice. When ODA budgets are cut, choices have to be made about what programmes are reduced or eliminated. At this moment, governments have an opportunity to say ‘we stand for gender equality and we will not cut these strategic investments.

5. Signature Initiatives: Funding Models That Work

The reports mention “signature initiatives” that partner directly with civil society. What is one concrete example of a funding model that is successfully getting resources to feminist movements?

Spogmay Ahmed: In our report, we outline a few of these ‘signature initiatives,’ such as France’s Support Fund for Feminist Organizations, which is allocated EUR 250 million over five years. Similarly, Canada invested CAD 300 million in the Equality Fund. We point to the Equality Fund as a powerful example of ‘institutionalizing’ feminist foreign policy; by making a large early investment, Canada helped ensure the Fund’s continued global impact.

Beth Woroniuk: These ‘signature’ initiatives all respond to calls from feminist activists to both increase investments in gender equality and change the terms on which this money flows – focusing more on feminist movements and providing more flexible funding.

6. The Power of Regional Partnerships

Beyond money, how are regional partnerships, like the one between Chile and Mexico, proving to be a powerful tool for advancing FFP goals?

Spogmay Ahmed: Our report recognizes a marked increase in regional cooperation. We see this primarily through a rise in ‘South-South’ cooperation efforts. One example is Chile and Mexico institutionalizing their FFP partnership through a memorandum of understanding on FFP, diplomatic training and Indigenous cooperation. Through such partnerships, governments are able to share learnings, strengthen collaboration, and collectively push for gender equality and human rights.

7. True Partnership: Beyond Writing Checks

The report recommends that FFP countries “ally with women’s and feminist funds.” What does a true, equitable partnership look like in practice, beyond just writing a cheque?

Katie Whipkey: We see that true, equitable partnership is grounded in co-creation and power-sharing. It means shifting from donor-recipient models to structures based on shared decision-making. Practically, this looks like feminist groups being involved in decision-making about how funds are prioritized, distributed, and evaluated. Feminists from the Majority World would be viewed and valued as knowledge experts. It also means long-term, core funding that enables spending on administrative and political work – not just service delivery.

Beth Woroniuk: Most development assistance projects are highly bureaucratic. Women’s and feminist funds are rooted in and accountable to feminist movements. Working together as thought partners, co-creators, and innovators are promising examples of changing out-dated structures.

8. Learning from Outliers

The report notes that some non-FFP countries invest a greater percentage in gender equality than FFP countries. What can FFP champions learn from these outliers?

Beth Woroniuk: One of the lessons from the report is that you don’t have to have an FFP to invest development assistance in gender equality. There are countries supporting key initiatives who haven’t adopted this label. So one lesson is that all countries can boost their gender equality ODA investments. There can be feminist champions doing solid work, without the feminist label.

9. One Action for Real Commitment

If you could tell the leaders of the remaining FFP countries one thing they must do in the next year to prove their commitment is real, what would it be?

Spogmay Ahmed: Strengthen feminist principles across all areas of foreign policy. This brings us back to the ‘Reach’ in our global framework. I would encourage leaders to broaden the scope and application of their feminist foreign policies, as well as their ambition.

Katie Whipkey: Institutionalize. We need to guarantee our gains by legislating what we know works, including protecting staffing and training budgets, providing direct funding to women’s rights organizations, and mandating regular publishing of transparent progress reports.

Beth Woroniuk: I would encourage countries with FFPs to reach out and engage civil society organizations. Yes, activists are often critical, yet they are also an enormous source of strength and creativity. These relationships can be sources of inspiration, expertise, and accountability.

From Pledge to Power: The Road Ahead

The insights from Katie Whipkey, Spogmay Ahmed, and Beth Woroniuk paint a clear picture: the future of Feminist Foreign Policy depends on closing the gap between rhetoric and resources. While institutionalization and civil society partnerships offer hope, true progress requires political courage—to protect funding, share power with grassroots movements, and extend feminist principles across all areas of foreign policy. As Whipkey powerfully notes, “In a time of backlash, we need courage.” The stakes could not be higher, but neither could the resolve of those fighting for a foreign policy that serves all of humanity.

Over the past two decades, Russia’s economic influence in Africa—and specifically in Nigeria—has been limited, largely due to a lack of structured financial support from Russian policy banks and state-backed investment mechanisms. While Russian companies have demonstrated readiness to invest and compete with global players, they consistently cite insufficient government financial guarantees as a key constraint.

