Following the Second Liberation Movement in Bangladesh in July 2024, regional dynamics are shifting, with Pakistan-Bangladesh relations ameliorating while those of India and Bangladesh deteriorate. If Islamabad continues to approach Dhaka based on mutual respect, the potential for overcoming past grievances and fostering a mutually beneficial partnership remains on the horizon. Similarly, if India-Bangladesh relations continue on their current trend, gradual deterioration of a relationship cemented over fifteen years may be witnessed. This indicates the unfolding of a strategic realignment in the region with repercussions at the global level due to its implications for the brewing power competition between the U.S. and China.
These developments stem from the ouster of Hasina Wajid’s government in Bangladesh after a rule of 15 years, which was marked by close ties with India and almost complete alienation from Pakistan. The interim government of Muhammad Yunus has approached Bangladesh’s regional ties differently, doubling down against Indian interference in domestic matters and inviting collaboration from Pakistan.
Several key developments have occurred in Bangladesh-Pakistan defense relations, including reciprocal visits by senior military delegations of both countries and participation of the Bangladesh Navy’s frigate in Pakistan’s multilateral naval exercise Aman. Dhaka is reportedly interested in purchasing Pakistan’s JF-17 jets, and unconfirmed reports by the Indian Defence Research Wing claim a potential deal for the purchase of Abdali missiles from Pakistan is also being pursued.
Developments beyond defense include meetings of Muhammad Yunus and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of UNGA and D-8 summits, discussing, among other agenda points, extension of economic cooperation and revival of SAARC. This cooperation translated into an estimated 27% increase in bilateral trade during the last quarter of 2024. Pakistan’s foreign minister is also scheduled for a visit to Dhaka, the first such visit in over twelve years.
Concurrently, tensions between Bangladesh and India are growing. Allegations by India of persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh have led to protests and the storming of a Bangladesh consulate in India. The Yunus administration has rejected what it claims is external interference in internal matters, accusing India of spreading disinformation to destabilize Bangladesh. Public sentiment against India, evident in the “India Out” campaign earlier in 2024, has influenced the new government’s policies, resulting in a gradual distancing from New Delhi.
Several new domestic policies, such as the cancelling of national holidays linked with the Mujib family, changes in textbooks documenting the first liberation, and the banning of the Awami League from participating in upcoming elections, highlight a rewriting of history to reshape public consciousness regarding the Mujib family’s role in Bangladesh’s history, and, with it, that of India. New Delhi’s noncompliance with the extradition request for Sheikh Hasina delivers the message that India prioritizes its relations with the Mujib family rather than with the state of Bangladesh itself, leading to further tensions.
The factor of China in the region cannot be ignored. Although Bangladesh maintained close relations with China under the previous government, with China having supplied a major chunk of Bangladesh’s military equipment, Sheikh Hasina managed a precarious balance between Delhi and Beijing. However, given the now deteriorating ties with India compared with China’s welcoming posture, Dhaka moving closer towards Beijing appears plausible, particularly given the incentives for development and economic integration under China’s BRI. The recent visit of Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser to China underscores the importance of this relationship.
With Pakistan also having a strategic partnership with China, an emerging Bangladesh-China-Pakistan trifecta may translate into a perception of hostile encirclement in India’s security calculus, as evidenced by heightening concerns over Siliguri corridor’s security. The installation of border fencing by India on its West Bengal border following the Pakistan army delegation’s visit near this corridor further highlights the heightening threat perception.
India may seek assistance from the U.S. in preventing the solidification of this trifecta, particularly given Washington’s interest in containing China’s influence and the support the Indo-Pacific Strategy promises to India. However, given the Trump administration’s strong anti-China stance, any significant collaboration offered to Bangladesh may be accompanied by pressure to reduce cooperation with Beijing. Considering the Yunus government’s commitment to maintaining decision-making sovereignty, such pressure is unlikely to elicit a positive response. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s opposition to foreign aid may render it unable to incentivize Bangladesh towards reducing partnership with China. At the global level, this may catalyze the Sino-U.S. power competition by providing China with a balance against the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership.
The ouster of Hasina Wajid’s government not only reoriented the domestic political contours of Bangladesh but also set in motion events that can lead to a major strategic realignment in the region. The effects of such regional developments would inevitably reverberate to the global level. At this critical point in time, how strategically each state in this nexus plays its cards will determine which way the tide turns.