WASHINGTON —  For 13 months of ghastly war in the Gaza Strip, the U.S. has repeatedly pressed Israel to limit civilian casualties and let in more humanitarian aid.

Israel repeatedly brushed aside U.S advice and requests, with more than 42,000 Palestinians killed, according to Gaza health officials. The flow of aid has been so slow, often halted by Israel, that many Palestinians face starvation.

In the offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon, a similar pattern is emerging. The U.S. urged bombings be limited and targeted, but Israel blasted away in southern Lebanon, Beirut and as far north as Tripoli.

Yet when it came to Israel’s retaliatory air strikes on Iran, the dynamic was different.

Iran launched a barrage of nearly 200 missiles and rockets at Israel on Oct. 1 in retaliation for Israel’s killing of several senior Hezbollah, Hamas and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders. Most were intercepted by Israeli forces and air defense systems, backed by the U.S. and Britain.

Israel immediately vowed it would retaliate. The question was when and how.

President Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid hitting nuclear research sites and oil fields. And when Israeli fighter jets fired missiles at Iran on Oct. 26, in its largest such operation ever, they hit primarily military targets and only four people — all soldiers — were reported killed.

Here’s a look at the thinking that went into Israel’s actions in Iran.

Why did Netanyahu limit targets this time?

The Israeli prime minister undoubtedly recognized that Iran was a different adversary, far more powerful and potentially dangerous than militant groups Hamas and even Hezbollah, Iran’s main proxy in the region. Iran would be in a position to respond more violently than those groups, even though it has proved itself adverse to direct conflict.

That in turn could lead to far greater escalation and destabilization across the region, possibly pulling in additional countries and drawing the U.S. deeper into the conflict.

Israel has managed to destroy most of Gaza and is in the process of pulverizing parts of Lebanon to international condemnation and outrage and political and diplomatic isolation, but without facing effective efforts to rein it in. The price to pay for all-out war with Iran would likely be higher.

Was it easy for him to make the decision?

Probably not. U.S. officials applied unusually strong pressure on Israel to scale back on its targets, according to people familiar with the talks. Initially both the nuclear sites and the oil fields and other energy facilities were on the list. The Israelis agreed to remove the nuclear installations because of the risks involved and the difficulty of taking them out. Eventually, they also relented on the oil so as not to disrupt the global energy market.

After Iran’s Oct. 1 barrage, Israel also apparently realized it would not be able to fend off a full Iranian attack alone and would need support from other countries. So it could not risk alienating the U.S. in these talks.

There were several carrots offered by the U.S.

The Biden administration also convinced Israel by offering several incentives. It imposed yet another batch of sanctions on Iran, this time cracking down on the so-called ghost ships, unmarked oil tankers Iran allegedly uses to export illicit petroleum products; fast-tracked to Israel an advanced ballistic missile air-defense system, known as THAAD; and launched air strikes on Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen as a show of solidarity.

Instead of nuclear and energy facilities, Israel said it took out many of Iran’s missile batteries and missile-production factories. In what it called precise air strikes, Israel also crippled much of Iran’s air-defense network, the Netanyahu government said.

It was “as much as Israel could take without a major schism with the Biden administration,” said Bradley Bowman, a military expert at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington. The operation left Iran vulnerable, he said.

Is it over?

Not by any means. Both Israel and Iran say they want to avoid conflagration, but both continue to threaten each other.