For over a decade, Nigeria’s military has fought to reclaim control over territories ravaged by extremist violence in the North East. But they have not fought alone. An army of civilians has stood shoulder to shoulder with them, volunteering to reinforce the success of the operations.
These civilians make up the volunteer security outfits (VSOs) that patrol villages, secure roads, and sometimes engage directly in battles against Boko Haram and other insurgents in the region. They started by wielding sticks — hence their local name yan gora — to acquiring guns and other light weapons.
A recent report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) produced in conjunction with the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles (S4) Initiative has brought to light the immense risks posed by the inadequate regulation of arms used by VSOs in the country.
The overflowing number of weapons is alarming. For instance, the well-known Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) operating in the North East has been a key player in the fight against Boko Haram and other insurgents in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states since its formation in 2013. According to the report, today, it boasts over 10,000 firearms, many of which have been provided by the Nigerian government.
The report, published on Wednesday, states that “about half of the roughly 55,000 members of VSOs operating in Borno state possess or have access to firearms. Most of these weapons are Dane guns, hunting rifles, and shotguns.”
Apart from the Nigerian government, the other principal source of the arms is local gunsmiths, who produce rudimentary artisanal muskets and hunting rifles. The number of such weapons can’t be ascertained due to the informal nature of their production.
Through interviews and local data, the UN report identifies four key VSOs that operate in Borno: the Borno State Hunters Association (BoSHA), the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Kesh Kesh, and the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN). The report highlights the formation of these organisations as well as how they operate and handle weapons.
Eric G. Berman, the report’s author, found that the groups, comprising between 50,000 and 55,000 members, represent a formidable force, outnumbering the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in Borno tenfold. According to him, there are only 6,000 police officers in the state for over five million residents.
As such, VSOs have become essential in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations, providing critical support to an overstretched military. They are also currently being moved to the northwestern region for other operations.
“Armed VSOs in Borno state are not going away,” the report stated. “They are growing in strength. The demand for their services is such that they have begun to operate not just elsewhere in the North East zone of Nigeria, but in the North West zone as well.”
VSOs are often the first line of defence in areas where state security forces are either absent or insufficient. They know the terrain intimately, have strong ties to local communities and are highly motivated by the desire to protect their families and homes.
“The CJTF members’ intimate knowledge of local languages, communities and terrain provided security forces with actionable information that they had previously often lacked,” the report said.
However, their rapid arming and deployment have also raised significant concerns about arms management and potential abuse or misuse.
Berman notes that much of the government-supplied materials come from recovered Boko Haram stocks, which are then redistributed to the VSOs, primarily the CJTF.
While rearming local militias with battlefield-captured arms may offer short-term gains in efficiency, it raises critical concerns about long-term security.
The report reveals that although the government closely monitors some of these firearms—especially those issued for joint operations, locally sourced arms often lack the same level of oversight. This gap increases the risk of diversion, potentially allowing these weapons to fall into the hands of criminals or insurgents, undermining broader efforts to maintain security.
For example, the CJTF and other groups are often entrusted with assault rifles during reconnaissance and clearance operations. These arms are typically handed back to the state at the end of the mission, but with 25,000 firearms in circulation, many of which are under the direct control of VSOs, the potential for loss or theft cannot be ignored.
The report acknowledges that hundreds of firearms have likely been lost to Boko Haram during skirmishes, exposing the fragility of this arms management system.
“State security services claim to issue assault rifles and light weapons to the CJTF only for short durations…Yet members of civil society…suggest such practices are not always adhered to,” it noted.
Weapons mismanagement
Berman’s report does not shy away from addressing the challenges of arms management. One key issue is the lack of standardised protocols for safeguarding and safekeeping weapons.
While the government has implemented some mechanisms — such as vetting members of the VSOs before issuing firearms and providing basic training on weapons handling — these efforts vary significantly between groups and regions.
For instance, the report suggests that governmental oversight of the CJTF’s weapons management is relatively robust compared to other VSOs. Yet, even within the CJTF, there are gaps.
Record-keeping is inconsistent, and while some units maintain detailed logs of weapons and ammunition, others have no system in place. The risks of misallocation and misuse are, therefore, significant.
Furthermore, the lack of alternative livelihoods for VSO members exacerbates the problem.
Despite their high casualty rates, the absence of a comprehensive benefits package for VSO members further compounds the issue. This economic vulnerability makes them more susceptible to corruption or the temptation to sell their firearms on the black market.
The report highlights that casualties among VSOs have increased steeply since January 2023. These militias are usually deployed in the most dangerous areas, conducting high-risk operations with limited support from state forces. Yet, their benefits — such as medical care and pensions — are often inadequate, leading to growing discontent among their ranks.
The politicisation of VSOs
A particularly troubling aspect of the report is its discussion of the politicisation of VSOs, especially the CJTF. While these groups were initially formed to counter the insurgency, there is increasing concern that political actors may co-opt them for purposes unrelated to security.
The CJTF, for instance, has become deeply embedded in Borno state’s political landscape. Its leaders are influential figures with connections to state and federal authorities, and there are fears that the group could be used as a tool for political intimidation or to influence electoral outcomes.
This politicisation undermines the group’s legitimacy and could further exacerbate tensions in an already volatile region.
Moreover, deploying Borno-based VSOs to conflict zones in northwestern Nigeria raises additional concerns. Hundreds of CJTF members have recently been sent to these areas, where they are expected to operate under different security dynamics and with unfamiliar communities. The risks of human rights abuses, exacerbated by poor oversight and inadequate training, are considerable.
The Sierra Leone, Sudan experiences
The UNIDIR report draws parallels between Nigeria’s use of armed civilian militias and similar efforts in other African countries, notably Sierra Leone and Sudan. In both cases, governments armed civilians to fight insurgent forces, but the long-term consequences were devastating.
In Sierra Leone, the government’s reliance on the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) during the civil war in the 1990s initially appeared successful. However, after the conflict, many of these militias refused to disarm, and some turned to banditry and other criminal activities.
The government’s inability to reintegrate these fighters into society contributed to a cycle of violence and instability that persisted for years.
Sudan’s experience with arming civilians is even more cautionary. The government’s use of the Janjaweed militias in the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s led to widespread atrocities and human rights abuses.
These militias, many of which were drawn from ethnic groups loyal to the government, became notorious for their brutality, and the conflict eventually escalated into genocide. The same group, which evolved into Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is now engaged in a civil war with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), plunging the country into a devastating humanitarian crisis.
While Nigeria’s situation is different in many respects, the lessons from these countries are that arming civilians to fight insurgents can yield short-term gains but often comes at a high cost in the long term.
Without proper oversight, training, and disarmament processes, these groups can ultimately become a source of instability.
Hence, the report recommended that the Nigerian government should establish more robust mechanisms for monitoring the distribution and use of firearms by VSOs. This includes standardised record-keeping, regular audits of arms stockpiles, and stricter vetting procedures.
The report recommended that the Nigerian Army should ensure that all arms issued to VSOs are marked with unique serial numbers following regional and international commitments, particularly Article 18 of the ECOWAS SALW Convention.
Furthermore, to reduce the risk of arms proliferation and misuse, it is recommended that the government provide alternative livelihoods for VSO members. This could include vocational training, access to loans, or direct employment in state security forces.