ASEAN

ASEAN is attempting to secure a foothold in the global semiconductor and electric-vehicle battery industries. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have each announced concrete industrial commitments that signal an ambition to move deeper into high-value manufacturing. These efforts carry strategic implications because semiconductors, power electronics, and batteries are essential inputs for artificial intelligence, renewable energy systems, and modern defense industries. The region now faces a growing set of geopolitical and engineering pressures that directly affect planned projects, cost structures, and national industrial strategies.

This piece documents the most significant national developments in 2024 and 2025, outlines precise vulnerabilities, and provides realistic mitigation measures for decision makers.

Strategic Context

In October 2025 China announced additional controls on rare-earth exports and related processing technologies. This decision briefly tightened the market for rare earth magnets and separated oxides that are crucial for EV motors and semiconductor equipment. Although Beijing later delayed parts of the policy’s implementation, the message was clear. Critical inputs can be restricted with little warning.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have continued to adjust export controls on chip-making equipment. Any further tightening directly affects the cost and feasibility of new packaging and test facilities across ASEAN. The strategic environment surrounding high technology has therefore become volatile and has placed pressure on firms hoping to expand into advanced electronics production.

Malaysia: Penang’s Advanced Packaging Ambitions

Malaysia is pursuing one of the most aggressive semiconductor upgrade strategies in Southeast Asia. Penang’s “Silicon Island” project and the new Green Tech Park represent a deliberate shift from assembly to higher-value packaging and design. Approved semiconductor-related investments reportedly exceeded RM 70 billion between January 2024 and June 2025. Investments include Infineon’s silicon carbide expansion and Carsem’s advanced packaging facilities for AI-related chips.

Advanced packaging and testing lines in Malaysia’s semiconductor clusters still depend on specialized lithography subsystems, ultra-high-purity precursor chemicals, and precision metrology equipment. These imports are increasingly vulnerable because Malaysia’s new export-control regime now requires notifications for high-performance AI chips and equipment, creating possible bottlenecks and compliance burdens. For example, Malaysia’s July 2025 directive made exporters notify authorities at least 30 days in advance when shipping U.S.-origin high-performance AI chips, signaling that regulatory headwinds may also apply upstream in tool and component supply chains. Without expedited import lanes, delays in receiving critical equipment would postpone factory commissioning in locations such as Penang, driving up capital costs through extended financing periods.

The Malaysian government must fast-track customs and import lanes for critical equipment, co-finance spare-parts pools for fabs, and invest in infrastructure near semiconductor clusters such as high-quality water, power reliability, and waste treatment. In parallel, public-private training centers should train large numbers of precision-manufacturing engineers.

Indonesia: Nickel Dominance and Downstream Battery Production

Indonesia has used its dominant nickel reserves to pull in major EV battery investments. The flagship project is the nearly USD 6 billion joint venture between Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. (CATL) and Indonesia Battery Corporation in West Java. According to a June 2025 Reuters report, the facility is scheduled to begin operations by late 2026 with a starting capacity of 6.9 GWh, with an expansion path toward 15 GWh or more. This scale demonstrates Indonesia’s ambition to anchor the region’s battery ecosystem, but it also highlights the limits of upstream advantage.

Despite controlling the raw material, Indonesia’s battery value chain is not yet integrated. The CATL–IBC project will still depend heavily on imported precursor chemicals, cathode active materials, and high-precision manufacturing equipment. Reuters noted that while Indonesia has rapidly expanded nickel processing, the country has not built the full suite of midstream capabilities required for stable cell production. Critical reagents and machinery remain tied to suppliers in China, South Korea, and Japan.

This dependency introduces substantial strategic risk. A February 2025 C4ADS report found that Chinese companies control roughly 75 percent of Indonesia’s nickel-refining capacity. That concentration means that although production occurs on Indonesian soil, operational control, technology flows, and strategic decisions often originate in external corporate or policy environments. Any shift in Chinese domestic policy, export priorities, or commercial strategy could ripple through Indonesia’s downstream battery plans and disrupt cell production timelines.