Unlike China, India, Japan, and the United States—which have provided billions in concessionary loans and credit lines to support African infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and SMEs—Russia has struggled to translate diplomatic goodwill into substantial economic projects. For example, Nigeria’s trade with Russia accounts for barely 1% of total trade volume, while China and the U.S. dominate at over 15% and 10%, respectively, in the last decade. This disparity highlights the challenges Russia faces in converting agreements into actionable investment.

Lessons from Nigeria’s Past

The limited impact of Russian economic diplomacy echoes Nigeria’s own history of unfulfilled agreements during former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration. Over the past 20 years, ambitious energy, transport, and industrial initiatives signed with foreign partners—including Russia—often stalled or produced minimal results. In many cases, projects were approved in principle, but funding shortfalls, bureaucratic hurdles, and weak follow-through left them unimplemented. Nothing monumental emerged from these agreements, underscoring the importance of financial backing and sustained commitment.

China as a Model

Policy experts point to China’s systematic approach to African investments as a blueprint for Russia. Chinese state policy banks underwrite projects, de-risk investments, and provide financing often secured by African sovereign guarantees. This approach has enabled Chinese companies to execute large-scale infrastructure efficiently, expanding their presence across sectors while simultaneously investing in human capital.

Egyptian Professor Mohamed Chtatou at the International University of Rabat and Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco, argues, “Russia could replicate such mechanisms to ensure companies operate with financial backing and risk mitigation, rather than relying solely on bilateral agreements or political connections.”

Russia’s Current Footprint in Africa

Russia’s economic engagement in Africa is heavily tied to natural resources and military equipment. In Zimbabwe, platinum rights and diamond projects were exchanged for fuel or fighter jets. Nearly half of Russian arms exports to Africa are concentrated in countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Large-scale initiatives, such as the planned $10 billion nuclear plant in Zambia, have stalled due to a lack of Russian financial commitment, despite completed feasibility studies. Similar delays have affected nuclear projects in South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt.

Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko and Senator Igor Morozov have emphasized parliamentary diplomacy and the creation of new financial instruments, such as investment funds under the Russian Export Center, to provide structured support for businesses and enhance trade cooperation. These measures are designed to address historical gaps in financing and ensure that agreements lead to tangible outcomes.

Opportunities and Challenges

Analysts highlight a fundamental challenge: Russia’s limited incentives in Africa. While China invests to secure resources and export markets, Russia lacks comparable commercial drivers. Russian companies possess technological and industrial capabilities, but without sufficient financial support, large-scale projects remain aspirational rather than executable.

The historic Russia-Africa Summits in Sochi and in St. Petersburg explicitly indicate a renewed push to deepen engagement, particularly in the economic sectors. President Vladimir Putin has set a goal to raise Russia-Africa trade from $20 billion to $40 billion over the next few years. However, compared to Asian, European, and American investors, Russia still lags significantly. UNCTAD data shows that the top investors in Africa are the Netherlands, France, the UK, the United States, and China—countries that combine capital support with strategic deployment.

In Nigeria, agreements with Russian firms over energy and industrial projects have yielded little measurable progress. Over 20 years, major deals signed during Obasanjo’s administration and renewed under subsequent governments often stalled at the financing stage. The lesson is clear: political agreements alone are insufficient without structured investment and follow-through.

Strategic Recommendations

For Russia to expand its economic influence in Africa, analysts recommend:

1. Structured financial support: Establishing state-backed credit lines, policy bank guarantees, and investment funds to reduce project risks.

2. Incentive realignment: Identifying sectors where Russian expertise aligns with African needs, including energy, industrial technology, and infrastructure.

3. Sustained implementation: Turning signed agreements into tangible projects with clear timelines and milestones, avoiding the pitfalls of unfulfilled past agreements.

With proper financial backing, Russia can leverage its technological capabilities to diversify beyond arms sales and resource-linked deals, enhancing trade, industrial, and technological cooperation across Africa.

Conclusion

Russia’s Africa strategy remains a work in progress. Nigeria’s experience with decades of agreements that failed to materialize underscores the importance of structured financial commitments and persistent follow-through. Without these, Russia risks remaining a peripheral player (virtual investor) while Arab States such as the UAE, China, the United States, and other global powers consolidate their presence.

The potential is evident: Africa is a fast-growing market with vast natural resources, infrastructure needs, and a young, ambitious population. Russia’s challenge—and opportunity—is to match diplomatic efforts with financial strategy, turning political ties into lasting economic influence.