In Gaza, the Israeli military continues on the offensive, and in the United States, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spent the past week courting more support for Israel’s assault on the Palestinian enclave.
But that apparently shared purpose does not reflect the reality: a growing divide between the generals and the government. And analysts say it means that the initial Israeli unity when it came to the war on Gaza is a thing of the past.
The differences emerge in the open on occasion. Most recently, they have centred on the conscription of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students – the military generals, and many secular Israelis, want them to be drafted like other Jews, but ultra-Orthodox parties opposed to conscription are a vital part of Netanyahu’s cabinet.
Of perhaps more consequence to Gaza, however, are differences over the conduct of the war, and how to end it.
In June, the Israeli army spokesperson Daniel Hagari said, “Whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” The problem is that one of those people is Netanyahu himself, who has clearly made the destruction of Hamas one of his conditions for ending a war that has now killed almost 40,000 Palestinians. That criticism is part of a wider dissent among some leading Israelis – and even Netanyahu’s own defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has questioned whether there are any plans for ending the war, which began in October.
Netanyahu has reserved his own criticism for the army, sharply criticising plans the military had announced, also back in June, for daily “tactical pauses in fighting” to facilitate aid delivery. An Israeli official at the time was quoted as saying that Netanyahu had made clear to the military that it was “unacceptable”.
The differences between the military and Israel’s right-wing political establishment are hardly new, and are particularly rife at the moment because of the presence of the far right within the government.
Over the last 20 years or so, far-right settler movements have moved from an outlier on the fringes of Israeli politics to the forefront of Israeli political and institutional life. Former supporters of Jewish movements that are banned as “terrorist” groups now sit in senior ministerial positions, with no attempt to repudiate their former affiliations.
In addition to an energised and often aggressive base, the far right’s representatives dominate many of Israel’s institutions, including the police and education system, with their influence over Israel’s traditionally secular army growing more and more apparent.
Rise of the far right
By repeatedly threatening to walk away and collapse Israel’s electorally vulnerable governing coalition, ultranationalist National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich have come to exert an effective veto over national policy.
That includes any potential ceasefire deal in Gaza – and Netanyahu has chosen to ignore those in the West calling for him to end what is an unpopular war internationally, instead fearing the wrath of the far right more. Netanyahu has his own legal troubles, and losing the protection his current position affords him could be costly.
The far right’s critical view of the army isn’t new. Rather, it stems from the military’s role in the 2005 ejection of the illegal Israeli settlements in Gaza, a move violently resisted by the enclave’s settlers, and their continuing – if sometimes fractious – relationship in the occupied West Bank, officially administered by the army since 1967.
“It seems strange, I know,” Eyal Lurie-Pardes of the Middle East Institute said, “but the settler movement has repeatedly accused the military of anti-Jewish bias in the West Bank”. And some of that suspicion goes beyond differences over war policy.
“With its emphasis on balanced genders and the rights of the LGBTQ community, the army is often criticised by settlers and the ultra-Orthodox for what they see as its progressive culture,” Lurie-Pardes said.
According to independent Israeli analyst, Nimrod Flaschenberg the religious Zionist and far right’s “march through the institutions” spurred by the 2005 Gaza withdrawal saw a gradual infiltration into many of the country’s establishments, from the media, to education and the judiciary, but the slow-moving hierarchies of the army are a work in progress.
Their influence in the military is growing, however. In a recent report published by The Guardian, the British newspaper suggested that about 40 percent of the graduates from the army’s infantry officer schools come from hardline religious Zionist communities more aligned with the worldview of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich than they do either the ultra-Orthodox Haredim, who avoid military service, or the senior commanders of the Israeli military’s secular old guard.
“You can see this influence in both Gaza and the West Bank,” Flaschenberg said, referring to the areas – the latter in particular, that Israeli settlers see as theirs by divine right. “You have these lower-ranked and mid-range officers repeating these almost genocidal religious chants, while either turning their backs on, or carrying out horrific rights abuses. All the while, their generals denounce such actions, while doing nothing to prevent them.”
One such notable denunciation came earlier in July from the outgoing Israeli general, Yehuda Fox, who has served in the Israeli army since 1987. He publicly condemned the settler violence, which has claimed dozens of Palestinians in the West Bank during the course of the war, calling it a “nationalist crime”.
And yet, ultimately, criticism from the armed forces of Israeli actions in the West Bank remain few and far between, and the military itself conducts near-daily raids on Palestinian cities, towns and villages, and has even attacked them from the air since October. The regular ill-treatment of Palestinians under occupation is also rarely, if ever, criticised by the army’s senior leadership.
As for the war in Gaza, both the army and the government have been fully supportive of the widespread destruction of Gaza and accepting of the killing of thousands of Palestinians, with the differences largely over tactics and future plans.
At war with the army
At the beginning of July, Gallant told the public the army needed 10,000 additional soldiers immediately if it was to maintain operations.
In early June, media reports pointed to shortfalls in both equipment, munitions and troops, with more and more reservists failing to arrive for duty, accounts of tanks entering Gaza only partly equipped, and broken equipment going untended.
The reports also indicated that the army was ready to reach a truce with Hamas if that agreement led to the return of the remaining captives within Gaza.
“People are unhappy, but we’re nowhere near reaching a critical mass,” Mairav Zonszein of the International Crisis Group said. “However, this is the closest to that I can remember. I can’t think of any other time when criticism [on both the army and government sides] was carried out on this scale.”
Nevertheless, across Israeli society, signs of war fatigue are growing. The Israeli association New Profile, which supports Israelis hoping to avoid military service, reports increasing numbers of inquiries from conscripts and reservists eager to avoid serving in the Israeli military.
“There’s been an increase in inquiries since October 7,” a spokesperson for the group told Al Jazeera, referring to the start of the conflict.
“We’re seeing more and more reservists turning against the war, or not wanting to return after being traumatised by previous deployments,” the spokesperson said.
While far from ready to mutiny, few would suggest that the army isn’t experiencing unparalleled pressure.
Understaffed, underequipped and with no clear victory in sight after almost 10 months of war, the Israeli army nevertheless finds itself fighting on multiple fronts.
In Gaza, it retains a monopoly of force. In Lebanon, it threatens and harasses. Yet at home, it finds itself encircled: with the far right taking over its ranks, and the politicians it has pledged to serve accused of prioritising their own ends above those of the army they command.