Given these vulnerabilities, Indonesia must accelerate the development of domestic precursor and cathode material facilities to reduce exposure to foreign suppliers. Battery-plant construction should also be sequenced with upgrades to grid capacity, wastewater management, and environmental controls, since these engineering systems remain bottlenecks in several industrial zones. Finally, manufacturers should design production lines with modularity so they can switch battery chemistries if global markets or reagent availability changes.

Thailand: Converting an Automotive Giant into an EV Hub

Thailand is moving quickly to convert its dominant automotive industry into an electric-vehicle hub. The Board of Investment’s EV 3.5 package, announced in 2025, offers tax incentives, consumer subsidies, and import-duty relief through 2027 for manufacturers that commit to local production. This policy has already shifted investment patterns. BYD opened a USD 490 million plant in Rayong in mid-2025 with capacity for 150,000 EVs annually, marking one of the largest EV manufacturing commitments in Southeast Asia. Domestic EV registrations also surged to roughly 70,000 units in 2024, up from fewer than 10,000 in 2021.

Despite these gains, Thailand’s EV ecosystem remains dependent on imported battery cells, semiconductor components, and rare-earth magnets. ASEAN Briefing’s September 2025 assessment found that Thailand still lacks mid-stream capabilities such as cathode production, electrolyte processing, and advanced battery-testing facilities. This dependence exposes the sector to the same vulnerabilities faced by regional semiconductor clusters.

These components also move through logistics systems designed for traditional automotive supply chains. Laem Chabang Port remains optimized for bulk auto parts rather than high-value lithium-ion cells. EV assemblers reported delays in 2025 due to congestion and manual customs checks on sensitive components during peak export periods. Even minor slowdowns disrupt just-in-time assembly and raise operational costs.

To protect its emerging EV advantage, Thailand must expand bonded logistics zones for battery components, accelerate port digitization, and cooperate with ASEAN partners to harmonize battery standards. Without these measures, Thailand’s EV ambitions will remain vulnerable to supply-chain friction and regulatory fragmentation.

Regional Risk Map

1. Material-concentration risk. China’s export controls on rare earths and magnets create leverage points. ASEAN must map critical-element dependencies and invest in regional recycling and stockpiles.
2. Equipment-and-technology risk. Restrictive export regimes on chip-making tools raise project execution risk. ASEAN governments should establish pooled spare-parts procurement, trusted procurement corridors, and diplomatic waiver channels.
3. Infrastructure-and-skills risk. All three countries face co-investment requirements in power, water, waste, and vocational training aligned with advanced manufacturing. ASEAN-level funding mechanisms and mutual recognition of professional certifications would reduce friction.

ASEAN stands at a pivotal moment. The opportunities to capture semiconductor back-end, EV battery manufacturing, and higher-value electronics are real. Malaysia’s move into advanced packaging, Indonesia’s downstream battery strategy, and Thailand’s EV pivot are promising. They are also fragile. Each depends on imported tools, materials, and specialized skills that can be disrupted by geopolitical shifts.

The region’s success will depend on how quickly leaders can reduce those vulnerabilities through strategic infrastructure investment, targeted industrial policy, regional standardization, and coordinated risk management. Without these measures, factories across ASEAN will remain profitable in calm markets but exposed during periods of geopolitical tension.

They call it a new chapter. For Timor-Leste — a nation born from fire, driven by a stubborn tenderness for its own future — that chapter begins with a long-cherished dream finally realised: accession to ASEAN. The ceremony in Kuala Lumpur was more than a ceremonial hoisting of a flag. It was a national exhale; a small, mountainous country of 1.4 million now stepping into a $3.8 trillion regional economy, with access to markets, labour mobility and political networks that a generation of Timorese leaders have chased since the end of occupation.

But dreams do not automatically translate into livelihoods. Behind the spectacle lies a harsh reality. Timor-Leste’s public funds have long been supported by oil and gas; a Petroleum Fund that once seemed like an unstoppable safety net now stands at about US$18 billion, roughly ten times the size of the non-oil economy. That reserve has funded unhealthy comforts: public spending that hides a weak private sector and limited job creation. International agencies have plainly warned that without decisive structural change, withdrawals will deplete the fund, and fiscal consolidation will be unavoidable by the late 2030s. The diplomatic victory of ASEAN membership gives Timor-Leste some breathing space — not an open cheque.

