China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has grown rapidly in recent decades, becoming the world’s largest navy by sheer number of vessels. However, size alone does not equate to capability, and the PLAN’s deficiencies in combat experience, technological reliability, and global trustworthiness underscore its vulnerabilities. Despite its ambitions, China’s naval power projection remains a paper tiger, faltering under scrutiny.
Lack of Naval Combat Experience
The PLAN’s biggest Achilles’ heel is its lack of real-world combat experience. Unlike the United States Navy and other QUAD navies, which have been engaged in multiple conflicts and joint operations worldwide, China’s navy has not faced significant combat since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Modern naval warfare demands operational expertise in complex scenarios, including high-intensity conflicts, amphibious assaults, and carrier strike group coordination—areas where PLAN personnel remain largely untested.
Case in point: China’s frequent naval drills in the South China Sea (SCS) often showcase choreographed exercises rather than realistic combat simulations. For example, during the 2021 joint exercise with Russia, the PLAN struggled to synchronise operations with its ally, revealing interoperability and command efficiency gaps. Similarly, its attempts to emulate carrier-based operations have been hampered by inexperience. The Liaoning and Shandong, China’s two aircraft carriers, are still in the nascent stages of developing effective carrier strike capabilities.
Recent reports amplify these issues. In August 2023, unconfirmed accounts suggested that a Type 093 nuclear-powered submarine experienced a catastrophic failure in the Yellow Sea, allegedly entangling in underwater defences and leading to fatal outcomes for its crew. While Beijing denied these claims, the incident highlighted potential deficiencies in operational readiness and safety protocols.
The lack of international experience further compounds these problems. PLAN vessels involved in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden have been criticised for excessive reliance on allied forces for logistical and operational support. In comparison, Indian and U.S. vessels operate independently with greater coordination and effectiveness.
Unreliable Weapon Technology
China’s indigenous weapons systems often fall short of their advertised performance. For example, the much-touted Type 055 destroyers are equipped with advanced radar and missile systems, but reports suggest frequent malfunctions during testing. In 2020, a Type 055 destroyer experienced propulsion issues during its maiden deployment, forcing it to return to port prematurely.
Further underlining these concerns is the recent mishap involving China’s newest nuclear submarine during construction in Wuhan, as reported in mid-2024. The vessel’s sinking at the shipyard revealed critical gaps in quality control and project oversight, delaying China’s attempts to modernise its underwater fleet.
Chinese anti-ship missiles, such as the DF-21D “carrier killer,” have yet to be proven in real-world scenarios. The missile’s ability to target moving vessels in contested environments remains theoretical, and experts have raised doubts about its reliability against advanced countermeasures deployed by adversaries.
Additionally, reports from export partners indicate systemic issues. For instance, Algeria’s purchase of Chinese corvettes in 2019 revealed that onboard sensors and weapons systems frequently malfunctioned in harsh maritime conditions. This has forced the Algerian Navy to seek upgrades and maintenance from third-party suppliers, significantly increasing operational costs.
Exporting Substandard Equipment to IOR Nations
China’s strategy to gain influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) involves supplying naval equipment to smaller nations. However, these exports often come with hidden costs: substandard quality and limited operational lifespans. Bangladesh’s purchase of two Ming-class submarines in 2017 exemplifies this issue. Marketed as modern assets, the submarines’ outdated technology and high maintenance demands quickly became apparent, rendering them more of a liability than an asset.
Sri Lanka’s experience with Chinese-built frigates highlights similar issues. The P625 frigate, gifted by China in 2019, reportedly due to poor manufacturing standards, faced frequent breakdowns. Such incidents erode the trust of recipient nations and tarnish China’s reputation as a reliable defence partner.
In another example, Thailand’s purchase of Yuan-class submarines was delayed indefinitely in 2022 when Germany refused to supply key propulsion components due to export restrictions. This exposed China’s reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies and further discredited its ability to deliver self-reliant solutions.
Dependency Through Technology Denial
China’s arms sales are designed to foster dependence rather than self-reliance. Unlike Western and leading Southeast Asian defence suppliers like India, which often include technology transfer agreements, Chinese exports are delivered as end-products with minimal post-sale support. Pakistan’s acquisition of Chinese-built Type 054A frigates illustrates this dynamic. Despite their advanced specifications, these frigates lack compatibility with Western systems, limiting Pakistan’s operational flexibility. Moreover, China’s reluctance to share critical maintenance know-how forces buyers to rely on Chinese technicians for repairs and upgrades.
This strategy extends beyond equipment. Beijing’s construction of dual-use infrastructure, such as the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, locks recipient nations into debt obligations, granting China strategic leverage without fostering local capability development. The Maldives, for instance, faces similar challenges with Chinese-built harbour facilities that remain underutilised due to a lack of operational expertise and maintenance support.
The Global Implications of China’s Weak Navy
China’s maritime strategy is increasingly viewed with scepticism, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad nations (India, Japan, Australia, and the United States) have emphasised the importance of quality over quantity in naval power, contrasting their battle-tested fleets with China’s unproven force. India’s naval engagements in the IOR—including anti-piracy operations and humanitarian missions—stand in stark contrast to China’s transactional approach.
Moreover, China’s inability to provide adequate post-sale support has opened doors for competitors. South Korea and Turkey, for instance, are gaining traction in defence markets traditionally dominated by China, offering technologically superior products and robust after-sales services.
Historical Context and Strategic Shortcomings
Historically, a defensive posture has shaped China’s naval strategy, prioritising coastal security over blue-water capabilities. The “Century of Humiliation,” during which China was subjugated by Western and Japanese naval forces, continues to influence its focus on regional dominance. However, this historical baggage limits China’s ability to project power globally, as evidenced by its limited presence in the Arctic and Atlantic regions compared to the US and European navies.
Another major drawback is China’s overreliance on numerical superiority rather than qualitative advancement. Despite building a vast fleet, the PLAN lacks the support infrastructure necessary for sustained global operations, such as replenishment ships and overseas bases. This shortfall became evident during the 2021 evacuation mission in Yemen, where Chinese vessels struggled to coordinate with allied forces due to logistical constraints.
The PLAN’s rapid expansion masks underlying vulnerabilities that undermine its credibility as a global naval power. Its lack of combat experience, unreliable technology, and exploitative defence exports have exposed the limitations of its maritime ambitions. As nations in the IOR and beyond reassess their strategic partnerships, China’s naval might be more facade than force—a sobering reality for Beijing’s aspirations of global, let along regional dominance.