Diplomacy

China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

US President Trump’s announcement of the creation of the so-called “Peace Council,” involving several countries, including Morocco, sparks a deep debate that goes beyond the diplomatic event itself. It addresses the core of the international order established after World War II. The issue isn’t only about establishing a new international body but also raises an implicit question: Is the United Nations still capable of managing global peace and security, or are we entering a phase in which alternatives are being sought?

From this perspective, the Peace Council becomes a political project par excellence, reflecting shifts in the American vision of the role of international institutions and revealing a structural crisis within the United Nations system.

First: The Peace Council… Read for the idea, not the structure.

Internationally and institutionally, the Peace Council cannot be considered a direct alternative to the United Nations. The latter is grounded in an international charter, legal legitimacy, and semi-inclusive membership, whereas the Peace Council remains a selective framework, initially limited in membership, and its legitimacy is based, in particular, on the political will of the countries involved, foremost among them the United States. However, attention to this formal aspect may overlook the substance of the matter. The true value of the Peace Council lies not in its organizational and administrative structure, but in the political message it carries: explicitly questioning the United Nations’ ability to perform its historical function, offering an alternative grounded in effectiveness rather than consensus, and prioritizing alliance over inclusiveness. In other words, we are facing a shift in how international peace is managed, not just a new institutional addition.

Second: Why does the US administration believe that the United Nations has failed? Washington’s view is rooted in the strong belief that the United Nations has faced significant challenges: it has become hostage to the veto powers within the Security Council; it struggles to enforce its strategic decisions in major international conflicts; and it has shifted from being a mechanism for resolution to more of a platform for political battles. This perspective is not merely popular opinion; it is shared by many international relations scholars, who argue that the UN has not evolved sufficiently to address emerging global and regional issues, including unconventional conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, shifting global power dynamics, and a waning collective commitment to international law. In this context, the Peace Council is regarded by the United States as a tool to address what it perceives as a long-standing institutional paralysis.

Third: The Peace Council… Is it truly an alternative or just a parallel path?

When we look at international relations realistically, we usually consider three levels: 1. Legal level: The Peace Council can’t replace the United Nations when it comes to legitimacy grounded in international law. 2. Practical level: The Council aims to fill a real gap in conflict management, especially in cases where the United Nations has struggled to resolve or contain issues. 3. Symbolic and expressive level: This is where the concern grows, as the Council challenges the UN’s exclusive claim to legitimacy in the “peace industry.” In the end, it’s not just about being an alternative or a supporting body. It’s more like a parallel system that could, over time, become a real competitor if it gains more influence and members.

Fourth: The American Dimension… Redefining International Leadership.

The creation of the Peace Council aligns with Trump’s broader perspective on international relations, emphasizing three key points: reducing dependence on multilateral organizations, strengthening alliances, and shifting decision-making authority to major global powers. From this standpoint, the Council is less about promoting peace and more about reshaping America’s influence and alliances, especially in a world where Washington is reluctant to bear the costs of a global order it cannot fully control. This reflects a shift away from seeking international legitimacy toward a focus on “realistic legitimacy,” in which institutions are judged more by their results than by strict adherence to rules.

Fifth: Morocco and the Peace Council… a strategically chosen location

The Kingdom of Morocco’s decision to join the Peace Council should not be seen as a departure from the United Nations, but rather as a strategic move in its diplomatic efforts to diversify its international partnerships. Morocco maintains strong institutional ties with the UN, actively participates in peacekeeping missions, and is also eager to expand its presence in new global initiatives. By joining the Peace Council, Morocco positions itself favorably in discussions on security and stability, gaining an influential role in shaping international approaches to conflict management. This move also helps to reinforce Morocco’s image as a responsible actor that avoids relying solely on a single framework for its diplomatic and security strategies.

Sixth: Is the time of the United Nations over?

The prediction that the United Nations mission is coming to an end may be premature, but it still carries weight. The key point is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness, not one of existence. It continues to exist, but it can no longer handle alone a world marked by multiple power centers, rising complex conflicts, and waning trust in collective action. So, the Peace Council isn’t signaling its demise but rather highlighting the deepening challenges facing the traditional international system.

In the end, the Peace Council put together by the Trump administration isn’t officially replacing the United Nations yet, but it definitely marks a shift—signaling that we’re moving from one phase to another. We’re entering a time when peace and security are handled through selective alliances and initiatives driven by major powers, rather than through large umbrella organizations. The big question is, will this new approach bring about more effective peace, or will it make the world less legitimate and more fragile? The answer won’t be found just in the data but in how this new model actually plays out on the ground.

