Mon. Nov 25th, 2024
Occasional Digest - a story for you

In 2024, gaining international recognition for the Taliban will be crucial from a diplomatic standpoint. The unrecognized Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which was re-established after a disorganized and poorly planned withdrawal by the US and NATO armies, is currently facing a challenging economic and social-humanitarian situation. Without diplomatic recognition from any country across the globe, the Afghan state is in a dire crisis. Afghanistan’s sovereign assets, which are worth over nine billion US dollars, are still frozen in Western banks. Major global companies refuse to cooperate with Afghan enterprises, investments, and money transfers are not being carried out in reality.

The Taliban has two main wings: a rational one and a conservative one. The rational wing of the Taliban is looking to establish good relationships with other countries, including regional powers, leaders of the Western world, and the world’s largest economies. On the other hand, the conservative wing is more focused on the Haqqani Network and its sponsors in conservative circles of the Pakistani army. They are not interested in normalizing relations with the outside world. For conservatives and radical groups within the Taliban, this situation is beneficial because it allows them to have a monopoly of power in the territory. Therefore, the year 2024 will be a crucial year in determining how external forces, great powers, and regional states plan to shape their strategy towards the Taliban.

There is a growing awareness among moderate Taliban members about the significance of this year. Ariana News, an Afghan publication that supports a modernist perspective, has noted that in the 1402 (2024) solar year, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has not received international recognition to take its place in the United Nations. This is due to the Taliban’s restrictions on education and work for women and girls, which have resulted in the international community distancing itself from the Emirate. However, the Taliban government has made some progress in its diplomatic relations with certain countries. For example, China was the first to send an official ambassador to Kabul, and a Taliban ambassador arrived in Beijing. Additionally, some Afghan diplomatic missions, which are still managed by diplomats appointed under the previous Ashraf Ghani regime, have gradually started to establish connections with the IEA, including the Netherlands and Spain.

Over the past year, the Islamic Emirate’s diplomats have taken control of the Afghan Embassy and consulates in India. Turkmenistan has removed the name Taliban from their list of terrorist groups. Meanwhile, Iran, Afghanistan’s western neighbor, has become involved in a dispute with the IEA regarding the rights to water from the Helmand River, which originates in Afghanistan. Relations with Pakistan have also deteriorated as Islamabad accused the Taliban of providing a safe haven for militants of the Pakistani Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP) group in Afghanistan. These tensions increased when Islamabad began forcibly expelling more than a million Afghan immigrants.

The interim government in Afghanistan is currently being run by the IEA Cabinet, although many former officials and politicians are returning to the country. The IEA leadership is proud of their accomplishments during the 1402 solar year, highlighting progress in all areas, particularly in expanding relations with other countries. The Taliban believes that certain countries, particularly the United States, are influencing the UN and preventing global recognition of their government. Currently, the IEA has 38 active diplomatic missions in different countries, and Azerbaijan has announced its intention to open an embassy in Kabul. Experts predict that the 1403 solar year (starting on March 21) will be crucial in determining whether the Taliban government will be recognized as legitimate or not.

At the same time, there are several international and regional terrorist groups present on Afghan territory, which poses a serious obstacle to progress in the issue of recognizing the Taliban and their Islamic Emirate. These groups threaten countries in South Asia and the world, and some radical groups even pose a threat to the main creators and sponsors of the Taliban – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The Taliban recently reported clashes with Pakistani security forces in the Afghan province of Paktika on the border and also claimed that Pakistani forces carried out an airstrike on areas in western Afghanistan, resulting in the death of at least eight civilians. This strike was condemned in Kabul. Islamabad reported that the attack was not targeted towards the Taliban but towards fighters from a banned extremist group in Pakistan. Muhammad Amin Khuzaifa, a representative of the authorities in the province of Paktika in western Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan, stated that there were clashes that lasted until 4 pm local time. As of March 19, there is a tense calm along the Afghan-Pakistani border, which is also known as the Durand Line, stretching 2600 kilometers. It’s important to note that Kabul does not recognize this border.

The sides involved in the conflict have exchanged strong statements, which indicates that there is a hidden and deep-seated disagreement between certain layers and clans within the Taliban and the Pakistani political elite. After Pakistan carried out airstrikes on the Afghan provinces of Paktika and Khost, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif declared that he will not tolerate cross-border terrorism. In response, a representative of the Islamic Emirate, Zabihullah Mujahid, warned Islamabad of serious consequences. The statement emphasized that Pakistan should not blame Afghanistan for its lack of control, incompetence, and problems on its territory. The statement also warned that such incidents could have serious consequences that would go beyond Pakistan’s control.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif has emphasized that “terrorism must be eradicated” and that Pakistan’s borders are a red line for terrorism. Last year, Pakistan consistently accused the Taliban of supporting terrorist groups such as the TTP and repeatedly called on Kabul to take serious measures against this group. Pakistan wanted Kabul to extradite its leaders. However, the Taliban rejected all accusations by Pakistan. In this context, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated that Pakistan does not want to engage in armed conflict with Afghanistan. However, he warned that Islamabad could block the corridor it provides to landlocked Afghanistan for trade with India. “If Afghanistan treats us as an enemy, why should we provide them with a trade corridor?” Asif asked. At the same time, former Pakistani Minister of Information Jan Achakzai claims that if the Taliban continue to attack Pakistan, Islamabad will quickly annex the Wakhan Corridor – a narrow strip of land in northeast Afghanistan between Tajikistan, Pakistan, and China that serves as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and its neighbors. The Wakhan Corridor has historically been an important trade route, connecting Central Asia with South Asia and the Middle East, and has played a crucial role in the ancient Silk Road network.

The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that certain forces within the Pakistani elite, especially in the military elite, have provided and continue to assist certain groups within the Taliban. It is important to understand that the Taliban cannot currently inflict significant harm upon Pakistan. However, they may resort to alternative methods such as assisting Islamic extremists and other radical groups to undermine the interests of the Pakistani government.

The political situation in the region is evolving rapidly, with two opposing factions within the Taliban. The moderate wing seeks to establish common ground with neighboring countries and demonstrate their reasonableness to the international community. However, the radical and conservative factions, influenced by fundamentalist Islamist ideologies and external supporters, are resistant to normalizing political and social structures in and around Afghanistan. This year will be critical in forming a consensus on the Taliban’s future in power.

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