Azerbaijan’s victory in the long-disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh was not the end of its conflict with Armenia and Armenians, but merely a turning point in an ongoing campaign. Below the radar of a distracted West, Baku has pursued what might in the spirit of the times be called “scrolling aggression” — a gradual escalation while avoiding anything dramatic enough to trigger a serious Western response. That could be about to change.

Until now, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has expanded influence incrementally—by seizing small territories, using diplomatic coercion, ensuring through aggressive rhetoric that Armenia remains on the defensive, then in late 2022 blockading Nagorno-Karabakh and finally, in Sept. 2023, attacking it and causing the exodus of its 120,000 ethnic Armenians. All of that was somehow below the threshold of global consequences.

Now Aliyev is after an even bigger prize: the Zangezur (or Meghri) “Corridor”, which Azerbaijan sees as a critical trade route between its Turkish patron and Central Asia. He  knows his military and economic superiority will not last forever, and views the next year or two as a critical window to act before Armenia closes the gap. The questions are whether Armenia will properly prepare – and whether the West will continue its  indifference and acquiescence. Aliyev’s approach is shaped by four key factors:

• Internal Politics and Armenophobia: Years of state-sponsored hatred against Armenians have created strong public expectations in Azerbaijan for continued pressure on Armenia. Aliyev leverages this sentiment to maintain his autocratic rule, one of the harshest in the world by any measure, distracting from internal economic challenges.
• Fear of Decline: Azerbaijan’s economy is currently at its peak, bolstered by high oil and gas revenues, about $75 billion in reserves (SOFAZ State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan assets and national reserves) and a $5 billion military budget for 2025 (compared to Armenia’s $1.7 billion). However, Armenia’s per capita GDP is rising faster, and as Azerbaijan’s oil wealth declines, the gap will close. Aliyev understands this and sees 2025 as a closing window for action.
• The Prevailing Hobbesian Winds: Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine, Turkey’s brutal interventions in Syria, and not Donald Trump’s own threats against Denmark (over Greenland), Panama (over the canal) and Canada (which he seems to want to annex all suggest a perhaps limited period in which might makes right.
• Aliyev’s Subtler Relationship with the West: Unlike Russia’s Vladimir  Putin or Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, Aliyev has kept diplomatic bridges intact. He regularly attends the World Economic Forum in Davos, engages Western leaders, and offers transactional deals that make the EU hesitant to confront him.

Against this complex background, the likelihood of an attack on the corridor cannot be dismissed. If global distractions — such as an Israel-Iran war or Trump deploying U.S. Marines elsewhere — arise, Aliyev may use the smokescreen to escalate. If he calculates this will keep him below the threshold still, he may call the land grab temporary, aimed at securing a trade route for the moment.

Part of the equation is the shifting regional balance of power, mainly involving  Turkey playing an increasingly decisive role in shaping the South Caucasus.

• Turkey’s Strategic Victory in Syria: Following regime change in Syria in December 2024, with the victory of rebels back by Turkey, Ankara has significantly expanded its influence. The key question now is whether Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will consolidate power in Syria only – or leverage his momentum to push further for a pro-Turkic corridor through Zangezur to Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
• Turkey-Azerbaijan Alignment Strengthens: Turkey and Azerbaijan’s strategic alliance remains intact, despite the potentially embarrassing ethnic cleaning of Nagorno-Karabakh’s 120,000 ethnic Armenians.  Ankara continues to providing diplomatic cover and military support and will likely deploy its clout as a NATO member to ensure Azerbaijan faces minimal Western pushback.
• Russia’s Potential Return to the Region: A potential resolution of the Ukraine war could see Russia reasserting its influence in the South Caucasus. Depending on how events unfold, Moscow could either stabilize or further destabilize Armenia’s security situation.
• Iran’s Position in the South Caucasus: While Iran has historically opposed Azerbaijan’s expansionism, recent developments have weakened its ability to counterbalance Turkish and Azerbaijani moves. If Tehran is further weakened by external pressures, such as an Israeli attack on its nuclear sites, Baku may feel emboldened.

What are Armenia’s options? Recent efforts to strengthen U.S.-Armenia relations, including the January 14, 2025, Strategic Partnership Charter, mark progress, but Armenia still lacks the security guarantees provided to formal U.S. allies. While some figures in the Trump administration may be sympathetic to Armenia, the broader foreign policy direction will be transactional. Armenia must proactively demonstrate its strategic value to secure long-term U.S. support.

To counter Azerbaijan’s threats, Armenia should pursue a multi-faceted strategy:

• Accelerate Military Reforms: Defense modernization, including territorial defense forces and high-tech military solutions, must be a top priority. Existing investments in fortifications in the Tavush and Syunik regions must be matched by improved strategic coordination and reserve forces modeled after Israel, which is also a smallish country with huge challenges.
• Engage Trump’s Administration Effectively: Armenia must move quickly from “strategic partnership” to a formal alliance, leveraging geopolitical alignment and shared values to deepen ties.
• Strengthen EU Alliances: France, Germany, and Greece are key European partners. Expanding the EU monitoring mission and aligning security frameworks with NATO standards where possible will strengthen Armenia’s position.
• Maintain Open Channels: A potential resolution to the Ukraine war could bring Russia back into the South Caucasus. Armenia must remain flexible and avoid unnecessary friction with Moscow and Tehran and also build stronger relationships with India, China, Latin America, and Middle Eastern states. The goal is avoiding total dependence on one bloc.
• Economic Resilience and Defense Industrial Development: Armenia must prioritize the development of its own defense industry, reducing reliance on external suppliers. This includes investing in drone technology, cyber warfare capabilities, and a self-sufficient arms production sector.
• Counter Azerbaijan’s Narrative in International Arenas: Baku’s diplomatic efforts have largely shielded it from Western sanctions despite its aggression. Armenia must launch a global awareness campaign highlighting Azerbaijan’s human rights violations and expansionist ambitions to increase diplomatic pressure on Baku.

The next two years will determine whether the country secures its sovereignty or remains vulnerable to regional power plays. Much like the act of scrolling on one’s social feed, “scrolling aggression” can feel almost passive, and is not attract attention as a drama in its own right. This misleads: we are in a perilous moment that requires a far more proactive strategy than we have seen.

Armenia’s fate is not just a regional concern — it is a test case for the future of the international order. If Azerbaijan succeeds with tacit Western acceptance, it will validate the idea that force, not law, determines borders in the 21st century.

Coming on the heels of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Turkey’s interventions in Syria, and a rising trend of nations acting with impunity in their spheres of influence, and amid an isolationist streak in U.S. politics  — the risk is no less than a global descent into a Hobbesian world ruled by the law of the jungle.