A negotiated China-Taiwan reunification or political association within a confederal or commonwealth framework, backed by key powers such as Japan, the USA, and other Asian middle powers, is critical for stabilizing the Indo-Asia Pacific (Indo-APAC) region and mitigating strategic tensions between the US and China.
The widening military and economic disparity between Taiwan and China, alongside uncertainties about US commitment to Taiwan’s defense amid growing tendencies towards isolationism, underscores the practicality of a negotiated settlement and convergence towards some shape of political union. The risk of conflict escalation involving regional actors like South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines further amplifies the need for a peaceful resolution.
A Chinese Commonwealth—regardless of its specific political configuration—that enables a form of unified entity between Taiwan and China while safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty is essential. Reinforced by regional security guarantees and mechanisms to deter Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from violating international norms, this framework could establish a lasting foundation for regional stability. It may draw on Deng Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions for Reunification, emphasizing cooperation, autonomy, and peaceful negotiation.
On 26 June 1983, during a meeting with Professor Yang Liyu of Seton Hall University, Deng Xiaoping introduced the “Six Conceptions” framework for the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. This proposal was pivotal in shaping cross-strait relations and laid the foundation for the “one country, two systems” model.
This framework has since become a cornerstone of China’s approach to reunification and was later implemented in the integration of Hong Kong and Macau as Special Administrative Regions (SARs) in 1997 and 1999 respectively.
“Six Conceptions for Reunification” outlined a framework for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland, emphasizing cooperation, sovereignty, and mutual respect:
- Shared Aspiration for Reunification: The reunification of Taiwan with the mainland reflects the shared goal of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT), providing a basis for cooperation between the two parties.
- One-China Policy: While both sides can maintain different systems, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) must be recognized as the sole representative of China in international affairs.
- Limits to Autonomy: Taiwan cannot have “absolute autonomy,” as this implies the existence of two Chinas. Autonomy must be limited to ensure the interests of a unified state are not compromised.
- Special Administrative Region (SAR) Status: Post-reunification, Taiwan can function as an SAR with unique privileges, including legislative, judicial, and final adjudication powers. Taiwan may maintain its own army provided it does not threaten the mainland, and the central government will not appoint officials. Taiwan’s internal political, governmental, and military affairs will be self-governed, although the central government may reserve positions for Taiwanese representatives.
- Mutual Respect in Reunification: Peaceful reunification will not involve the mainland “swallowing” Taiwan or vice versa. The “Three People’s Principles” cannot serve as a practical basis for reunification.
- Negotiation Framework: Reunification should be achieved through negotiations between the Communist Party and the KMT on equal terms. Agreements reached would be announced jointly, without interference from foreign powers, as external involvement would undermine China’s sovereignty and lead to future complications.
These principles aimed to provide a conciliatory yet firm approach, systematically articulating the “one country, two systems” concept. They sought to reinforce China’s territorial claims and sovereignty while accommodating Taiwan’s distinctiveness within a unified framework. At the time, The New York Times described them as the “most detailed and generous terms offered to date” and noted that they “…probably are the best basis for negotiations that Taiwan is likely to get.”
However, under Xi Jinping’s regime, the credibility of this approach has been undermined. The implementation of the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong in 2020 violated the China-UK Joint Declaration and eroded the privileges and autonomy promised to Hong Kong. This development has cast doubt on the viability of the “one country, two systems” model as a basis for future cross-strait relations.
Former Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo proposed the concept of a Chinese Commonwealth during discussions at the Asia-Pacific Forward Forum in 2023, presenting an alternative to Deng Xiaoping’s “Six Conceptions” framework. Yeo’s proposal sought to establish a collaborative and flexible approach to cross-strait relations while respecting the distinct identities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Key aspects of Yeo’s proposal include:
- Convergence of Equals: The Commonwealth framework would facilitate dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan on equal terms, avoiding rigid political structures or hierarchical relationships.
- Cultural and Civilizational Ties: Emphasizing shared cultural and civilizational heritage, Yeo advocates for a relationship rooted in mutual respect rather than political dominance or subjugation.
- Sustainable Relations: Yeo highlights the unsustainable nature of the current status quo, warning that continued stagnation could lead to conflict. Proactive and cooperative engagement is therefore essential.