Everybody is talking about how the Trump administration is combining carrots and sticks in novel ways in its attempt to control Venezuela’s present and imminent future. But the stances that other governments around the world have taken after the bizarre reality that the US Navy choppers left behind is also worthy of a closer look. 

Some governments have questioned Delcy Rodríguez’s legitimacy, or reaffirmed their support of the opposition victory in the 2024 election, while chavismo’s longtime allies and pragmatic regional partners have engaged with or recognized the interim government. 

A pattern emerges: cautious engagement that aims to prevent a state of chaos that would make our country a more problematic place than it already is. 

Neighbors Colombia and Brazil might favor the institutional continuity that Rodríguez offers, since the mayhem caused by a prolonged conflict would likely result in further migratory crises. China’s position appears to be financially driven, as the interest payments from Venezuela’s debt relied on oil shipments, which could be interrupted because of the increasing US involvement in the oil industry. In addition, it’s worth pointing out that Russia’s support is not as solid as previously considered, given statements by its ambassador that suggest broader divisions within of the chavista coalition. 

Other governments framed their position along with their longstanding rejection of Maduro’s legitimacy and the electoral fraud of 2024. Most of their current leaders come from conservative parties and positioning themselves as actively anti-chavismo might perform well with their domestic constituencies. In addition, their response reinforced alignment with Washington, at a time in which US foreign policy became particularly focused on the region. 

A third group opted for a delicate balancing act. While many support a democratic transition, they avoid endorsing Maduro’s removal, out of concern for future military interventions by the US, in particular because of Trump’s rhetoric on Greenland. These countries also emphasize elections and negotiated solutions. A notable addition of this group is Turkey, a longtime Maduro ally now seeking to preserve working relations with Washington amid shifting regional dynamics, particularly in Syria.

Colombia

Beyond “respecting” her swearing in, as stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosa Villavicencio, President Petro’s administration has engaged in talks with Delcy Rodríguez and even suggested that there could be a meeting in Bogotá (although her government denied any imminent trips). On January 27th, Petro also demanded the return of Maduro and Flores, alleging that they were “kidnapped” and that they needed to face trial in Venezuela. 

Brazil

Brasilia was quick to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as interim president. President Lula Da Silva condemned the military operation referring to it as an “unacceptable crossing of a line” and a “grave affront of sovereignty”. On January 9th, Rodríguez thanked Da Silva for his “support and solidarity.”

Nicaragua

In a statement during the UN’s Security Council meeting, that country’s representative condemned American military actions, recognized Delcy Rodríguez as interim president and called for the release of Maduro and Cilia Flores. The Rodríguez government also accepted the credentials of the new Nicaraguan ambassador Valezka López.

Cuba

In addition to confirming the deaths of 32 Cuban military officers during Maduro’s extraction, the Díaz Canel government remained supportive. In a speech condemning the attacks, the Cuban president said he was willing to give his “blood” for Venezuela. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez was seen in Caracas with Rodríguez in a memorial ceremony for the Cuban officers killed on January 3rd.

Russia

On January 6th, the Russian Foreign Ministry celebrated the appointment of Delcy Rodríguez and referred to it as a measure to safeguard stability amidst “neocolonial threats”. Moscow also called for the release of Maduro and Flores. Later, on January 25th, the Russian Ambassador in Venezuela, Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov, claimed that Maduro was betrayed by Venezuelan security officers.

China

Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said her country “respected” the arrangement that led to Rodríguez’s swearing in. The Chinese ambassador Lan Hu in Caracas met with Rodríguez and stated that his country remains committed to Venezuela. Rodríguez thanked him for his support.

Mexico

On January 5th, President Claudia Sheinbaum condemned Maduro’s extraction, citing the country’s long standing rejection of foreign intervention. Mexico promoted a joint statement with Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Spain and Chile rejecting the military operation. 

Spain

After “emphatically condemning” the US incursion, the Pedro Sánchez government saluted Delcy Rodríguez as its counterpart. Foreign minister José Manuel Albares said that, while they didn’t recognize the official results of the 2024 election, they were open to working with her administration. They also have been in contact with the opposition with the hopes of facilitating dialogue. 

India

On January 4th, the Indian government expressed its concern over the situation in Venezuela and the “wellbeing of the people in Venezuela”. They called for peaceful and negotiated solutions. On January 30th, President Modi spoke with Rodriguez, referring to her as acting president and stating that both leaders would seek further cooperation between their countries. 

Qatar 

On January 10th, Delcy Rodriguez thanked the Kingdom of Qatar for facilitating the release of the first “proof of life” of Maduro. In addition, Qatari authorities said they were open to facilitate a dialogue for a peaceful resolution. The Rodríguez government also received the new Qatari ambassador, Salman Nabit Mubarak Abdullah.

