In her book Tell Me How This Ends, American scholar and author Linda Robinson posed fundamental questions about the 2003 Iraq War, and indeed all wars. What are the victory conditions needed to conclude a war? What are the necessary actions in its immediate aftermath?
While there is little prospect of the Russia-Ukraine war being over this year, it may now be time to ask such questions about this conflict. And the most important question, because this outcome looks very likely, what happens when Ukraine wins?
This is not an unusual question to ask while the war is still raging. Clever national leaders and strategists in conflicts including the 20th century’s World Wars have begun thinking about – and planning for – post-war conditions and arrangements well before the last battle is fought.
The groundwork for understanding and resolving issues related to post-war Ukraine should be laid now, even as combat operations continue.
Planning beyond the end of conflict provides added purpose for those who must fight. It also provides a light at the end of the tunnel for Ukrainian civilians and displaced persons. And importantly, having a view to the post-war world can help shape Ukrainian and Western strategy for the war over the next year or so.
Three issues facing Ukraine post war
There are several major issues for resolution. Some of the most important include security guarantees, reconstruction, building a standardised military, and the status of Russian minorities.
This is not an exclusive list but these issues highlight the fact that wide-ranging but integrated post-war planning must begin soon.
In the wake of this war, assuming Ukraine prevails, it will require a security framework to protect it from future Russian aggression.
The geography is such that Ukraine and Russia are stuck with each other. To that end, the United States and NATO will probably have to continue to provide security assistance to Ukraine in the coming years and decades.
Whether this involves NATO membership or not, Ukraine will require security assurances. Quiet discussions about this matter are probably already occurring and will need to be part of any enduring settlement for the war.
It will inevitably be part of the revised European security architecture that will emerge from this war.
Reconstruction is a second major issue.
The magnitude of rebuilding Ukrainian infrastructure is beyond the capacity of Ukraine alone. The World Bank and European Commission recently estimated reconstruction in Ukraine will cost at least US$349 billion ($534 billion) to remediate damage already done in this war. This will require direct aid from multiple nations as well as EU and World Bank assistance.
It will be a task at a scale not seen thus far this country. And it will be an undertaking that must be transparent and fully accountable for the Ukrainian people and the international community.
A third issue for resolution will be the reconstruction of the Ukrainian military. Before the war, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were largely equipped with Soviet era weapons and equipment. During the war, they have begun a transition to NATO standards for logistics. They have also been armed with a hodgepodge of Western arms.
This might work for a short time in an existential fight, but it is unsustainable in the longer term. Effective military institutions require standardised equipment and training for simplicity and cost effectiveness.
To achieve this, the Ukrainian military has to be rearmed after this war with a NATO standard and affordable army and air force. While US Foreign Military Financing will be part of the solution in providing grants and loans to purchase US military equipment, all NATO countries may be required to play a role.
How Russians in Ukraine are treated
In every war, belligerents normally undertake activities that dehumanise their enemies. This serves to unify a population behind the war’s aims, and to make it easier for soldiers to kill their adversaries.
The Russo-Ukraine War is no different. The Russians have essentially treated Ukrainians as a sub-class of people to be abused, tortured, and exterminated, as seen in Bucha and Izyum.
But Ukraine, in calling Russian soldier ‘orcs’ has also engaged in dehumanising the Russian invaders. While this is an understandable and very human impulse, it does pose challenges for a post-war Ukraine that will still have Russian minority populations.
The data on ethnic Russians in Ukraine is fuzzy as the last Ukrainian census was conducted in 2001. Back then, a little over 17 per cent of respondents identified themselves as Russian.
In a post war Ukraine, the government will need to cater to its ethnic Russian citizens, roll back dehumanisation that might have occurred during the war, while also transparently dealing with ethnic Russians and Ukrainians who might have collaborated with Russian occupiers. It will be a difficult task.
This is just a small selection of the many tasks that will face the Ukrainian government in the wake of this war.
Other issues, such as trade and investment, dealing with the psychological effects of the war, unexploded ordinance and remnants of war, and the reintegration of hundreds of thousands of military veterans back into society will comprise a huge challenge for Ukrainian leaders. And while the focus now must be on winning this war, the magnitude of likely post-war tasks means that some planning for them will need to begin now. There is no time to lose.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.