If there is a single, combustible source of hope it is Timor-Leste’s people. More than half the population is under 25, a demographic shape that could be blessing or burden. Invest in them and the dividend could be immense; ignore them and the social consequences will be stark. The World Bank and UN partners have reiterated the message: the nation must rapidly transform its petroleum wealth into human capital.

Education is not a sentimental policy box. It is Timor-Leste’s lifeline. In the years after independence the country achieved near-universal primary enrolment — a testament to determination and a vital base to build from. Yet quality lags, secondary and vocational pathways are thin, literacy remains stubbornly low in parts, and rural classrooms are starved of materials and trained teachers. If Timor-Leste is to avoid the ‘resource mirage’ and build diversified industry; tourism, agro-processing, fisheries, light manufacturing, it must scale teacher training, technical education and secondary access now.

There is rich irony here. Timor-Leste’s inheritance is not only oil; it is a deep well of local knowledge, language and culture. Tetum, ancestral farming techniques and community stewardship of marine coasts. Education that respects and builds on that knowledge will do more than teach arithmetic: it will anchor citizens to livelihoods that are sustainable and uniquely Timorese. Pilot studies already show promise: teaching science through local agriculture and marine ecology makes learning relevant and sticky. This is a policy sweet spot where identity and development reinforce one another.

The foreign-policy playbook Timor-Leste is writing is strikingly pragmatic. It seeks friends everywhere: Australia and Japan on governance and renewable energy; China and India for infrastructure and scholarships; the EU and multilateral banks for budget support and norms; and the Global South (CPLP, G7+) for political solidarity. This is small-state diplomacy at its finest — networked, nimble, and honest about capacity limits. The Tibar Bay Port public-private partnership, championed with Chinese and private partners, is an early testament to the practical payoff of such outreach: ports, connectors and trade corridors that can anchor an export economy.

And yet, for all its global friends, Timor-Leste’s credibility rests on its domestic reform. Corruption, weak public financial management and the slow pace of accountability erode trust and scare off the long-term investors Timor-Leste needs. The answer is painfully ordinary: transparent budgets, active audits, prosecutions where evidence exists, and devolution of decision-making so rural communities can see value return to their villages. Only then will foreign capital stay beyond short-term infrastructure projects and fund genuine, job-creating enterprises.

Climate change is no footnote. Timor-Leste’s mountains and coasts are exposed to storms, floods and erosion; nearly 15 per cent of the population stands to gain from GCF-backed rural resilience projects that repair roads, irrigation and water supplies. These are not charity: they are investments that protect productivity, reduce disaster costs and safeguard food security. Marrying green infrastructure with grassroots knowledge is both practical and moral.

Unlike Singapore — a compact, highly urbanised entrepôt that inherited British administrative systems and English-language institutions and could pursue rapid, technocratic, top-down development — Timor-Leste emerged from decades of violent occupation with Portuguese colonial legacies, a dispersed rural population, nascent public institutions and a heavy, finite dependence on petroleum revenues; consequently, where Singapore could quickly attract multinational capital and build bureaucratic capacity, Timor-Leste must first prioritise rebuilding local administrative capability, craft multilingual education policies rooted in Tetum and local wisdom, and pursue community-centred diversification strategies suited to a post-conflict, resource-dependent society.

Timor-Leste’s reform strategy must address political-economic realities such as vested interests, elite capture, and inadequate administrative ability, which will hinder progress unless reformers establish wide coalitions and achieve visible short-term gains. Immediate efforts should prioritise public audits and targeted scholarships to increase confidence and swiftly offer benefits to communities. Over the medium term, pass and execute a stronger Public Financial Management Act to enhance budget regulations, procurement, and oversight. Long-term work should explore decentralisation in selected districts, combining fiscal devolution with capacity-building to ensure local governments handle funds openly and provide visible results to rural voters.

What should Canberra and others in the region do? Support Timor-Leste’s human-capital pivot, yes; but do it through long-term technical cooperation, scholarships tied to return-home conditions, and public-sector mentoring that helps rebuild procurement and auditing systems. Encourage ASEAN to fast-track trade and mobility measures that fit Timor-Leste’s capacity, not only its potential. And when investment arrives, insist it rides on the rails of transparency and community benefit.

