Thu. Oct 24th, 2024
Occasional Digest - a story for you

Authors: Jason Wahlang and Saman Ayesha Kidwai*

Germany has increasingly been beset with the rise of ‘isms’ due to the extremist narratives promoted by the far-left and far-right political actors. They have moved the country further away from its post-World War II liberal and globalist worldview amid heightened domestic polarisation and reinvigoration of German nationalism. This is evident by the rise in the popularity of two parties, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). However, this cannot be understood in isolation and must be examined within the evolving regional context.

Across the continent, mainstreaming of erstwhile fringe ideas and parties on the one hand and rejection of multicultural globalist norms on the other hand have become common. The growing disenchantment of the electorate with traditional politicians due to their failure to address socio-economic grievances, mainly beginning with the fallout of the 2008 global financial crisis, has allowed extremist narratives to gain legitimacy in the political sphere.

Over the past few years, the conflict in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemic have significantly influenced the European continent, having a profound impact on its politics and economy. This has, in turn, reshaped the socio-political landscape of Europe.

Therefore, it is imperative to examine how AfD and BSW have integrated themselves into the mainstream political arena while assessing the impact of their domestic and foreign policy on the domestic and regional landscape.

Analysing the AfD and BSW

AfD

The AfD, a far-right party established in 2013, surged in popularity following the refugee crisis of 2015. It effectively tapped into the public’s discontent with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s refugee policy, advocating staunch anti-immigration positions that struck a chord with a segment of the local populace. Notably, the decision to play host to more than a million refugees as part of the Open Door Policy was a gamble that had received considerable backlash, including from within her party members.

Genuine concerns about border security, cultural assimilation, socio-economic opportunities, and unemployment were amplified through virulent rhetoric and media platforms, creating a trickle-down effect in German society. This allowed the AfD to ride on the wave of tribalism and identity politics to electoral success over the next few years, making a mark in the parliament.

Since its inception, the AfD, an overtly xenophobic and anti-immigrant party, has been a potent force in Germany’s political landscape, particularly in the comparatively less prosperous and neglected Eastern Germany. It has been compared to the National Socialist Party and branded as a threat to democracy by the country’s domestic intelligence agency. However, it has effectively positioned itself as the only legitimate representative of those disenchanted with the status quo maintained by centrist and centre-right policies since 1945. This is evident by its electoral success and projections, which show that it is expected to be the second-largest party after the upcoming national elections.

BSW

Notably, extremism in German society has not remained confined to the identity politics exploited by the far-right.

Following in the AfD’s footsteps, another party – BSW – has significantly shaped German politics. As a far-left populist party, the BSW has championed itself as an alternative to traditional parties like the Social Democrats, the Christian Democratic Union, the Left party, and the Greens. Founded by Sahra Wagenknecht, who was part of the Der Linke party until 2023, the BSW has been vocal about its differences on national and global issues, but like the AfD, it has presented an unlikely hardened anti-immigration stance.

Despite its left-leaning label and economic policies, the BSW has strategically adopted a slightly far-right stance on domestic and border security by co-opting AfD’s position on immigration. By tactically tapping into anti-migration rhetoric that has gained significant acceptance among the public, the party has effectively capitalised on the growing dissatisfaction within the German public towards the state’s immigration policies.

This strategic, ideological framework has broadened the party’s support base by reaching beyond economically left-leaning working-class individuals to attract conservative voters (who perceive AfD to be ‘too extremist’) who support anti-immigration measures. These trends showcase the intricate nature of the current political landscape. The party’s political acumen is reminiscent of the Socialist Party in the Netherlands or the Communist Party of Greece, which share similar stances on specific issues.

Impact on the Domestic Space

The German public sees the two parties through different lenses. The BSW is considered a party more ideologically moderate than the AfD. To a large extent of the population, the BSW is even seen as a non-extremist alternative to the AfD, particularly with the population hesitant to support the far-right AfD but supportive of its anti-immigration rhetoric. The BSW’s stance on anti-immigration is seen as more based on national pride, whereas the AfD is seen to be more racist-oriented.

On one hand, the AfD has gained recent prominence with its regional, national, and European Parliament election performances. Over the years, the AfD has begun gaining support amongst the public. In the 2017 Bundestag elections, the party gained a 12.6 per cent vote share, thus making it the first non-mainstream party to enter the Bundestag since the 1990s. There was a slight dent to the AfD political aspirations in 2021, after the Bundestag elections, where it saw a reduction of the vote share and the party secured 10.3 per cent of the vote.

Nonetheless, this loss of vote share has not translated to the regional elections, with the party improving in the recent election in Brandenburg (29.2 per cent), gaining a six per cent increase from the previous election of 2019 (23 per cent). In Thuringia, the party became the first far-right party since the Second World War to win a regional election with a 33 per cent vote share. This increase in the vote share is concerning given that the Bundestag elections are due to be held next year, mainly since this highlights a staggering shift in the vote share among the local populace from the mainstay parties. This can also be seen as a reaction of the local population towards migration, given how the AfD’s primary focus and rhetoric is based on the idea of anti-migration.

