After nearly a decade of a more retracted foreign policy due to Brazil’s internal political turmoil followed by a prioritization of bilateral relations with the US and lack of fanfare for multilateral organizations, Brasilia rolls back into restoring Lula’s first two mandates’ (2003-2010) active diplomatic protagonism and foreign policy legacy. Noticeably, following his statement “Brazil is back”, Lula quickly restored Brazil’s centrality in the South American region, rejoining Unasur and CELAC (after his predecessor’s withdrawal in 2019 and 2020, respectively) and demonstrating efforts to conclude the Mercosur-Europe Union deal (started in 2019). Moreover, Brazil also sought the re-surge of its high-profile role in the international space through a historical BRICS expansion, and its proposal to mediate solutions for the Ukrainian crises via a “Peace Club” multilateral coalition. Therefore, Brazil’s G20 presidency conforms with Lula’s international determination under the concept of achieving rising power status through diplomatic diversification, advocating for multipolarity along with the support of like-minded states to reshape the future global governance and international institutions.
Denoted as the “main goal for the Brazilian presidency” by the Brazilian Sherpa, Ambassador Mauricio Lyrio, Brazil has employed a taskforce to launch its Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty initiative, drawing similitudes from its domestic “Brazil Without Hunger” program. The initiative proposes the implementation of public policies to eradicate poverty at the national level, multilateral funding, and technical support for developing states along with institutional UN support and trilateral cooperation, consisting of “one [state] that has the financial resources, one with experience in social programs and those [including beyond G20 members] that can be the beneficiaries of this cooperation between rich and developing countries”. Here, inequality and poverty eradication are central premises of Lula’s domestic political discourse since the 2000s, rendering him favoritism during elections, and once again highlighted in his 2023 inaugural address. Likewise, desires to tackle hunger and inequality at the international level find their historical precedents in Lula’s attitude on the War on Terror in the early 2000s, stating that “the true path to peace is the relentless war against hunger […], in a campaign of solidarity capable of uniting the planet”.
Equally, the emphasis on environmental concerns reflects Lula’s domestic agenda, which has recently encouraged specific legislation and preservation plans for the protection of the Amazon region. More importantly, environment and sustainable development have been key attributes of Brazil’s historical diplomatic agenda since Rio-92, underlining the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Since then, Brazil has advocated for developing states’ reduced accountability during the international forums (COPs, Rio+20), in order to promote economic development and industrialization while not forsaking their environmental role. Concurrently, he has called for increased contribution and funding of global responses to climate change from developed states due to their “debt to the planet”, such as the Green Climate Fund and the Amazon Fund. Here, the specific taskforce for Global Mobilization against Climate Change, a proposal that operates in tandem with the G20 Sherpas and Finance Tracks, represents Brazil’s firmness in articulating political action to “reach the Paris Agreement long-term goals and to restore the […] international community’s capacity to answer climate urgencies”. On energetic transition to low-carbon and lessening dependency on fossil fuels, Brazil has the opportunity to expose its past and current experiences, from its National Alcohol Program (Proálcool) since the 1970s to its recently launched new industrialization program (bioeconomic focused), as avid efforts are made to include an initiative centered at bioeconomy in the international agenda, potentially the cornerstone subject of its soon to be hosted COP-30 (2025) in the Amazon region.
Moreover, Lula’s domestic efforts and narrative of social inclusion are analogous to desires to integrate peripheral states at the center of the discussions at the international level. Here, Brazil’s vows to promote multipolarity and reformation of the global governance institutions can be rewind to successes in achieving greater representation of the developing world’s interests in Western-centered institutions via South-South cooperation in the early 2000s. Under Lula, the tackling the IMF voting and quota reforms, not to mention the formulation of alternative mechanisms such as the BRICS, are noteworthy examples of Brazil’s crusading to consolidate its status as an emerging global power and representant of the Global South. The sought political coordination with states of similar footing and aligned demands are vital for the attainment of goals at the international regimes, if not the only feasible modus operandi. Hence, the strengthening and reform of the existing institutions, particularly the UN, WTO, and IMF, considered goals towards the “democratization of international relations”, are underscored at the G20 as imperative for Brazil.
Noteworthy, such desires have met international support. As stated by African Union’s Sherpa, Albert Muchange, “The AU fully supports the priorities because they have direct relevance to […] the African continent. […] We need to embark on the reform of global institutions, both political and financial institutions […], and Africa is going to support that”. Officially consolidated as a permanent bloc member of the G20 (same status as the European Union) at the end of the Indian presidency in 2023, the AU no longer stands as a passive abider but as an active protagonist able to impact the decision-making structures. A milestone for the G20 while instrumental for Brazil to press for a Global South agenda along with the African continent within the forum. Previously only represented by South Africa, now the representation of the whole bloc at the negotiation table is deemed crucial to advance effective resolutions, not only because of its productive and economic potential, combined GDP ($3 trillion), and populational growth (1.4 billion and expected to double by 2050) but also because global financial decisions made excluding the continent’s representation “have fallen short”, specifically the G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatment.
Brazil has long rendered its position as a political partner of the region, from advocating in favor of its decolonization process throughout the 20th century to forsaking 12 African states’ nearly USD 900 million debt (2013) in the hope of inspiring the international community through example. Consequently, there are positive prospects that the bloc and Brazil could collaborate via a cohesive agenda toward alternative solutions that could address several mutual interests. For instance, the viability of strategies to promote the energetic transition towards low-carbon and reduce oil dependency requires the assimilation of Africa within the global supply chains due to its abundance of crucial resources, particularly minerals, wherein the Democratic Republic of Congo alone produces over of the world’s supply of cobalt. Counting on Brazilian support, UA has the opportunity to leverage demands vis-à-vis global economic interests to boost the continent’s market competitiveness and integration (facilitated by the AfCTA since 2021), stimulate its sustainable development, and increase its efforts in mitigating climate change, given that African states still stand “among the countries who suffer the most issues”. In turn, the AU is recognized as a pivotal partner for the achievement of Brazil’s objectives in reforming financial institutions and international organizations, particularly in its quest to revitalize the UN’s role and centrality, and to “engage the G20 in Brazil’s struggle for a new global governance”.
As a forum, the G20 provides a more flexible stage for Brazil to press its agenda through an alternative approach, one that reproduces Lula’s domestic political stance while in consonance with Brazilian foreign policy tradition. For instance, he seems eager to demonstrate that his pro-democracy and public participation is not merely symbolic nor limited to domestic policymaking, calling for a mobilization of the civil society, private business sector, academic institutions, and policymakers, among others, to voice their insights through 13 engagement groups (B20, T20, W20, etc.). Perhaps, more amenable issues such as fighting hunger and poverty, sustainable development, and energetic transition are the needed common denominator to help de-securitize the conflicting interests on the international stage. As put by Ambassador Lyrio, “the G20 is an opportunity to reinforce the Brazilian foreign policy”; if successful, Brazil is expected to reconsolidate its strategic-political profile as a responsible emerging power as a leading (not hegemony-seeking) voice of the developing world.