Timor-Leste has endured colonisation, occupation, and the trauma of state-building. It now stands at a rare crossroads: a diplomatic win that could be the first chapter of a story about inclusive prosperity — or a beautiful opening to a chapter that closes too soon. The decision will not be made in Kuala Lumpur’s ceremonial halls; it will be determined in classrooms, provincial council chambers, and the small harbours where fisherfolk mend nets. If ASEAN membership teaches us anything, it is this: belonging to a community of nations only counts if that belonging creates more opportunities for ordinary people. For Timor-Leste, the task is urgent, the tools are known, and the country’s people — fierce, young, and proud — are waiting.

Russia’s policy towards Southeast Asia is undergoing a remarkable adjustment period. From focusing on defense cooperation, which has been its traditional strength, Russia is gradually shifting its focus to more sustainable areas. This shift reflects Russia’s flexible efforts to maintain its presence in a region strongly affected by great power competition, while demonstrating its ambition to position itself as a reliable and independent partner, contributing to the balance of influence against the expanding US involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

From diplomatic presence to substantive cooperation

For many years, Russia’s Southeast Asia policy has been largely confined to diplomatic presence and participation in ASEAN-led multilateral forums. However, in the wake of Trump 2.0’s tariff adjustments, Moscow has increasingly recognized Southeast Asia as a potential market to fill the economic void left by sanctions. This realization has led to more proactive and substantive shifts in Russia’s regional policy.

Since the beginning of 2025, Russia has stepped up bilateral cooperation with key ASEAN economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, focusing on areas that the US and China have not yet focused on competing in, such as oil and gas exploitation, agriculture, and civil nuclear power. At the same time, Russia has also expanded its network of embassies, cultural centers, and trade promotion agencies in most ASEAN countries, thereby creating a multi-layered approach from politics to economics.

One of the most notable changes is the shift of Russia’s traditional trade to non-dollar payment mechanisms to minimize the risk of sanctions. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, in 2024, trade turnover between Russia and ASEAN reached a record for the second consecutive year, increasing by 5.8%. Over the past decade, trade turnover has increased by 70%, with most transactions being settled in local currencies or currency swaps. At the same time, Southeast Asia is also a potential area to promote exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), fertilizers, and military materials, helping to reposition Russia as a stable energy supplier.

Diversifying partners outside of China

The trend of diversifying partners beyond China has emerged as a new driving force in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy. After years of relying on the Chinese market as a “lifeline” for its wartime economy, Russia has increasingly recognized the asymmetry in its trade relations as China has gradually gained an overwhelming position. This has forced Russia to rebalance its dependence and expand its influence by seeking alternative partners.

The “multi-directional” policy that Russia is implementing is clearly demonstrated through the strengthening of bilateral economic relations with a number of countries in the region. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, the international situation is opening up many new opportunities for Russia to strengthen relations with the region of more than 650 million people. On the contrary, from the perspective of ASEAN, cooperation with Russia has its own appeal, because investment capital from Russia is considered less politically binding than the “debt trap” risks often associated with projects within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, limited financial resources have caused this direction of Russia to largely stop at the level of framework agreements or projects waiting to be launched.

In addition, Russia has also proposed establishing cooperation mechanisms focusing on less sensitive areas such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief. Although these initiatives have not yet reached the institutional level, they reflect Russia’s efforts in the regional innovation race with the US and China.

Connecting Southeast Asia to the Eurasian Axis and the Global South

Since launching the “Pivot to the East” policy in 2014, Russia’s strategic interests have gradually shifted from the European region to a vision of Eurasian integration. While in the early stages, this policy was mainly aimed at demonstrating efforts to “pivot” according to the trend of global power shifts; entering the 2020s, Russia has concretized its orientation with in-depth initiatives.

