Iran faces a complex dilemma over whether to attack Israel directly or use its string of proxy armies — as weakened as some of those now appear — to retaliate for the assassination of the head of the Lebanese Hezbollah militant and political organization.

Diplomats, analysts and officials throughout the region and in the West agree that an all-out war between Iran and Israel would be devastating, quite likely more for the Islamic Republic than its archenemy.

The fragile state of its economy and domestic politics is another motivation for Iran to hold its fire.

But failure to forcefully avenge the decapitation of its most important proxy — its military and strategic “crown jewel” in the so-called Axis of Resistance that surrounds Israel — could suggest weakness and make followers in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere question what Iranian support really means.

The conundrum appears to have created a schism between some of Iran’s top leaders, who are proceeding with caution, and its biggest hard-liners, who are demanding swift and decisive action.

Israel’s assassination Friday of Hassan Nasrallah, veteran leader of the powerful faction, came amid a steady onslaught of punishing attacks. Several top Hezbollah officials died alongside Nasrallah — along with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Gen. Abbas Nilforushan. On Saturday, according to Israeli and Hezbollah officials, Israel killed Nabil Kaouk, deputy head of Hezbollah’s Central Council, the seventh senior Hezbollah leader slain in little over a week.

The setbacks suffered by both Iran and its proxies “underscore intelligence and operational inferiority coupled with Israel’s willingness to move up the escalation ladder,” said Ali Vaez, head of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group. “Iran and its allies have no real way of countering the former, and in Tehran’s case, reluctance to match the latter.”

“Iran has always tried to push conflict away from its borders and play the long game,” he added.

In Tehran on Sunday, grief-stricken Lebanese demanded revenge. But there also was a strong sentiment that retribution should be the work of an alliance of Muslim and other sympathetic forces, not Iran alone or even at the fore. Iran, experts say, always worked more effectively from behind the scenes, and could do so once again to help rebuild Hezbollah as it struggles to install new leadership and seal off security breaches and infiltrations.

“We must mobilize Islamic countries and the international community against Israel,” Hamid Reza Teraqqi, deputy chair of the Islamic Coalition Party, the oldest Islamic party in Iran, said in an interview. “Negotiations with America will not help. Israeli must be confronted by forces, not by talks.”

He and others said Iran needed to improve its flagging economy, battered by Western sanctions, as well as an arsenal, which is lacking in sufficient cyber technology, AI and other military know-how to position itself against Israel, which is armed by the United States.

In the days before Nasrallah’s killing, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was at the United Nations, where he made conciliatory statements about a desire to renew negotiations with the West, possibly to renew talks aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

Back in Tehran in the aftermath of Nasrallah’s death, Pezeshkian on Sunday also seemed unwilling to escalate tensions, although he said that the U.S. was complicit in the attacks against Hezbollah because of its steady supply of weapons to Israel. He also said he was confident Hezbollah would secure new leadership.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, on social media, said Hezbollah “makes its own decision and is fully capable of defending itself, Lebanon and the people of Lebanon on its own.”

That may be overly optimistic, but it reflects an enduring reluctance to proceed further down the warpath with Israel.

Iran might also decide to grant a greater role to the Houthi militants in Yemen as part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force strategy. The Houthis, fighting the Saudi-backed government of Yemen, have had success in recent months attacking and disrupting vessel traffic in the Red Sea as their way of expressing solidarity for Gazans. Iran might prioritize efforts to arm them with technologies that could increase the impact of those operations.

On Sunday, a day after Houthis said they fired a missile toward Israel’s Ben Gurion airport, the Israeli military reported that its warplanes struck the Houthi strongholds of Ras Isa and Hudaydah in Yemen — hitting power plants and a seaport used to import oil.

The military was “determined to continue operating at any distance — near or far — against all threats to the citizens of the State of Israel,” it said in a statement.

Houthi broadcaster Al-Masirah said that four people were killed and at least 30 wounded in the attack. On X, senior Houthi official Nasruddin Amer described the attack as a failure and said that an emergency plan activated earlier meant oil tanks were emptied before the raid.

“The Zionists will not stop our operations under any circumstances,” he wrote. “We will make them more qualitative.”

What Iran does next will ultimately be decided by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who so far has appeared supportive of Pezeshkian, a relative moderate.

Khamenei and Iran have reasons for avoiding a full-blown war with Israel. In addition to the struggling economy, many Iranians still suffer from the trauma of Iran’s last major conflict, the war with Iraq in the 1980s that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Analysts say the aging ayatollah is sufficiently pragmatic to seek to avoid wider conflagration, as long as the proxies will be able to step up.

In April, after Israel killed senior Iranian commanders in Syria, Iran retaliated with its first-ever direct attack on Israel. But the airstrike was calculatingly limited: The rockets and missiles were intercepted, and damage was minimal.

Iran would probably suffer more than Israel in an all-out war between the two sides, especially if Hezbollah, Iran’s first line of defense against Israel, is significantly degraded. And economic strife and political uncertainty would make it more difficult for the current government to rebuild.

“Regime survival is #1,” Karim Sadjadpour, a Middle East analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said on X. “Khamenei is now in a dilemma of his own making. By not responding strongly, he keeps losing face. By responding too strongly, he could lose his head.”

Still, another unknown component in any calculation of what Iran does next lies inside the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He has shown little interest in easing his country’s relentless bombardments on Lebanon and has rebuffed efforts by Washington and other powers to broker a cease-fire.

If Netanyahu reads muted reaction from Tehran as lack of resolve, he may be tempted to pound Lebanon harder, proceed with tentative plans to launch a ground invasion and even expand the offensive into other spheres of Iran’s influence. That could in turn dial up anger among the proxies who would stoke pressure on Tehran.

Some groups like the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria might begin to question what good Iran’s backing serves if it does not defend its most important allies, said Trita Parsi, an analyst at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington.

“Some may conclude there were no redlines for Iran in Lebanon,” he said. “But if Israel is so confident that it takes the war not just into Lebanon but to Iran, then Iran may conclude, whether they want it or not, war with Israel is at their doorstep.”

Times staff writer Wilkinson reported from Washington and special correspondent Mostaghim from Tehran. Times staff writer Nabih Bulos in Beirut contributed to this report.