Argentina

In an interview with Andrés Oppenheimer, President Javier Milei celebrated Maduro’s extraction and referred to it as a “liberation”. His government stated they trusted Trump’s transition plan towards democracy and peace.

Bolivia

In a statement on January 3rd, the Rodrigo Paz government released a statement showing support for “the Venezuelan people” in what he considered the beginning of a path of “recovery of his democracy” and considered “inescapable” that there is a “real democratic transition”. Shortly after Maduro’s removal, La Paz announced entry restrictions for individuals linked to chavismo. 

Costa Rica

On January 5th, President Rodrigo Chaves emphasized that his country never recognized Maduro as a legitimate leader and expressed hopes that the political transition leads to democracy.

Dominican Republic

President Luis Abinader posted on X that his government was closely monitoring the events in Venezuela, and emphasized respect for the true results of the 2024 election. Foreign Minister Roberto Álvarez said they did not recognize Rodriguez’s government, but emphasized the need to re-establish consular relationships. Venezuela’s chancellor Yvan Gil announced that these relationships would be reactivated in the coming days after cutting ties in the aftermath of the 2024 electoral fraud. 

Peru

Peruvian Interim President Jose Jerí had a phone call with Edmundo González, who the country recognizes as president elect. In a statement, his office said that he supported a political transition and hoped that the results of the 2024 election were respected.

Ecuador

Ecuador’s Foreign Affairs Office announced that it was restricting access to Venezuelans linked to the Maduro government. In addition, President Daniel Noboa celebrated the removal of Maduro by posting in his personal X account, “the time will come for all narco-chavista criminals. Its structure will end up falling all over the continent”. He also called for María Corina Machado and Edmundo González to take power. Noboa attended Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in December 2025.

Panama

President José Raul Mulino of Panama, who also attended the Nobel Prize ceremony in Oslo, stated that his country does not intend to recognize Rodríguez as interim President. 

Chile

President Gabriel Boric condemned the January 3rd attacks and called for a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan crisis. In a meeting at the UN Security Council, Chile’s representative stated that her country did not recognize the Maduro regime and also called for a peaceful and gradual transition process. President-elect José Antonio Kast, set to take office in March, celebrated Maduro’s capture in early January and called for regional cooperation to re-establish democracy and to “coordinate the safe and expeditious return of Venezuelans to their country.”

Paraguay

President Santiago Peña of Paraguay lamented the military incursion in the region, but stated that he didn’t see “any other alternative”. He called for a democratic resolution of the crisis and emphasized that Maduro’s removal was positive for the region. Peña also attended Machado’s Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony.

Canada

Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney emphasized that his country has not recognized Maduro since the 2018 presidential vote, and voiced his support for a transition. However, he called for restraint and adherence among all actors involved.

Italy 

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that she is monitoring the situation in Venezuela. In an X post, she celebrated the announcement of the release of political prisoners and hoped that Rodríguez would usher in a “new era of constructive relationships between Caracas and Rome”. The Rodriguez government also accepted the credentials of the new Italian ambassador, Giovanni Umberto De Vito and, with approval of the National Assembly, named Maria Elena Uzzo as the new ambassador to Italy.

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Keir Starmer released a statement on January 3rd celebrating Maduro’s removal and saying that his government will “shed no tears about the end of his regime”. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper reaffirmed support for a transition in a speech before the House of Commons, urging Rodríguez to take steps towards democratization.

Uruguay

Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin stated on January 9th that his country does not recognize Delcy Rodríguez, arguing it had not extend such recognition to Maduro. 

European Union

Annita Hipper, foreign affairs spokesperson for the European Commission, said the EU did not intend to recognize Rodríguez as interim president. In a press briefing, she emphasized that both Rodríguez and Maduro lacked electoral legitimacy. However, the European Commission has indicated it will maintain “limited contact” with Venezuelan officials.

Germany 

While initially condemning Maduro, calling for a political solution and respect for international law, the Merz government stated it was still conducting a legal assessment of US actions. A spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs questioned Rodriguez’s legitimacy.

France

After political backlash caused by Macron’s initial reaction celebrating Maduro’s extraction and calling for Edmundo González to be sworn in, a French government spokesperson said the president remained neutral about the method used to remove Maduro, and continued calling for González to be sworn in.

Turkey

After Maduro’s removal, President Erdogan has remained moderately silent. In the direct aftermath of the extraction, his government called for restraint of all parties involved for the sake of regional safety in a statement. On January 5th, Erdogan stated that he brought up his criticisms of the military operation to Trump during a phone call.