Following the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Vietnam in 2015, Russia continued negotiations with Indonesia and Thailand, aiming to form an economic network that is less dependent on the dollar system. Russia is also promoting initiatives for the construction of a connecting corridor between the Russian Far East and Central Asia with maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Speaking at the International Conference on Eurasian Security in Minsk, Belarus, on October 28, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia wants to build a common development structure for the entire region and does not exclude any country on this continent. Transcontinental connectivity projects such as the Vladivostok-Chennai transport corridor or the Asia-Europe maritime and air route are integrated by Russia into its vision of an expanded Asia-Europe economic space, reflecting its efforts to bring Southeast Asia into the Russia-led “Greater Eurasia” strategy.

At the same time, Russia has been actively promoting the “multipolarization” discourse through mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in collaboration with China and India, to strengthen the image of a post-Western order. Russia’s support for Indonesia’s entry into BRICS not only reflects the group’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence but also demonstrates Russia’s strategy of integrating Southeast Asia into the emerging South-South partnership network. Through this, Russia wants to demonstrate its flexible integration into the Asia-Pacific region while also being a voice to show that Russia is not isolated in the process of restructuring the global order.

Taking advantage of ASEAN principles

One of the factors that helps Russia maintain a stable position in Southeast Asia is its ability to effectively exploit ASEAN’s neutral space. Unlike the US or China, which often pursue a strategy of competing for influence by “choosing sides” under pressure, Moscow chooses a flexible approach based on the principle of non-interference in ASEAN’s internal affairs and consensus.

Thanks to these principles, Russia’s participation in ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms is not interpreted as an attempt to form political alliances or challenge the existing order, but on the contrary, is seen as consistent with the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. It is ASEAN’s neutral space that provides Russia with access in a variety of roles, from observer to dialogue partner to direct participant, thereby legitimizing Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia.

In fact, Russia actively participates in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) to promote cooperation in less sensitive areas, helping Russia both strengthen its image as a constructive contributor and avoid creating suspicion from the West.

Rebooting defense and energy diplomacy

Through the two pillars of defense and energy, Russia has put into its foreign policy to reaffirm its position. These are considered the spearheads by which Russia still maintains its most substantial competitive capacity compared to the US.

In the defense sector, Russia is restoring bilateral cooperation with traditional partners such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Previously, Russia accounted for about 25% of the arms market share in Southeast Asia, maintaining its position as the largest supplier in the region. However, instead of continuing to rely on sales contracts, Russia is now focusing on expanding the “after-sales” sector, such as training, maintenance, technology transfer, and joint research in the defense industry. At the multilateral level, Russia actively participates in high-level defense dialogue mechanisms such as ADMM+ and ARF to demonstrate the voice of a responsible partner, promoting peace and stability in the region.

Along with defense, Russia considers energy a common concern to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Russia takes advantage of its deep-sea oil and gas exploitation techniques and develops nuclear power technology to strengthen cooperation with developing economies with large energy consumption needs. Leading energy corporations such as Zarubezhneft and Rosatom have been cooperating with Vietnam in gas exploitation projects on the continental shelf of the East Sea. Russia also boosts LNG exports to Thailand and the Philippines to expand its market share in the region while cooperating with Indonesia’s Pertamina Group in developing petrochemical refining and building civil nuclear energy infrastructure. These steps reflect Moscow’s efforts to establish an Asian energy supply chain to replace the disrupted European market.

Position on the East Sea dispute

Russia’s stance on the East Sea dispute is clearly cautious. Basically, Russia supports the settlement of disputes by peaceful means based on international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while emphasizing the central role of ASEAN in conflict management. Unlike the US, which always emphasizes the issue of freedom of navigation, Russia chooses the role of a “balancing third party,” maintaining cooperative relations with all parties. However, Russia also avoids making specific statements regarding China’s sovereignty claims in order not to harm the Russia-China relationship, which is currently the leading pillar of its foreign policy.

In addition, Russia also supports the early completion of the Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), considering it an important tool to maintain stability and calling on all parties to exercise restraint. Instead of directly engaging in disputes, Russia maintains its presence through limited oil and gas cooperation within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demonstrating Russia’s commitment to the legitimate sovereignty of its partner countries. At the same time, participating in joint exercises with ASEAN countries also helps Russia affirm its image as a responsible power, promoting trust and the ability to coordinate security at sea.

