The Strategic Importance of the South China Sea:
A region of immense historic and contemporary significance, the South China Sea has emerged as a global focus point, witnessing frequent hostilities and standoffs owing to its strategic importance. With its waters bordering China, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, the South China Sea is a vital intersection for international trade, facilitating approximately 64% of global trade through its maritime channels (Beaver, 2024).
As a result, the waterbody is of immense strategic importance to China. If Beijing successfully establishes power in the region, it could potentially disrupt American trade vessels, restrict trade with Japan, and project its power into the Pacific. This prospective outcome has led states such as Japan, India, and Australia to show increased interest in maintaining the freedom of passage in the South China Sea to ensure uninterrupted international trade, resulting in growing diplomatic tensions.
Why is China focusing on territory acquisition?
Beijing’s actions reflect Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. Following the Century of Humiliation, China has aimed to establish itself as a global power. This ambition has compounded into Xi’s vision of the ‘Chinese Dream,’ focusing on national rejuvenation incorporating economic prosperity, military strength, societal equality, and national peace. For this dream to materialize, China has adopted a more definitive approach to policies and partakes in actions that improve its national power. While previous leaders abided by the concept of ‘hide your strength and bide your time,’ Xi Jinping has implemented a more aggressive approach to countering the power of the United States, especially in the South China Sea. China perceives the West’s intervention as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, prompting often aggressive responses against such involvement as reflected by China’s denial of the 2016 Arbitration Ruling. While indicating that the state was unwilling to compromise on its territorial claims, it also portrayed China’s desire to become a regional hegemonic power that impacts global norms and influences the domestic policies of other nations (Nguyen, 2024).
Xi Jinping justifies these assertive acts as protecting the country’s interests, not encroaching upon foreign land. However, it is quite evident that China’s dominant influence operations in the South China Sea through militarization, economic leverage, and gray-zone tactics are simply an extension of Beijing’s foreign policy.
Influence Operations carried out by China in the South China Sea and how they project Beijing’s Foreign Policy:
China is investing substantially in its resources and military presence in the South China Sea, aiming to enhance its political and geographic influence. Further, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with backing from the Communist Party of China (CPC), has engaged in ‘political warfare,’ which is construed as a war without the use of a country’s military assets but with enough influence to get the opponent to act in a favorable way to China. The party abides by Sun Zi’s belief that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” which forms the basis of various influencing operations conducted by China to assert its territorial and regional interests (Financial Times, 2022). These efforts could be interpreted as subtle means of ‘wolf warrior diplomacy,’ referencing China’s increasingly assertive and aggressive stance through acts of coercion, power projection, and grey-zone tactics (Financial Times, 2022). They demonstrate Xi Jinping’s vision of the ‘Chinese Dream,’ in which geopolitics is shaped to position China as a great power with the ability to influence global decision-making.
1. Developing and Militarising Artificial Islands in the South China Sea
The primary means of influence operations are island building and militarization. Between 2013 and 2015, China developed multiple artificial islands in the Spratly Islands region. Subsequently, these islands were militarised, and in recent years, China has built approximately 20 outposts in the Paracel Islands and 7 in the Spratly Islands. It also maintains control of the Scarborough Shoal, which it seized in 2013, through a constant coast guard presence (AMTI, n.d.).
Although initially claimed to be built in the interests of the public, China has increased its military activities and presence in these islands. Specifically, on the Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Island, Cuarteron Reef, and Subi Reef, multiple forms of military infrastructure have been developed, including airstrips, naval ports, radar systems, and hangars that allow constant surveillance of activities in the South China Sea and prevent the landing of any foreign vessels on these islands (Pradhan, 2022).
These actions reinforce Xi Jinping’s claims concerning China’s self-demarcated Nine Dash Line, where it has claimed sovereignty over a large area of the South China Sea while also threatening the counterclaims of countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. The military bases established by China enhance the country’s geographic reach, allowing timely action against opposing nations at sea and projecting power throughout the region. Further, since the PLA is permanently stationed in these islands, it will enable China to maintain constant control and observation over the airspace and maritime routes of the South China Sea and, as a result, deter opposing armies from taking action. This further gives the country an advantage in terms of security intelligence, which it can leverage against enemy states, hence compromising the sovereignty of other coastal countries and the American Freedom of Navigation Operations. This projects China’s foreign policy objectives, which aim to strengthen its territorial integrity and reduce American influence. Such aggressive island-building alongside China’s refusal of the 2016 Arbitration Ruling highlights its intention to resist international interventions that potentially threaten its sovereignty.
2. Staking Claims over the Resources in the Region:
China is also engaging in activities to seize control of natural resources in the South China Sea within the Nine Dash Line. Chinese vessels have frequently been observed intimidating those participating in fishing and oil extraction activities carried out by other nations. For example, in 2019 China deployed vessels to enter Vietnam’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) to partake in oil extraction activities, as well as instructing fishing boats to operate in Indonesia’s EEZ. Reports suggest that by the end of 2019, approximately 63 Chinese fishing boats and two coast guard ships were found in Indonesian waters (Nguyen et al., 2024). These actions stem from China’s aim to monopolise resource-rich areas that could contribute to its economic development since it furthers Xi Jinping’s foreign policy of gaining more political leverage globally. However, China’s assertive approach overpowers and threatens the autonomy of smaller nations in the region, leading to widespread instability.