Yeo’s vision aimed to transcend conventional notions of sovereignty and governance, fostering a platform that balances respect for Taiwanese identity with acknowledgment of shared Chinese heritage. Despite its innovative approach, the proposal faces skepticism due to historical tensions and Taiwan’s diverse public sentiments regarding unification or closer ties with China.
Yeo observed that the international order is undergoing a significant transformation as China’s economic and military power grows relative to the United States. By 2050, he argued, China’s economy is likely to surpass the combined strength of the US and EU, fundamentally shifting the global balance of power. This transition is further accelerated by the weakening of the US dollar’s global reserve status, which has historically underpinned American military dominance.
In this context, Taiwan’s strategic position becomes increasingly precarious. While Taiwan has substantial military capabilities, it cannot independently counter the mainland, and US intervention grows riskier and less viable. China’s advanced missile systems pose a significant threat to US carriers and bases, and traditional economic sanctions are unlikely to cripple China’s robust and diversified economy as they have with Russia.
This evolving reality leaves Taiwan with two primary options: maintain the status quo, hoping for internal changes within China, or pursue gradual convergence with the mainland. The current policy of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” delays an inevitable decision.
As China’s power continues to rise and the US’s ability to intervene diminishes, Taiwan’s leverage in negotiations will erode. Proactively engaging in earlier negotiations with Beijing could secure more favorable terms for Taiwan than waiting for Beijing to act unilaterally under more constrained circumstances.
While it remains contentious whether China will surpass the US in nominal GDP by 2050, Xi Jinping’s emphasis on state control over the economy, coupled with a declining workforce—projected to shrink by over 0.5% annually by 2030—and demographic challenges, casts doubt on sustained rapid growth. Nonetheless, China’s economic scale will remain substantial, underpinning its considerable military power.
China’s economic influence is unlikely to rise steadily relative to the US. In contrast, the US workforce is expected to expand over the next 30 years, driven by higher fertility rates and immigration. Slowing productivity growth and a shrinking labor pool in China are key factors that may prevent it from overtaking the US in overall economic strength.
Additionally, a conflict between China and Taiwan would have devastating economic consequences for the Asia-Pacific region and the global economy. Bloomberg Economics estimates the cost at US$10 trillion, or 10% of global GDP, surpassing the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war, and the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Global supply chains, particularly in semiconductors – critical for industries such as electronics and automotive manufacturing – would face severe disruptions, exacerbating the economic fallout.
According to Defence Connect, Taiwan’s economy, heavily reliant on its semiconductor industry, could see a GDP reduction of 40% in direct conflict scenarios or 12% within the first year of a blockade. For China, the consequences would also be severe, with a potential GDP contraction of 16.7% due to trade disruptions and international sanctions. The loss of access to advanced semiconductors would cripple key sectors of its economy.
Meanwhile, the broader Asia-Pacific region and further afield like Europe would not be spared, with European polities already hedging their bets in case of such a possibility. Disruption of trade routes in the South China Sea, through which 25% of global trade passes, would increase costs and delays, destabilising economies reliant on these routes, such as Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia. Meanwhile, financial markets would react sharply, triggering capital flight from China and deterring investment in the region due to heightened geopolitical uncertainty.
While clear signs of military mobilisation would precede any Chinese preparation for an invasion of Taiwan—a highly complex and strategically daunting task—the consequences of such an action would be profound and far-reaching. An invasion would almost certainly preclude any return to the status quo ante and could escalate into a prolonged conflict lasting years.
China would face significant risks, including the possibility of a U.S.-led blockade, multilateral sanctions, and coordinated actions by U.S. allies. These measures could severely disrupt China’s economy, weaken its global influence, and destabilize the broader Indo-Pacific region. The strategic and economic costs of such a conflict would be immense, underscoring the critical need for diplomatic solutions.
The risks of a China-Taiwan conflict are heightened by several compounding factors. Xi Jinping’s ongoing corruption purges within the military could affect its readiness and cohesion. Simultaneously, China’s strategic orientation in the East China Sea is shaped not only by ambitions regarding Taiwan but also by a perceived security threat from the United States. The belief that the U.S. is actively seeking to contain China’s rise remains deeply embedded in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic thinking.