However, Russia’s influence in the South China Sea is still limited. The war in Ukraine has significantly reduced the frequency of Russian military patrols in the region. In addition, the increasingly close relationship between Moscow and Beijing has also made some ASEAN countries cautious, worried that Russia’s “neutrality” could be broken.

The adjustments in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy clearly reflect Russia’s efforts to adapt to a situation where it has to allocate resources to multiple goals. It is easy to see that Russia has chosen to shift from an ideological orientation to a pragmatic strategy, focusing on areas that can generate specific benefits. Instead of directly confronting the US or competing for influence with China, Moscow seeks to exploit gaps to position itself as a balancing factor.

Russia’s current Southeast Asia policy is a survival adaptation, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain influence in a regional structure that is reshaping under the pressure of US-China competition. Under increasing pressure from the US, Russia is forced to pursue a more autonomous path in Southeast Asia to maintain its strategic space. However, Russia’s influence is still limited by its internal capacity and competition from other powers. Russia may not be able to shape the rules of the game or lead the order, but it is certainly a factor that cannot be left out of the Southeast Asian strategic chessboard.

Reporting from Washington — For weeks this fall, an ebullient President Trump traveled relentlessly to hold raise-the-rafters campaign rallies — sometimes three a day — in states where his presence was likely to help Republicans on the ballot.

But his mood apparently has changed as he has taken measure of the electoral backlash that voters delivered Nov. 6. With the certainty that the incoming Democratic House majority will go after his tax returns and investigate his actions, and the likelihood of additional indictments by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Trump has retreated into a cocoon of bitterness and resentment, according to multiple administration sources.

Behind the scenes, they say, the president has lashed out at several aides, from junior press assistants to senior officials. “He’s furious,” said one administration official. “Most staffers are trying to avoid him.”

The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, painted a picture of a brooding president “trying to decide who to blame” for Republicans’ election losses, even as he publicly and implausibly continues to claim victory.

White House Chief of Staff John F. Kelly and Kirstjen Nielsen, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who are close allies, “seem to be on their way out,” the official said, noting recent leaks on the subject. The official cautioned, however, that personnel decisions are never final until Trump himself tweets out the news — often just after the former reality TV star who’s famous for saying “You’re fired!” has directed Kelly to so inform the individual.

And, according to a source outside the White House who has spoken recently with the president, last week’s Wall Street Journal report confirming Trump’s central role during the 2016 campaign in quietly arranging payoffs for two women alleging affairs with him seemed to put him in an even worse mood.

Publicly, Trump has been increasingly absent in recent days — except on Twitter. He has canceled travel plans and dispatched Cabinet officials and aides to events in his place — including sending Vice President Mike Pence to Asia for the annual summits there in November that past presidents nearly always attended.

Jordan’s King Abdullah II was in Washington on Tuesday and met with Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, but not the president.

Also Tuesday, Defense Secretary James N. Mattis announced plans to travel on Wednesday near the U.S.-Mexico border to visit with troops Trump ordered there last month in what is ostensibly a mission to defend against a caravan of Central American migrants moving through Mexico and still hundreds of miles from the United States.

Trump had reportedly considered making that trip himself, but has decided against it. Nor has he spoken of the caravan since the midterm elections, after making it a central issue in his last weeks of campaigning.

Unusually early on Monday, the White House called a “lid” at 10:03 a.m. EST, informing reporters that the president would not have any scheduled activities or public appearances for the rest of the day. Although it was Veterans Day, Trump bucked tradition and opted not to make the two-mile trip to Arlington National Cemetery in northern Virginia to lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, as presidents since at least John F. Kennedy have done to mark the solemn holiday.

FULL COVERAGE: The latest on the Trump administration and the rest of Washington »

Trump’s only public appearance Tuesday was at a short White House ceremony marking the start of the Hindu holiday Diwali at which he made brief comments and left without responding to shouted questions.

He had just returned Sunday night from a two-day trip to France to attend ceremonies marking the centennial of the armistice that ended World War I. That trip was overshadowed, in part, by Trump’s decision not to attend a wreath-laying at the Aisne-Marne American Cemetery, the burial place for 2,289 soldiers 60 miles northeast of Paris, due to rain.

Kelly, a former Marine Corps general, and Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, did attend to honor the American service members interred there. Trump stayed in the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Paris, making no public appearances.

