During the past three decades, China has emerged as a dominant power in digital technology, including in the development and application of cyber technology.i As global economic and military affairs become increasingly digitised China’s rapid technological advancements have become a significant geopolitical factor, in particular raising concern among those nations that view China as a competitor.ii The European Union (‘EU’) and its member States have responded to China’s digital expansion in various ways. While many perceive it as a threat to national interests and security, some States have shown support and a willingness to engage with China.iii
China’s Digital Silk Road (‘DSR’), an integral component of their Belt and Road Initiative (‘BRI’), seeks to facilitate global digital trade and thereby further solidify China’s position as a leader in digital technology. Although not the first to develop the 5G technology, China has securely positioned itself as the leading global provider with 10 million advance orders recorded as of October 19th 2019.iv Its digital presence in the EU is evident through substantial investment in infrastructure, telecommunications, and technology by Chinese corporations such as Huawei and Tencent, making it a key player in the EU’s digital transformation.v Importantly, the EU-China Agreement on 5G networks, signed in 2015,vi initially indicated cooperative intentions.
However, growing concerns have emerged within certain EU States regarding cybersecurity, cyber-espionage, data privacy, infrastructure integrity, and potential financial leverage by China,vii with critics warning that China’s access to the EU’s innovative technologies and economic assets poses risks to its security and policy-making.viii Politically, China’s digital expansion has created divisions within the EU with some member States supporting its technological investments, while others advocate for stricter measures to ensure that “EU Digital Sovereignty” is upheld. This essay examines the influence of China’s digital expansion on the EU’s politics and analyses the resulting policy measures and their broader political implications.
Grounded in the theoretical frameworks of sovereignty, balance of power, and digital sovereignty, this essay addresses the two questions. Firstly, how has China’s expanding digital presence in the EU influenced the political dynamics amongst EU member States? Secondly, how has the EU responded to China’s digital expansion and perceived cybersecurity threats, and what are the broader political implications for EU politics?
2. Theoretical Frameworks: Sovereignty, Balance of Power, and Digital Sovereignty
Within the Westphalian system “sovereignty” emphasises a single sovereign authority within each State, granting it supreme and legitimate authority to impose its will.ixx Thus, the international system is anarchic with each sovereign State retaining autonomy over internal and external matters.xi The ‘internal sovereignty’ of each State is legitimised by the inhabitants of a defined territory,xiixiii signifying the States’ supremacy over their populace, while ‘external sovereignty’ ensures independence from foreign intervention.xiv In a world that is increasingly globalised the expansion of foreign digital forces may be seen as an example of such an intervention (Section 3).
The concept of sovereignty has evolved through historical and contemporary contexts. In continental Europe, integration arose in response to several centuries of fragile power balance and destructive conflicts, culminating in and manifested by the two World Wars.xv This led to the pursuit of a new order of peace which amended State sovereignty to include the recognition of the authority of international organisations, a process which led to the creation in 1951 of the European Coal and Steel Community and subsequently its evolution into the European Union.xvixvii
The ‘Balance of Power’ concept is relevant as it aims to prevent any State from becoming so powerful that it can impose its will on others, with opposing coalitions formed to counteract such dominance.xviii This balance has fostered political equilibrium, maintained order and liberty,xix and contributed to peace within the EU and more broadly within Europe.xxxxi It is in this context that China’s rising prominence in the digital realm may be seen as a threat to this equilibrium and as an external intervention (Section 3).
In liberal sovereignty, the State extends sovereignty to protect an individual’s autonomy.xxii Sovereign individuals, deemed to be rational, exist between sovereign States and the moral autonomy of humansxxiii with individuals having the right to act autonomously or form associations for specific goals.xxivxxv This sovereignty encompasses political identity, democracy, representation, accountability, and freedom in economic and political activities.xxvi Tensions may arise between State repression and an individual’s autonomy and rights, especially under policies that arise from the pursuit of ‘digital sovereignty’.
The concept of digital sovereignty has emerged to reassert the State’s control of global digital governancexxvii which defines the State’s autonomy in decision-making on critical digital matters,xxviii and encompasses its authority over digital technologies and their social, political, and economic impacts.xxix Digital sovereignty involves infrastructural, technological, and economic dimensions, intertwining a States’ geostrategic interests with its citizens’ economic interests.xxx
China’s prominent and growing role in digital technology, and the EU’s responses, underscore the importance of digital sovereignty in international politics. Thus, in this context data is viewed as a “fundamental strategic resource” which is vital to production.xxxixxxii China’s digital sovereignty affects both geostrategic and private economic interests,xxxiii which explains its digital expansion in both the Global South and North.xxxivxxxv In response, the EU has sought to advance its own digital sovereignty, increasing its innovation capacity and autonomy in new technologies, with both defensive and offensive measures,xxxvi actions which have sparked debate on the extent of State power over digital data.
