Libya stands as a sobering testament to the catastrophic consequences of military intervention in Africa, where regime change by outside powers births chaos rather than stability. The cautionary parallels between Gaddafi’s Libya and other interventions expose the fallacy of regime change as a pathway to stability, revealing it instead as a catalyst for enduring turmoil.

The Trump administration must break from the liberal foreign policy missteps of its predecessors and adopt a leadership style that prioritizes strategic clarity over European-influenced approaches to Africa. As African nations navigate distinct political and economic development paths aligned with their interests, Washington, unburdened by colonial baggage in Africa, should pursue a restrained, laissez-faire political strategy. Failing to do so risks aligning too closely with Paris and diminishing U.S. influence on the continent.

Libyan Nostradamus: Gaddafi’s Grim Prediction of His Regime’s Fall

Libya: The “Somalia of the North”

Libya, an Arab-African nation in North Africa, has become the “Somalia of the North,” where insecurity and uncertainty dominate. Islamist non-state actors control strategic real estate, terrorizing the populace, while the central regime lacks both legitimacy and a monopoly on violence. To complicate matters further, two rival factions, each backed and armed by foreign powers, are vying for control of the country. The Libyan Nostradamus predicted his downfall and the downfall of other Arab autocrats. Although he was ridiculed by other Arab leaders in 2008 during the Arab League Summit, Gaddafi ultimately had the last laugh, a testament to his final words.

Arab Spring, Gaddafi’s Fall, and the Aftermath

Libya was an Italian colony from 1911 to 1943. After Italy’s defeat in World War II, Libya was administered by the French and British. In 1951, under direct British supervision, Libya was granted independence and became a federal monarchy led by King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi. In 1969, Muammar Gaddafi, an Army Captain, orchestrated a military coup. He ruled Libya with an iron fist from 1969 until 2011. Gaddafi was far from an ordinary authoritarian; he was enigmatic, contradictory, and full of paradoxes.

Gaddafi’s 41-year regime ultimately succumbed to the domino effect of the Arab Spring. This revolutionary wave began with the self-immolation of a disgruntled Tunisian street vendor, whose act of desperation ignited uprisings across the Arab world. The flames he sparked consumed the regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, and, eventually, the Libyan Nostradamus himself.

The revolution in Libya did not topple Muammar Gaddafi; NATO’s military intervention, particularly the enforcement of a no-fly zone and precision strikes on Libya’s military infrastructure, was the decisive factor. NATO’s air campaign dismantled Libya’s defenses and facilitated the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, not the so-called “rebels.” In addition, it is improbable that the “rebels” would have succeeded without covert direct support on the ground from specialized units guiding their operations.

What is the present status of Libya? Since Gaddafi’s departure, Libya has descended into a failed state, joining the ranks of Somalia and, more recently, Sudan. Two rival factions are fighting for control of the country, not to promote democracy, freedom, stability, or security, but to exploit Libya’s natural resources, much like Gaddafi did. The Libyan National Army (LNA), led by General Khalifa Haftar, is supported by Russia, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and France. In contrast, Turkey, Qatar, and Italy back the Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj. The civil war in Sudan mirrors the conflict in Libya, almost as if the “Libyan Nostradamus” left behind a curse before his demise.

For the United States, the intervention in Libya was a strategic failure. Washington’s decision to “lead from behind” instead of taking a more decisive role reflected a lack of clear strategy and insufficient justification for military action. The military operation did not advance U.S. national interests in the region.

Unresolved questions linger 14 years later regarding NATO’s intervention in Libya:

Did the 2011 Libyan revolution, which sought to topple Gaddafi, truly justify NATO’s intervention? Was the military action morally defensible or unjust, and did it have the African Union’s endorsement?

What were the strategic objectives of the intervention? Were they clearly defined, measurable, actionable, and attainable? Did NATO’s political objectives align with realistic expectations, and were its military goals rooted in operational feasibility?

Was the exit strategy merely an attempt to shift the burden indefinitely onto Libya’s neighbors? Did the Libyan people ultimately reap the benefits of what was branded as a ‘benevolent’ humanitarian intervention, or was it merely a regime change in disguise, leaving them to grapple with the fallout?”

These questions can only be fully answered by Libyans, those who lived through the bombardment, its chaotic aftermath, and who now endure life in the “Mad Max” of North Africa. Their perspectives hold more weight than those of NGOs, academics, politicians, or military leaders who analyze Libya from the comfort of the West, sipping lattes during the week and martinis on the weekend, far removed from the harsh realities of a nation that has been in anarchy for 14 years.

Are Common Sense and Good Judgment Relics of the Past?Fourteen years after NATO intervenes in Libya, can it be considered a strategic failure?

Damage to NATO’s Reputation: NATO’s intervention severely damaged the organization’s reputation and undermined the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Unlike the tragedies of Bosnia or Rwanda, the costs of the present-day situation in Libya far outweigh the military intervention. Washington’s and NATO’s credibility, trustworthiness, and reliability are questioned, particularly within the African Union member states.

Libya as a Failed State: Libya remains ungovernable and continues to serve as prime real estate for Sunni Islamic non-state actors. Although the Islamic State in Libya has been severely degraded, the threat has not been eradicated. The recurrence and metamorphosis of extremism in the years to come are likely, and Europe will share the burden of fighting jihadis not in distant lands like Iraq or Afghanistan but right across from the shores of the Mediterranean, not from the air, but with boots on the ground. Libya is 3.2 times the size of France, and due to its size and proximity to Europe, it is positioned to become a central hub for jihadist networks targeting Europe.

The sheer size of Libya, compounded by the instability in the neighboring failed states of Niger, Sudan, and Chad, amplifies the complexity and scope of the anarchy in Libya and its spillover effects. For perspective, California, Texas, and Michigan could fit inside Niger, Sudan is one-quarter the size of the United States, and Chad is 3.6 times the size of Germany. The intended consequences of this instability are extremely severe for the region, the Middle East, and Europe.

The transactional boundary lines between Libya, Niger, Chad, and Sudan create a fertile real estate for disenfranchised Islamic terrorist organizations to seize territory, triangulating strategic corridors to establish a foothold for advancing their aspirations of an Islamic State similar to those in Iraq and Syria. Although the Islamic State in Libya (IS-Libya) has been significantly degraded, its ideological foundation and future external support from outside forces and countries and through illicit trade in the Sahel region pose a long-term threat to North Africa, Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Sahel region is a critical area of interest for Islamic terrorist organizations, where the absence of state structures in Sudan, Chad, and Niger could transform these states into an area of influence. Libya’s anarchy offers a pivotal area for operations and a corridor for expansion, enabling the deployment of jihadists to Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Europe. By exacerbating the migrant crisis and exploiting individuals fleeing conflict zones, these groups can weaponize vulnerabilities to execute lone-wolf attacks and foster insecurity and uncertainty in European countries with sizeable Muslim populations. This strategy enables the deployment of Islamic operatives to Europe, where lone-wolf attacks can generate insecurity and ideological subversion and further escalate radicalization, particularly within Muslim communities that remain marginalized and poorly integrated into European societies.