Other heads of state also managed to make it to World War I cemeteries in the area for tributes to their nations’ war dead on Saturday.

Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin were the only world leaders to skip a procession of world leaders to another commemoration, on Sunday, at the Arc de Triomphe. About 80 heads of state walked in unison — under umbrellas in the pouring rain — down Paris’ grand Champs-Elysees boulevard. Trump arrived later by motorcade, a decision aides claimed was made for security reasons.

Nicholas Burns, the former U.S. ambassador to NATO under George W. Bush, said the weekend events, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the end of a war in which 120,000 Americans were killed, were ripe for soaring words and symbolic gestures, which Trump failed to provide.

“Not only did he barely show up, he didn’t say anything that would help Americans understand the scale of the loss, or the importance of avoiding another great war,” Burns said. “He seemed physically and emotionally apart. It’s such a striking difference between the enthusiasm he showed during the campaign and then going to Paris and sulking in his hotel room.”

He added, “The country deserves more energy from the president.”

Trump took heavy flak on social media, especially for his no-show at the military cemetery.

“President @realDonaldTrump a no-show because of raindrops?” tweeted former Secretary of State John F. Kerry, a Navy veteran. “Those veterans the president didn’t bother to honor fought in the rain, in the mud, in the snow – & many died in trenches for the cause of freedom. Rain didn’t stop them & it shouldn’t have stopped an American president.”

Nicholas Soames, a member of Britain’s Parliament and grandson of Winston Churchill, tweeted, “They died with their face to the foe and that pathetic inadequate @realDonaldTrump couldn’t even defy the weather to pay his respects to The Fallen.”

Trump, clearly feeling on the defensive days later, tried to explain himself on Tuesday, in a tweet.

“By the way, when the helicopter couldn’t fly to the first cemetery in France because of almost zero visibility, I suggested driving,” he wrote. “Secret Service said NO, too far from airport & big Paris shutdown. Speech next day at American Cemetary [sic] in pouring rain! Little reported-Fake News!”

In that tweet, Trump falsely described the weather at the Sunday visit to another U.S. cemetery. Rather than “pouring rain,” photos showed him standing without a hat or an umbrella under overcast skies when he delivered remarks, though he did grasp an umbrella at one point while paying tribute at one soldier’s grave.

Just as Trump was returning to Washington on Sunday evening, Pence was heading to Asia in the president’s place, and at his first stop greeted Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Trump’s absence, experts said, is notable, and a glaring affront to many Asian leaders.

“It matters more in Asia than other regions because ‘face’ is so important,” said Matthew P. Goodman, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former White House coordinator for Asia-Pacific strategy during the Obama and George W. Bush administrations. “Your willingness to go out there is a sign you’re committed and not going is a sign you’re not.”

Putin is attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, looking to expand his country’s influence in Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and President Moon Jae-in of South Korea are also attending regional summits. And China’s President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang are simultaneously attending meetings across the region looking to broaden their country’s influence in the South China Sea and expand multilateral trade agreements.

Although Trump is set to meet with Xi at the Group of 20 summit of wealthy countries this month in Buenos Aires, his absence from the major Indo-Pacific meetings for a second straight year will “have some consequences for our position and our interests in the region,” Goodman continued. “Other countries are going to move ahead without us.”

What makes Trump’s perceived snub to the Asian powers more significant is that it comes on the heels of his brief European trip, which showcased his growing isolation from transatlantic allies. French President Emmanuel Macron rebuked Trump in a speech, stating that “nationalism is a betrayal of patriotism” as the U.S. president looked on sullenly.

Trump’s relations with Latin America, already strained, are little better after the White House last week announced that he was reneging for a second time on a commitment to visit Colombia. He had planned to go there later this month on his way back from the G-20 meetings.

In April, he’d sent Pence in his place to the Summit of the Americas in Peru, citing a need to remain in Washington to monitor the U.S. response to a chemical weapons attack in Syria. He’d planned to visit Bogota on the same trip.

This time around, there appeared to be no extenuating circumstances preventing a visit.

In a statement, the White House simply said, “President Trump’s schedule will not allow him to travel to Colombia later this month.”

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@EliStokols