3. Exerting its Influence through the Belt and Road Initiative:
Beijing’s policies are further propagated by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which reinforces the strategic significance of the South China Sea. China seeks to create economic dependency by developing ports and infrastructure in Southeast Asia, complicating these countries’ ability to challenge its territorial claims. For example, Malaysia has received multiple infrastructural development projects from China, which could coerce Kuala Lumpur to take a more supportive stance toward China in international forums (Busbarat, 2023).
Such projects also allow China to control strategic infrastructure and trade routes and provide resources to the PLA. As seen in the development of the Kuantan Port in Malaysia, this strengthens China’s presence in the South China Sea while forcing Malaysia to take up less confrontational approaches to Beijing. This is often interpreted as a debt-trapping tactic adopted by Xi Jinping, where a smaller state’s allegiance is secured through infrastructure projects funded by China. Although these are portrayed to benefit the host state, they often compromise their autonomy since China demands their diplomatic support in exchange (Xuanmin, 2024).
Moreover, the geopolitical benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative project China’s foreign policy by countering the American influence on trade, minimising the reliance on U.S.-dominated trade routes, and establishing China as a regional hegemony. This contributes to Xi Jinping’s goal of long-term economic security, potentially providing the country with more political power since countries benefiting from the BRI are likely to align with Chinese interests. This, in turn, gives China more leverage in international organisations like the ASEAN, where it can garner support from countries that benefit from the BRI, effectively steering decisions in their favor.
4. China’s Grey-Zone Tactics:
Lastly, China has engaged in various grey-zone tactics to erode U.S. influence in the region. Although not a form of outright war, the PRC often uses grey-zone tactics to achieve coercive impacts. These tactics aim to nullify existing American influence in East Asian maritime routes and usually include using Chinese vessels and coast guard ships to harass rival countries that stake a claim over the region rather than engaging in open conflict.
Chinese grey-zone tactics involve the gradual encirclement of disputed territories and islands to establish control. This strategy aligns with Sun Tzu’s principle of “winning without fighting,” as China deploys fishing vessels, maritime militias, and coastguard ships to expand its regime of influence while avoiding confrontations. Examples of these include:
- The Philippines protested China’s illegal fishing activities and resupply missions being carried out in the Second Thomas Shoal (Flores and Morales, 2024).
- Indonesia protested the presence of Chinese fishing vessels near its Natuna Islands, which are rich in oil and natural gas. The PRC however, claims fishing rights near the islands under its Nine Dash Line (Lamb and Da Costa, 2021).
- China’s coast guard ships fired water cannons at Filipino fishing boats to drive them out of the Second Thomas Shoal of Spratly Islands (Kwon and Chen, 2023).
Such calculated ambiguity allows China to broaden its influence through military infrastructure and the building of artificial islands, although these activities still do not qualify as ‘war’ tactics. This further benefits China by reducing the risk of international backlash and the potential military response from other countries such as the Philippines or Vietnam (Kardon, 2024).
Additionally, China is careful to deploy only coast guard ships, not warships, to counter the increased American presence in the South China Sea under the Freedom of Navigation Operations. This enables Beijing to lawfully challenge operations carried out by the Quad, another gray-zone tactic that allows China to signal its strength while still not engaging in direct military confrontations (Kardon, 2024).
This situation underscores China’s strategy to diminish American influence in the region. Although a single action may appear inconsequential, an amalgamation can lead to a significant regional power shift favouring China. The U.S. cannot justify counter-military actions that could escalate tensions, particularly since China is not employing overt war tactics. Over time, this dynamic could harm the U.S.’s relationships with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, all of which face a threat to their economic growth from China’s control over their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). In the long run, this is likely to be perceived as American strategic fatigue among its allies, which is detrimental to the U.S. in the broader context. Hence, this trend again aligns with Beijing’s goal of positioning itself as a regional hegemon.
Conclusion:
China’s actions in the South China Sea have proven to be multifaceted and calculated. It reflects Xi Jinping’s aim of ‘making China great again’ while highlighting that military power is not the only means of achieving dominance. Instead, China has engaged in various economic methods and gray-zone tactics to assert its power, ensuring that its actions do not escalate into war. These influence operations portray a realist need for power since China’s strive for regional dominance and security aligns with Beijing’s foreign policy. The state’s actions aim to redefine international maritime norms where its sovereignty and regional power precede international law.
China’s approach may lower the risk of war, but it could also alienate smaller rival states, U.S. allies, and members of the Quad. If these actions remain unaddressed, they could heighten regional instability and provoke resistance from smaller adversaries. While China is likely to continue pursuing its national interests, the reactions of regional actors will be crucial in shaping power dynamics in the South China Sea.