Since the 1990s, China has pursued military modernization alongside an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy designed to limit US military effectiveness near its territorial waters. This approach is central to Beijing’s efforts to counter US regional dominance and secure its own strategic position. These developments have intensified the geopolitical complexities, with Taiwan positioned at the center of these competing priorities.
Compounding these challenges is the prospect of a second Trump administration, which is expected to adopt a confrontational approach toward China, further escalating tensions. Additionally, claims by a U.S. admiral that China aims to develop the military capacity to invade Taiwan by 2027 amplify concerns.
Such a conflict could prompt a global reconfiguration of supply chains as companies increasingly shift operations away from China and Taiwan to mitigate risks. This trend, already underway, is likely to accelerate, with nations like India and Southeast Asia standing to benefit. Given these profound economic and geopolitical risks, the need for proactive measures to prevent conflict and stabilise cross-strait relations is urgent.
This is notwithstanding the political crisis Xi Jinping has potentially set in motion. After consolidating unprecedented power and positioning himself as China’s most dominant leader since Deng Xiaoping—effectively reversing the collective leadership model designed to prevent abuses akin to those under Mao Zedong—Xi has destabilized elite politics and dismantled the power-sharing norms established since the 1980s.
By refusing to nominate a successor, disrupting traditional generational leadership transitions, and altering established pathways for political advancement, Xi has sown the seeds of a potential succession crisis. This instability could manifest in the 2030s and beyond, creating uncertainties not only for China’s domestic governance but also for its international posture and strategic decision-making.
Theoreticals: Deng’s Vision, Yeo’s Commonwealth
Deng Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions and George Yeo’s vision of a Chinese Commonwealth could theoretically align if interpreted within a framework that prioritizes mutual respect and autonomy:
- Both proposals acknowledge Taiwan’s distinct identity while advocating for a connection or unified entity with mainland China.
- Yeo’s emphasis on negotiations as equals mirrors Deng’s call for KMT-Communist dialogue conducted without external interference.
Practical implementation of a Chinese Commonwealth framework remains challenging, given fractured public sentiment in Taiwan, where unification under any model is highly contentious. However, establishing a forum to foster cultural and civilizational ties between Taiwan and mainland China offers a constructive alternative to the risk of a conflict that could escalate into a global war.
While Deng Xiaoping’s peaceful reunification framework and George Yeo’s Chinese Commonwealth concept share some similarities, aligning these approaches with contemporary Taiwanese sentiments and Xi Jinping’s agenda presents significant challenges.
To strengthen Taiwan’s negotiating position, its political parties could consider incorporating the Chinese Commonwealth concept into their constitutions. Although revising existing language may be challenging, adding preambles that address present realities and future aspirations could foster a unified stance. A more cohesive Taiwan would be better equipped to engage constructively with mainland China, bringing greater clarity and strength to cross-strait discussions.
One scenario for establishing a Chinese Commonwealth envisions it as a regular forum for interaction between Taiwan and mainland China. This forum would focus on developing rules for their relations and resolving disputes without requiring an overarching executive body during an extended transition, thus ensuring flexibility. The degree and pace of executive integration would be guided by practical needs and the level of trust cultivated between the two sides over time.
With no fixed timeline for evolving into “one China” or a defined vision of such a unified entity, this gradual and adaptive framework could allow a new “China” to emerge organically. This evolution would be driven by changing realities, mutual cooperation, and shared aspirations for long-term stability and prosperity.
A second scenario envisions a merger of equals after a prolonged transition period. If unification is accepted as a long-term goal, mainland China may agree to maintain the status quo, provided both sides work sincerely towards gradual convergence. This process would require mutual concessions and efforts to prepare the public on both sides for eventual integration. As both societies evolve, the PRC of today is already markedly different from 20 years ago and will continue to transform in the coming decades.
A key challenge is how Beijing’s record of strategic deception deepens current challenges. In 2020, Xi Jinping’s actions — imposing Hong Kong’s National Security Law, continuing South China Sea violations, concealing the 2020 COVID outbreak, and provoking India at Galwan — further eroded trust in China’s commitments. These breaches demonstrate why a strong multilateral system must both check Chinese power and preserve Taiwan’s diplomatic voice.
The Taiwan question extends beyond Xi Jinping’s legacy. Since Deng Xiaoping, the CCP has consistently linked national unification with China’s rejuvenation. While CSIS suggests this implies a 2049 deadline for Taiwan’s absorption, Xi’s statements about resolving Taiwan’s status leave the timeline deliberately ambiguous.