It also indicates how there is a growing concentration of racists and extremists within the society, albeit it would be an exaggeration to claim it signals a return to the ecosystem promoted by Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Party.

On the other hand, despite only being established  in January 2024, the BSW party has gained substantial electoral support in the recent regional elections in the Eastern side of Germany. The party saw a vote share of 11.8 per cent in Saxony, 15.8 per cent in Thuringia, and 13 per cent in Brandenburg. Given that the party was formed in the early months of 2024, the results have been seen as remarkable, and the performance has ensured that the party could play a part in the role of kingmaker in Saxony and Thuringia.

Furthermore, gains and strategic initiatives such as these could bolster its political future as it positions itself as the more acceptable extremist force than AfD, which is perceived as a neo-Nazi party. They would prove critical to realise the party’s vision to establish itself an important broker in German politics and as a national party by expanding its influence beyond Eastern Germany  and carving a presence in the Bundestag in Berlin.

The party has also begun establishing state-level branches, with the most recent opening in Bremen, a proven testing ground for political experiments. It seeks to tap into the vote share of the mainstream parties through its benefit-based economic policies coupled with strict domestic migration laws. If it gets substantial support in the West, similar to that in the East, the party could gain prominence in the overall political structure of Germany. It could become a key political force in the 2025 Bundestag elections if it keeps performing on the same trajectory and pushes its narrative in the Western part of Germany. 

Convergences and Divergences

Notably, despite their polarising ideological positioning and key differences on domestic and foreign policy issues, the BSW and AfD also share some similarities.

One of the major highlights of the BSW party manifesto is its opinion on regional and global issues. In the Russia-Ukraine war, the party has stressed the need to oppose any stationing of the United States’ long-range weapons in Germany. The party mentioned the need to end military aid for Ukraine. The party is also supportive of negotiating the end of the war, including the relinquishing of territory. A similar stand can be seen from the AfD, with the party stressing the need to end military aid to Ukraine. The two parties partly blamed NATO for the war in Ukraine, and additionally, they boycotted the address of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Bundestag. These strong stances on the Russia-Ukraine war can be seen in the long term as the two parties are trying to ensure strong voter support in East Germany given its old ties with the Soviet Union and certain populations still having some affinity towards Russia and their Soviet past.

The two parties also share similar sentiments concerning climate policies but with different justifications. While both parties oppose climate policies, they differ in their reasons; the AfD feels they threaten German identity, and the BSW feels that climate policy has eroded the welfare state and impacted economic quality.

However, a key point of divergence between these parties is reflected in their economic policies. While BSW promotes and advocates for expanding economic benefits, including generous pensions and an increase in minimum wages, the AfD stresses the need to reduce state subsidies and the taxation ceiling and abolish wealth and inheritance taxes. Furthermore, while the AfD supports keeping the minimum wages at the status quo and encourages pro-family fiscal initiatives, the BSW seeks economic benefits that are available to all.

Additionally, the two parties have differing views regarding the Gazan conflict. The AfD, despite its neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic affiliations, has been firmly pro-Israel. At the same time, the AfD calls for the cutting of aid and support for the Palestinians, including through UNRWA. However, the BSW criticises Benyamin Netanyahu’s actions in Gaza, including calling Gaza an ‘open-air prison’ and calls for the end of the war. It also stresses the need for a two-state solution while emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself.

Finally, the two parties differ regarding Germany’s participation in the European Union (EU). On the one hand, The AfD is considerably anti-EU and aspires to have a referendum on German Exit, similar to Brexit. On the other hand, BSW calls for reformation from within to a more nation-centric and less integrated European Union while being critical of further expansion.  

Conclusion

Overall, BSW and AfD have proved electorally and socially disruptive to the status quo that governed Germany for over half a century. By exploiting the rise of conservatism prevailing in the European sphere and anti-immigration sentiments in Germany, they have carved their strongholds in East Germany, and AfD particularly has become a force to be reckoned with considering the projections of the 2025 elections. The BSW, in particular, has laid the foundation for becoming the potential kingmaker and having the most stakes in regional government formation. As schisms in German society widen alongside a surge in extremist and populist rhetoric across Europe, similar trends can be expected to take shape.

It is vital to consider that these developments will inevitably dent the resilience and acceptance of liberal globalist policies across the continent without completely eroding them. This is despite the zeitgeist favouring extremist ideological worldviews in Germany due to the stagnation of liberal economic institutions and periods of upheavals caused by the 2008 financial and 2015 refugee crises and COVID-19. There is no precedent of successfully translating populist rhetoric into concrete reforms without pushing the world into greater uncertainty and instability. The role of the Nazi Party in pushing the world into a protracted World War in 1939 remains a harrowing reminder.

*Saman Ayesha Kidwai is a Research Analyst in the Counter-Terrorism Centre at MP-IDSA. Her views are personal and do not reflect those of the institute or the Government of India.

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