3. Evidence and Analysis
3.1. The Influence of China’s Expanding Digital Presence on EU Politics
China’s DSR seeks to establish its technology as a global standard by offering cost-effective, advanced solutions in telecommunications, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure.xxxvii This strategy has enabled Chinese companies, including Huawei and ZTE, to secure a prominent presence in the EU, particularly in 5G infrastructure and telecommunications.xxxviii While this has enhanced economic ties between the EU and China the adoption of Chinese technology has raised concerns about security risks and an increased security dependency on China. Notwithstanding China’s substantial investments in the EU’s digital infrastructure, and its strategic partnerships with specific EU member States, these concerns have resulted in EU members holding divergent political stances on policies toward China and its technology companies, stances with significant political implications.
In November 2019 Hungary announced that Huawei would participate in the development of its 5G network, diverging from the caution exercised by other EU countries and despite security concerns raised by allies such as the US.xxxix This decision followed Huawei’s earlier establishment of a strategic partnership with the Hungarian government in 2013.xl Between 2005 and 2019 Huawei invested approximately $1.2 billion in Hungary and employed around 2,000 people.xli Chinese investments in Greece are exemplified by the acquisition of a 51% stake in Piraeus Port by China’s COSCO Shipping in April 2016 for €280.5 million, with provisions to increase ownership to 67% for an estimated €368.5 million.xlii This investment, aimed to enhance the port’s infrastructure and operations, established Piraeus as a key hub for China’s BRI global trade strategy. Croatia, while focusing primarily on infrastructure and renewable energy projects, has expressed interest in attracting Chinese investments in technology with the €230 million Senj wind farm project illustrating the scale of Chinese involvement in Croatia’s economic development.xliii
The political influence of these investments is evident in instances where EU unity on China-related issues has been disrupted. For example, Hungary has repeatedly opposed EU statements criticising China, including those addressing the new security law in Hong Kong in April 2021 and broader policies towards Hong Kong in May 2021.xliv Similarly, in July 2016, Greece, Hungary, and Croatia blocked an EU statement addressing China’s activities in the South China Sea (SCS)xlv and Greece further vetoed an EU statement at the UN Human Rights Council in June 2017 that criticised China’s human rights record.xlvi
In contrast, Germany, France, and Poland have adopted a stricter stance towards Chinese investments in digital infrastructure, particularly in 5G networks, with Germany initially permitting Huawei’s participation but since reconsidering this decision amidst internal and external pressure.xlvii France has implemented stringent regulations limiting Huawei’s role, while Poland has excluded Huawei from its 5G networks citing security risks and aligning itself closely with US policies on Chinese technology corporations.xlviii
Germany has reaffirmed its commitment to reducing reliance on Huawei and ZTE in its 5G networks,xlix with its Interior Minister highlighting the ‘dangers’ posed by the inclusion of essential components from Chinese manufacturers within Germany’s 5G infrastructure, announcing plans to phase out Chinese components by the end of 2026.l Germany has also strengthened its regulatory stance on cybersecurity and the geopolitical risks linked to any dependence on Chinese technology.li Similarly, Italy has begun reviewing and considering the potential phasing out of Huawei’s involvement in critical telecommunications projects.lii
These examples of States’ political divergence illustrate how Chinese investments have influenced host countries’ positions, creating division amongst EU members and highlighting the challenge to forming a unified EU response to China’s growing digital presence.
3.2. The EU Policy Frameworks in Response to China’s Digital Expansion and the Impact on EU Politics
China’s integration into the EU’s infrastructure, telecommunications, and technological advancement has granted it significant influence over critical European systems, resulting in rising concerns about cybersecurity, data privacy, and the potential access by the Chinese Government to sensitive information.liii There is growing unease among EU member States about the economic and social influence of foreign, non-EU technology companies that could control data, threaten citizens’ privacy, limit the growth of EU tech companies, and complicate the enforcement of national and EU laws.liv However, some EU member states have shown divergence in their policies towards China and its technology corporations, underscoring the need for the EU to adopt a unified approach.
