In a discussion between Bush and Kohl on 24 February 1990, the US President expressed his resolute support for NATO’s eastward enlargement: “The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell with that.”
His proposal was that Germany should “buy off” the Soviets. And indeed, this was the strategy later pursued in the US under Clinton (1).
The Two Plus Four Agreement on German reunification with its protocol note and the Two Plus Four Forum were a strategy to formally get the Soviets on board. In practical terms, however, it meant that Germany had full access to the former territory of the German Democratic Republic; foreign NATO troops were not permitted to be stationed permanently there, but would, subject to approval from the German Federal Government, have access (transit, exercises). The stationing of nuclear weapons was ruled out, yet, most significantly, “NATO forces could now be active east of the Cold War line” (2). Russian Foreign/Prime Minister Primakov, a shrewd and strategic thinker, admits in his memoires that Gorbachev failed, in his view, to obtain a legally binding written commitment to non-enlargement (3).
Likewise, the NATO-Russia charter, the subject of much praise from the NATO side (“in the current and foreseeable security environment [NATO has] no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons [or] substantial combat forces on new members territory”) (4) was an attempt to reassure the Russians, without making any substantive concessions. President Clinton commented that:
“All the Russians get out of this great deal we’re offering them is an assurance that we are not going to put our military stuff into their former allies who are now going to be our allies, unless we happen to wake up one morning and decide to change our mind” (5).
Despite opposition from renowned foreign-policy experts such as Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, experts consulted by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Eisenhower Group (led by former President Eisenhower’s granddaughter), US Secretary of Defence during the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara, Jack Matlock (former US Ambassador in Moscow) and former Senator Nunn, as well as from Congress, NATO’s eastward enlargement was driven forward from 1994 at the latest.
The Partnership for Peace, involving military integration and joint exercises, enhanced interaction between armed forces, and civil control over the military, was initially an instrument to reassure Russia (and postpone reunification indefinitely), then (from 1994 onwards) an instrument to drive forward enlargement. How did this come about? The reasons are to be found in the USA’s own domestic policy situation. In the midterm elections in 1994, the Republicans won, mainly due to the support of voters from Polish, Hungarian and Czech communities in the swing states. The First Chechen War (1994) and Yeltsin’s shelling of the Supreme Soviet a year earlier helped spread fears of the “Russian Bear”, not only in the Baltic states and Poland.
Alternatives to NATO: historical and legal aspects, policy recommendations
Since the eastward enlargement of NATO has taken place, the search for alternatives within NATO appears to be a realistic approach.
The Scandinavian model (no foreign bases, no stationing of nuclear weapons), or the French/Spanish model (no military integration into command structures) could serve as blueprints for the future of an eastern European buffer zone. Or, indeed, the East German model: no nuclear weapons, no permanent stationing of foreign NATO troops, exercises/transfers conditional on the consent of the government.) After all, former NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen recently cited in this context the model used for West Germany in 1955. This model would allow Ukraine to become a member of NATO, but only without the four occupied regions, for which the mutual defence clause contained in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would not apply.
Alternatives to NATO
Were the EU to break apart, regional defence alliances would be one alternative, but not a desirable one. The problem with this would be that a large number of possible defence alliances (Nordic alliance, Visegrád, the Polish Intermarium concept) would create security-policy instability on the European continent. The alliances would seek to “counterbalance each other”, would conclude treaties with and against each other, etc. The historic fear of German hegemony would once again take hold.
A European army? Not a realistic alternative!
What about that old favourite of soapbox speeches by established politicians: the European army? This is not practical for legal and practical reasons.
There are different variations on the theme of a European army.
- A single European intergovernmental army (EDC 2.0); command authority would remain at the national level, as would decisions on budget and organisational matters etc.;
- A single supranational army (with decisions on deployments taken by the European Council). The different strategic cultures and languages would be problematic here. In addition, this army would not be permissible under German and EU law;
- A single intergovernmental army made up of sections of national armies. Disadvantage: states would be able to withdraw their contingents at any point. Furthermore, issues regarding the procurement of military equipment would arise. And then, the burning question: who would have command authority?
- A single supranational army would exist in addition to the national armies. This army would be managed exclusively by European organs and would be composed of EU soldiers. This would contradict German and EU law.
References
- Sarotte, M.: Not One Inch. America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate. New Haven & London 2021. p. 73.
- ibid., p. 193.
- ibid. p. 253.
- ibid. p. 271.
- ibid. p. 267.
- WD 2 – 3000 – 126/18, Die europäische Armee 1948-2018 (Sachstand). URL: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/586142/e7c004e3b5c14b1b15232eca0a0f863e/WD-2-126_18-pdf-data.pdf and Racky, K. R.: Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Voraussetzungen europäischer Streitkräfte : [Teil 1] – Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht : NZWehrr = German Military Law Review. – 63 (2021), 6, pp. 248-257.
Racky, K. R.: Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Voraussetzungen europäischer Streitkräfte : [Teil 2] – Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht : NZWehrr = German Military Law Review. – 64 (2022), 1, pp. 25-41.