The CCP masterfully blends ideological flexibility with calculated deception. Stalin’s “margarine of communism” label captured this pragmatic approach, exemplified when Mao projected reasonableness during the 1945 Chongqing Negotiations before seizing power.
This strategy combines Warring States realpolitik with Marxist dialectics—enabling shifting alliances while framing contradictions as revolutionary progress. Domestically, this manifests as authoritarian control coexisting with limited capitalism. Anti-corruption campaigns serve both ideological and practical control purposes.
In Taiwan, Beijing has built significant military capabilities while maintaining consistent rhetoric across three decades. Though prepared for forceful annexation if deemed necessary, China preserves strategic flexibility by avoiding firm unification deadlines. In both Taiwan and the South China Sea, Beijing pairs conciliatory language with steady military pressure, advancing its objectives while avoiding direct confrontation.
A Chinese Economic Community (CEC) would establish a structured platform connecting China, Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, with Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore serving as moderators based on their economic ties and significant Chinese diaspora populations.
This framework could evolve into a broader Chinese Cooperative Economic Community (CCEC), incorporating Taiwan as a “special partner” while integrating regional powers like South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand as associate members. Nations maintaining ties with Taiwan through the Compact of Free Association would participate, while larger entities such as ASEAN, EU, and AUKUS could join as observers.
This multilateral approach would serve multiple strategic purposes. It would moderate China’s growing influence in international organizations, where Beijing increasingly shapes agendas and norms that sometimes diverge from established global standards.
The framework would enhance Taiwan’s strategic flexibility and leverage while creating multiple channels for engagement and pressure. Most importantly, it ensures China’s constructive participation while preventing dominance over smaller nations, fostering regional cooperation through institutional safeguards and balanced representation.
For such an arrangement to succeed, it must be carefully designed to balance member interests and prevent dominance by any single power. Lessons can be drawn from the proposed four-tier EU membership structure, which accommodates varying levels of engagement.
This model envisions: (1) an Inner Circle of fully integrated states collaborating on deep issues like taxation and climate policy; (2) a second tier of EU Member States, adhering to core EU policies but with flexibility on deeper integration; (3) Associate Members, maintaining close economic ties without voting rights, like Norway and Switzerland; and (4) the European Political Community, fostering political cooperation with non-EU nations such as Ukraine and Turkey.
Adapting this approach, stakeholders in a CCEC could foster trust and dialogue toward unification, drawing inspiration from Deng Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions and Yeo’s Commonwealth vision. The framework could explore varied outcomes, including federal union, confederation, associated statehood, or a dominion-style arrangement, akin to Canada or Australia’s relationship with the UK. Such a structure would support collaboration, safeguard autonomy, and enhance long-term regional stability.
The Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun identified “asabiyya” – social solidarity – as the foundation for the rise and growth of civilizations. Forged through shared hardship and austerity, this solidarity fosters courage, self-reliance, and communal fellowship. Notable examples include the solidarity built in European Jewish ghettos during the 20th century, which aided the establishment of Israel, and the Prophet Mohammed’s harnessing of *asabiyya* to inspire early Islamic conquests.
Ibn Khaldun theorized that civilizations have a lifespan of about 120 years, spanning three generations of 40 years each, with decline beginning in the fourth generation. Applying this framework, Taiwan and China—emerging from the 1940s civil war and the 1912 founding of the Republic of China—are now in their mid-70s.
This suggests that the matter of unification may reach a resolution within the next 50 years, by the 2070s. The period leading up to any potential union will likely bring significant changes to Hong Kong, Macau, mainland China, and Taiwan. George Yeo’s Chinese Commonwealth vision and Deng Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions underscore the importance of fostering asabiyya and solidarity to bridge differences among these peoples.
In the nuclear age, a war over Taiwan would be catastrophic. A conflict between the US and China would not remain localized, as China would likely target US assets in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and potentially Singapore. Such aggression could draw these nations into the conflict, escalating it into a broader regional or even global crisis.
Taiwan is not merely a bilateral issue but a matter with profound regional and global implications for stability. Proactive diplomacy is essential to avert disaster. Establishing a forum for equitable and meaningful dialogue between Beijing and Taipei appears to be the only viable path forward.