The nation of Georgia will hold national elections on the 26th of October, 2024. The Ruling party Georgia Dream (GD) advocates social conservatism and geopolitical pragmatism and leans towards Russia. The opposition parties loosely led by the United National Movement (UNM) advocate for a pro-Western posture and seek integration into the EU and NATO. The election in a way is not just about the future of Georgia but also a referendum on US foreign policy in the region.
Since the end of the Cold War, Georgia has been playing a pivotal role in global geopolitics. It is counted as an important ally of the West, serving as a potential buffer against Russian expansionism and as a beacon of hope for democracy in the post-Soviet region. Yet, paradoxically, despite overwhelming public preference (79%) for the advancement of democratic values and pro-Western stance, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, is pivoting toward Russia’s side. While this situation, in the words of the U.S. Ambassador to Georgia, is “unfortunate and deeply disappointing,” the prospects of democracy in Georgia are clearly shaky. The reality raises serious questions such as why has the US failed to integrate Georgia into the trans-Atlantic fold and why is Georgia drifting away?
Background of the U.S.-Georgia relations
To grasp the complexity of relations between the U.S. and Georgia, it is necessary to briefly review the history of the two countries’ partnership. The relations between the U.S. and Georgia date back to the early days of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. By establishing official ties in 1992, Washington and Tbilisi fostered dialogue grounded in the mutual understanding of the need for democratic reforms. Financial and developmental assistance provided by USAID guided Georgia on the path to democracy and elevated its position in the international system.
“From institutional strengthening, consolidating democracy, and enhancing security and defense capabilities to education, agriculture, and healthcare,” the U.S. supported Georgia’s aspirations to grow as a country, which culminated in an emphatic turn toward the West after the peaceful Rose Revolution in 2003. This peaceful revolution led to the elections of the United National Movement (UNM) party leader Mikheil Saakashvili, who aimed to liberalize the economy and transform the country into a democracy with the support of the West. Yet, four years after the revolution, the authoritarian style of governance and corruption came back, which eventually resulted in public distrust and the loss of the party’s majority in 2012.
In 2008, Georgia experienced several setbacks in the Russo-Georgia war resulting in the separation of two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This made Georgians lean heavily towards the US and NATO to strengthen its military infrastructure and capacity to face Russia’s aggression and eventually become a member of NATO. Yet, since 2012, when the UNM was succeeded by the Georgian Dream party, Georgia has adopted a hedging strategy seeking closer ties with the West without threatening or upsetting Russia.
In recent years, however, Georgia has tilted more in favor of Russia. Georgia did not support U.S. sanctions against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it passed an anti-democratic and harsh foreign agents’ law and banned LGBTQ+ movements like Russia. These actions have led the US to reevaluation its ties to Georgia. Moreover, Georgian Dream party leaders increasingly allow Russia’s disinformation campaigns, promote “global war party” conspiracy theories that agitate against the influence of international organizations supported by the U.S., and promise to outlaw pro-Western opposition parties. As such, it is getting clear that the U.S. is losing Georgia. Georgia is blamed for this drift towards Russia, but the fact remains that the U.S. foreign policy is equally deserving of blame.
What went wrong?
Why did a country supported by the U.S. and which experienced a successful democratic revolution revert back to authoritarianism? How did the prospects of a non-democratic future come to overshadow the appeal of democracy in Georgia? And what mistakes did the U.S. make that contributed to its waning influence in the country? Is Tbilisi resorting to a more pragmatic foreign policy – improving relations with Moscow, solidifies ties with Iran and North Korea, looking to China for investments – or is it actively joining the emerging anti-West alliance in the East?
I submit that there are at least three reasons for the decline of U.S. influence over Georgia: inconsistency in democratic commitment, overemphasis on military partnership, and unattractiveness of the U.S. model for some Georgian elite.
First, while the U.S. is investing in Georgia’s state capacity by providing finance for reforming the judiciary, nurturing the civil society, and independent mass media, after the Rose Revolution, the U.S. thought it completed the mission of democracy building in Georgia. Yet, the success has been premature in the wake of loosening accountability mechanisms in Georgian governance. The U.S. has shifted its focus to other priorities relating to maintaining its global influence in competition with China, involvement in the ongoing global crises in the Middle East, and in support of Ukraine. Preoccupied in maintaining its global preeminence the U.S. neglected the backsliding in Georgian democracy.
Second, integration into the Euro-Atlantic block was critical for preserving Georgian democracy and mitigating its security fears from Russia. The U.S. has the same post-Soviet region playbook by capitalizing on the threat rhetoric coming from Russia while downplaying the mechanisms needed for building the state’s capacity and accountability. In the chase to break Georgia’s orientation away from Russia, the U.S. inadvertently fostered a counterproductive reaction among the elite who grew suspicious of the heavy military emphasis across the U.S. administrations. This suspicion fostered fertile ground for conspiracy theories against the U.S. and created inconsistency in commitment to the imposed liberal values.
Finally, given these two problems and the overall dismal track record of unsuccessful democracy-building attempts initiated by the U.S., the liberal model is losing its attractiveness among the dominant elite groups in Georgia who doubt the utility of following it. This, as a result, along with the elite’s self-interests in the regime’s survival, makes them revert to the opposite camp of reliable autocrats.
Future scenario
The U.S. is facing a dilemma in Georgia, which will likely become more apparent with the coming parliamentarian elections. If the opposition wins the election, then the U.S. has an opportunity to strengthen its influence, but it needs to make a course correction and work to integrate Georgia into the Euro-Atlantic block. If the Georgian Dream wins, then the risks are greater, and restoring U.S. influence and democracy is more difficult. Either way, in order to keep Georgia close, the U.S. needs to reconsider its strategy. In the former case, it may need to deepen the U.S.-Georgian partnership, strengthen weak opposition, and reengage in the Georgian state capacity building more closely. In the latter, it needs to refrain from solely punitive strategies and sanctions and try to find ways to mitigate the suspicions of the Georgian Dream party elites by offering carrots rather than sticks. It is time for the U.S. to move away from outdated strategies and leverage the situation to its advantage regardless of the outcome. The American Eagle should be a strategic guardian rather than a stern enforcer to prevent Georgia from falling into Bear’s embrace.