In response, several regional policy and legal frameworks have been established to protect the EU’s digital sovereignty, resulting in more stringent regulations. Key policies include the “EU Cybersecurity Act of 2019” which grants the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) a permanent mandate to assist member States in addressing cybersecurity incidents and coordinating responses to large-scale cross-border cyberattacks.lv This Act also establishes an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for ICT products, services, and processes, thereby ensuring recognition across all member States. The EU has also established a framework for screening foreign direct investment,lvi and in 2023 the President of the European Commission introduced the concept of “de-risking,” emphasising the EU’s policy of “conditional involvement” in China’s digital presence.lvii
Europe’s commitment to protecting its digital sovereignty is further demonstrated through its active efforts to form strategic alliances with allies such as the US, Japan, and other democracies to enhance cybersecurity and reduce dependence on Chinese digital technology.lviiilix The EU’s policy of “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” its ties with China was highlighted in the European Commission’s proposal on June 24th, 2024 for a “European Economic Security Strategy” which includes cybersecurity cooperation with the US.lxlxi This approach aims to strengthen EU supply chains, enable market diversification, and lower economic reliance on China.lxii
Earlier, in 2016, the EU introduced the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) to protect the processing of personal data, with all EU members aligning their data privacy laws with the GDPR effective from May 2018.lxiiilxiv The Digital Europe Programme (‘DEP’), established during COVID-19 with a budget exceeding €8.1 billion, was designed to shape the EU’s digital transformation, enhance its competitiveness, and modernise its digital governance, aiming to match the investments made by major powers such as the US and China who spend €10-20 billion annually on artificial intelligence alone.lxvlxvi
Despite these policy frameworks a significant divide remains within the EU. Many member States and their telecommunications companies continue to rely on Huawei and ZTE due to the technological impracticality of immediate bans which would also result in substantial costs.lxvii Essentially, countries with limited domestic alternatives or weaker economies cannot afford to replace Chinese suppliers due to the affordability and technological efficiency of Chinese products.lxviii
3.3 Analysis: China’s Digital Expansion, EU Digital Sovereignty, and the Balance of Power
The concepts of ‘Sovereignty,’ ‘Balance of Power,’ and ‘Digital Sovereignty’ (Section 2) provide a theoretical framework to analyse China’s expanding digital presence in the EU, the EU’s responses, and their influence on the EU’s politics.
China’s rapid advancement in digital technology, coupled with substantial investments and strategic partnerships with certain EU member States, poses a distinct challenge to the EU’s political equilibrium and balance of power. From the perspective of the Balance of Power China’s growing influence is seen as a potential disruption to the EU’s order, peace, and autonomy, and as a foreign superpower, China’s digital expansion necessitates counterbalancing coalitions to restore equilibrium and safeguard the EU’s political independence.
The perceived risks of China’s dominance in 5G networks, particularly in terms of the EU’s security, have been emphasised by political leaders including recent statements by Germany’s Interior Minister (referenced in Section 3.1). Public and political discourse surrounding the integration of Chinese 5G technology into EU telecommunications often frames this as an ‘unwanted intervention’ by an external actor, invoking concerns over ‘external sovereignty.’ The EU and certain of its member States increasingly view the preservation of digital independence as essential amidst escalating global competition.
The EU’s policy responses, notably the “EU Cybersecurity Act of 2019,” reflect efforts to uphold internal sovereignty by addressing cybersecurity threats, ensuring data privacy, and reducing dependence on Chinese technology. This Act is expected to play a crucial role in unifying and strengthening the EU’s cybersecurity approach through: (i) strengthening a unified approach and collective resilience to cybersecurity threats, (ii) reducing regulatory fragmentation and smoothing intra-EU trade in the digital market, (iii) increasing trust through a standardised cybersecurity approach, (iv) prompting member States to align their national cybersecurity policies with EU standards, and (v) improving operational cooperation in coordinating responses to large-scale cross-border cyberattacks.
These measures, together with other policies detailed in Section 3.2, demonstrate the EU’s commitment to achieving ‘digital sovereignty’, a strategic objective which includes fostering innovation, advancing autonomy in technology, and enhancing the EU’s ability to independently develop and manage digital systems. China’s growing digital influence has further motivated the EU to prioritise digital sovereignty in its domestic and international policies.
However, political divergence among EU member States complicates these efforts. Countries such as Hungary, Greece, and Croatia, which support China’s digital expansion, exercise their sovereign rights to shape domestic and foreign policies. While these States are EU members, sovereignty grants them the ultimate authority over internal and external matters.
4. Conclusion
Against the backdrop of China’s digital expansion in the EU this essay examines the impact on EU politics through the lens of Sovereignty, the Balance of Power, and Digital Sovereignty. Specifically, it addresses two questions: (1) How China’s expanding digital presence has influenced political dynamics among EU member States, and (2) How the EU has responded to China’s digital expansion and perceived cybersecurity threats, and the broader political implications for EU politics.
China’s digital presence, particularly through corporations such as Huawei and ZTE, has solidified its role in the EU’s 5G infrastructure and telecommunications, however, concerns over security risks and dependency on China have emerged. China’s substantial investments and strategic partnerships with certain EU countries have led to divergent political stances on policies towards it, with significant consequences. Countries such as Hungary, Greece, and Croatia support China’s digital investments and have blocked EU joint statements condemning China’s actions on human rights. In contrast, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland have adopted more critical positions on China’s digital expansion.
These differences highlight the EU’s struggle to maintain a unified stance on what it deems to be its core liberal values such as human rights and individual freedoms, all of which are perceived to be at risk due to China’s growing influence. However, the EU’s response through the Cybersecurity Act of 2019 has helped to strengthen its approach to cybersecurity, fostering greater unity and cooperation among member States.
A further implication, beyond the scope of this essay and requiring additional research, is the potential impact of the Cybersecurity Act on the relationship between nation-States and their citizens. Tensions may arise between State-imposed measures under the Act and individual rights, such as autonomy and freedom in economic and political activities. These dynamics raise critical questions on the balancing of State control with the principle of liberal sovereignty.